[Aristotle's The Politics is a milestone in empirical political science. Aristotle demonstrated a remarkable emphasis on observation. Indeed, the classic Barker (1946) translation of The Politics begins with the word observation and an aspiration to scientific inquiry: "Observation shows us... Just as in all other fields, a compound should be analysed until we reach its simple and uncompounded elements (or, in other words, the smallest atoms of the whole which it constitutes), so we must also consider analytically the elements of which a polis is composed." Aristotle's focus on observation motivated him (almost all of responsibility was delegated) to collect an estimated 158 Greek Constitutions and gather information about non-Greek institutions (Barker 1958). He used this data to generalize about the types of government and to explain their behavior. The excerpts below include his comparison of the Cretan and Spartan (Lacedaemonian) constitutions and his analysis of what contributes to government effectiveness. The book was originally written around 330 B.C. and the excerpts are from an early 20th century translation by Jowett in the Internet Classic Archives, where the entire work is available.]
The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan [Lacedaemonian], and in some few points is quite as good; but for the most
part less perfect in form. The older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the later, and the
Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a very great measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition,
Lycurgus [Spartan legislator], when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charillus, went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete. For the
two countries are nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when
they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing among the inhabitants. Even to this day the
Perioeci, or subject population of Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos is supposed to have
enacted. The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well situated; it extends right
across the sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are settled; and while one end is not far from the
Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired
the empire of the sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others; at last he invaded Sicily, where he died
near Camicus.
The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots are the husbandmen of the
one [Sparta], the Perioeci of
the other [serfs in Crete], and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were anciently called by the
Lacedaemonians not 'phiditia' but 'andria'; and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that
the common meals originally came from Crete. Further, the two constitutions are similar; for the office of the
[Spartan] Ephors is the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are
ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the council. And the
kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war.
All classes share in the ecclesia [general assembly], but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders and the
Cosmi. The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one
pays so much per head, or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him to exercise the rights
of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth and cattle raised
on the public lands, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the Gods and to the
service of the state, and another to the common meals, so that men, women, and children are all supported out of
a common stock. The legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating, which he conceives to
be a gain; he likewise encourages the separation of men from women, lest they should have too many children,
and the companionship of men with one another- whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of
considering at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian there
can be no doubt.
On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without
the good. Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a
corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in
the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain
families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of those who have been Cosmi.
The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been already made about the Lacedaemonian
elders. Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their
own judgment, and dispensing with written law, is dangerous. It is no proof of the goodness of the institution
that the people are not discontented at being excluded from it. For there is no profit to be made out of the office as out
of the Ephoralty, since, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation.
The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close
oligarchy than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own
colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are allowed also to resign before their term of office has expired. Surely all
matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very unsafe rule. Worst of all is
the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not submit
to justice. This shows that the Cretan government, although possessing some of the characteristics of a
constitutional state, is really a close oligarchy.
The nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get together a party among the common people and their
own friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this but the temporary destruction of the state
and dissolution of society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack
her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation; distance has the same effect as the
Lacedaemonian prohibition of strangers; and the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the
Perioeci are contented in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But when lately foreign invaders
found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of the government
of Crete....
Book 6, Chapter 5
The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such a state, for any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. The legislator should therefore endeavor to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states; he should guard against the destructive elements, and should make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of states. He must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest. The demagogues of our own day often get property confiscated in the law-courts in order to please the people. But those who have the welfare of the state at heart should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned should not be public and go into the treasury but be sacred. Thus offenders will be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations; for it is the practice to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.
Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by a property tax and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies); where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid; and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy; measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or husbandry. And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies; and should in return be excused from useless public services. By administering the state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections of the people; their policy is from time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns, where they grow rich. It is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, they gain their good will. Moreover, they divide all their offices into two classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others by lot; the latter, that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot.
Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted.