Part IV: Values

Large file: Patience please

Coping and change can be accomplished through intrapersonal communication. Extensive research has been conducted related to the use of intrapersonal communication as a way of changing the self, changing behaviors, and coping. These articles examine several perspectives, including some spiritual implications of the intrapersonal communication process.

Communication and the Development of Self (Renee Edwards)

Imaging on the Go (Richard L. Weaver II and Howard W. Cotrell)

A Hierarchical Model Of Message Selection: The Filtering Affects Of Emotional Response (Larry R. Vinson) 

"How Embarrassing:" Intrapersonal Coping Mechanisms (Audra L. Colvert)

Cognitive Structuring for Uncertainty Reduction: Invariants Under Transformation (Maurine Eckloff)

Contemplation: The Art of Intrapersonal Communication (Tom Bruneau)

Intrapersonal Communication and Meditation (Thomas Baglan)

Indian Thought and the Intrapersonal Consequences of Speaking: Implications for Ethics in Communication (William Kirkwood)

Thinking About God: A Cognitive Science Perspective (Dale E. Gauthreaux)

 

Communication and the Development of Self

Renee Edwards

About the Author: Renee Edwards is a member of the faculty of the Department of Speech Communication, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-3923, telephone (504) 388-6821. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1993 meeting of the Speech Communication Association.

Abstract: This chapter reports a research project that examined communication factors that influence the development of self-concept. Impression management theory postulates that an individual's sense of self is a function of interactions with others. Hence, the type and number of communicative experiences experienced throughout childhood and adolescence should be related to the differentiation of self. However, too many experiences may restrict the development of self by preventing the individual from creating a core definition of self on which to build. Results of a study reveal that self-differentiation is positively associated with intimacy with extended family and continuity of childhood friendships, and negatively associated with family moves and school moves.


Perspective:

1. This article identifies some "variables" associated with self-differentiation, such as family moves and feeling close to relatives. What other kinds of childhood and adolescent experiences and communication are probably associated with greater self-differentiation?

2. This author proposes that a stable or core sense of self must exist before self-differentiation can occur. What are some characteristics of a "core sense of self"?

3. Based on this research, what should parents do (or not do) to enhance the self-differentiation of their children?

 

The notions of self and self-concept have permeated theory and research in communication (Greene & Geddes, 1988). Roberts, Edwards, and Barker (1987) discuss the self-concept as the center point from which all communication radiates. The self is the environment in which intrapersonal communication occurs (Barker & Edwards, 1980). These theorists propose that characteristics of the self influence the perceptions, cognitions and emotions that construct an individual's communicative actions.

Other researchers have extensively examined the consequences of features of the self on interpersonal communication. Communication apprehension (McCroskey & Richmond, 1987), interaction involvement (Cegala, 1981; Cegala, Savage, Brunner, & Conrad, 1982), and cognitive complexity (Burleson, 1987) are a few of the characteristics that have been shown to influence an individual's communicative skill as well as choice of communication partner or strategy. The lines of research concerning the "personality" features of self provide strong support for the argument that individual characteristics influence communication behavior.

Theorists and researchers concerned with the concept of self generally agree that most animals lack a notion of self (Gallup & Suarez, 1986); this conclusion is drawn largely from mirror recognition studies. These studies reveal, for example, that birds attack their reflections whereas other animals generally ignore theirs. Higher order primates, on the other hand, recognize themselves in mirrors. Chimpanzees learn to use mirrors for grooming purposes (Gallup & Suarez, 1986). Comparable research with human children has found that infants generally do not recognize themselves until eight to twelve months of age (Lewis, 1986). Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) found no relationship between the age of self-recognition and sex, amount of experience with mirrors, socio-economic status, maternal education, birth order, or number of siblings. However, they did find that children who are insecurely attached to their mothers recognize themselves at an earlier age than children who are securely attached. This suggests that the development of self (as measured by self-recognition) may be influenced by very early social relationships.

Self-concept develops throughout childhood and adolescence in extensiveness and complexity (Rosenberg, 1986). Very young children know whether they are male or female, but think that they can be the other when they grow up. Grade school children describe themselves in terms of concrete characteristics ("Celeste is my friend") whereas teenagers include abstract characteristics in their self-descriptions (e.g., honesty, friendliness).

Researchers from several perspectives have investigated the role of self for adults. Research has been concerned with how an individual's self is used to process information, with "personality" variables associated with various dimensions of self, with how dimensions of self influence communication and interpersonal relations, and with the processes by which an individual develops a self.

Research by Markus (1977, 1983; Markus & Smith, 1981) has examined how dimensions of self-concept are used to process information. Markus argues that individuals are "schematic" for particular traits that they perceive themselves to possess and which are important for them. For example, a man who is schematic for creativity is one who describes himself as "creative" and who rates creativity as being an important characteristic of himself. Another individual who perceives herself as creative but does not regard it as an important trait is not schematic for creativity. Markus' research has revealed that individuals who are schematic for a trait process relevant information more efficiently than individuals who are not relevant for that trait.

The interpersonal and communicative implications of self-concept have also been investigated. Ziller, Martell, and Morrison (1977) developed a notion of self-complexity, defined as the degree of differentiation of the self-concept. They argued that persons with complex self-concepts are multifaceted; they possess many characteristics that are important to them. As a result, complex individuals are more likely to be able to match a characteristic from their self-concept to a characteristic of another person and, consequently, they should be perceived more positively by others. Ziller and colleagues conducted two studies that supported this relationship. One study found a positive correlation between complexity and a self-report of social identification for college students. Another study examined popular and unpopular sixth-graders; this study strongly supported the hypothesisó results revealed that 49 out of 50 children could be correctly classified as popular or not based on their complexity score.

The communication effects of self-concept have also been examined in relationship to personal narratives. M. Shaw (1993) gave subjects a list of adjectives and asked them to check those that describe them. The subjects then told a story that was coded for the features of self-concept that it presented. M. Shaw found that the stories matched the subjects' own self-descriptions more than they matched the self-descriptions of composite targets and randomly selected subjects.

Finally, other research has examined the processes associated with the development of self. This research has generally been rooted in impression management theory and the notion that interactions with others form a basis for developing a sense of self. Mead (1934) described the development of self as part of a process of distinguishing between the self and others. Cooley (1902) proposed the concept of "looking-glass self," arguing that sense of self is derived from perceiving the self through the eyes of others.

As part of their research on complexity, Ziller et al. (1977) compared students with speech and hearing impairments to control students; they also compared terminally ill and chronically ill patients. They predicted that reduced social interaction for the impaired and terminally ill subjects would be associated with less complexity; results supported the predictions. In another test of self-development, Edwards (1990) examined the relationship between sensitivity to feedback and self-schematicism. Sensitivity to feedback is a "personality" dimension that concerns an individual's attentiveness to the feedback received from others. Self-schematicism was defined as the degree to which individuals rate personal traits as important to their sense of self. This research found a positive relationship between the variables and concluded that self-schematicism was a result of sensitivity to feedback.

The results of these investigations and impression management theory suggest that the quantity of interaction is an important factor determining the degree of self-development or differentiation. However, Leahy (1985) has argued that the role-taking that accompanies extensive social interaction may have a negative effect on personality in two ways. First, role-taking leads to the awareness of the self as an object in others' thoughts; this may lead to heightened self-consciousness particularly for adolescents. Second, role-taking permits an individual to focus on how the self does not "measure up" to one's own (or others') expectations or standards. Research suggests that higher intelligence, increasing age, and greater social competence are associated with a greater disparity between real and ideal self-image (Leahy, 1985). This argument suggests that extensive interaction may be disruptive to the development of self by preventing an individual from developing a core definition of self. Without a core sense of self, an individual may experience confusion or inconsistency with the peripheral features of self.

Current theory on childhood development assumes the notion that a stable and secure childhood is essential for proper development (Sigel, 1987). However, Peters and Kontos (1987) note that the importance of continuity has not been examined in the literature. At the family level, specific types of consistency that have received some consideration include consistency between attitudes and behaviors of parents (Palkovitz, 1987), consistency between father behaviors and mother behaviors (Palkovitz, 1987), and consistency of care between home and daycare (Long & Garduque, 1987). Other research has examined divorce as a disruptive event in childhood and its effect on development. Allison and Fursterberg (1989) found that children who are younger when their parents divorce suffer more negative effects.

The purpose of this study was to examine these issues by considering childhood and adolescent experiences and their effect on the self-concepts of young adults. Specifically, this research attempted to identify experiences and features of childhood and adolescence (e.g., family moves, school changes, relationships with relatives) that may be associated with greater or less self-differentiation in young adults.

Methods and Procedures

Subjects were 109 students under the age of 30 enrolled in communication classes at a large Southern university. The sample was 63% male and 37% female; the average age was 20.7 (s.d. = 2.01). Approximately 14% were freshmen, 28% sophomores, 29% juniors, and 30% seniors.

Subjects completed a five-page questionnaire during class time. Part 1 of the questionnaire requested information concerning social relationships: number of siblings, marital status of parents, closeness to other relatives, number of family moves, job status of mothers, number of times they switched schools, participation in school activities (measured with three items; Cronbach's alpha = .85), size of high school, television viewing, hobbies (measured with two items; Pearson r = .70), work experience (measured with two items; Pearson r = .53), and dating experience (measured with two items; Pearson r = .52).

Part 2 of the questionnaire assessed self-differentiation using the complexity scale (Ziller et al., 1977). This scale lists 109 adjectives and requests respondents to check all those that describe the self. The complexity score is the total number of adjectives checked. This measure is based on the notion that individuals who are more complex will describe themselves as possessing a greater number of characteristics. Consequently, it appears to tap a "breadth" dimension of the self-concept. Subjects in the present study selected an average of 34.50 adjectives to describe themselves using this instrument (s.d. = 14.24).

Part 3 of the questionnaire assessed self-differentiation using a version of the self-schematicism scale (Edwards, 1990). This scale uses a semantic differential format and requests respondents to rate themselves on 23 adjective pairs. Following each adjective pair, the subject is also asked to rate how important that particular characteristic is to the self-concept on a 9-point scale. The importance ratings are averaged to provide a measure of self-schematicism (Cronbach's alpha = .82 for the present study). This measure is based on Markus's (1977) notion that a self-definitional trait must be perceived as important in order to be considered schematic to the self. Consequently, this measure may tap a "depth" dimension of self-differentiation. The mean response in the present study was 6.43 (s.d. = .88).

Results

Social Relationships

The average number of siblings was 2.45 (s.d. = 2.03). The parents of 26% of the subjects were divorced, and subjects ranged from 1 to 19 years old when their parents divorced (M = 9.15, s.d. = 5.78). Thirty-three per cent of the subjects had a "second" family they spent time with. Forty-three percent felt close to 0-3 relatives; 32% felt close to 4-9 relatives; 13% felt close to 10-15 relatives; and 12% felt close to more than 15 relatives. Their families had not moved for about 50% of the sample; half of the remaining subjects had moved only once or twice. Sixty-two percent of the sample had mothers who worked outside the home. The average number of times that subjects had switched schools was 3.50 (s.d. = 2.00); this includes moving up from elementary to secondary school. Over 40% of the sample attended church regularly or often (answering 7 on a 7-point scale), with the remaining spread fairly evenly across the rest of the scale.

Relationships Between Self-Differentiation and Social Characteristics

The correlation between the two measures of self-differentiation, Ziller and colleagues' complexity scale and Edwards' self-schematicism scale, was .39 (p < .01) (because of the exploratory nature of the research, this and all remaining probability values are for two-tailed tests).

Self-Complexity. Self-complexity, as measured by the Ziller and colleagues scale, was positively correlated with the number of relatives the subjects felt close to (r = .23; p < .05) and with the extent to which subjects pursued hobbies they did alone (r = .38; p < .01). Complexity was not correlated with age, family size, number of family moves, number of schools attended, amount of TV viewing, age at which parents were divorced, amount of dating, activities, amount of work experiences, continuity of childhood friendships, or church attendance.

Males and females were not significantly different (t = -1.31, p > .10; Male M = 33.49; Female M = 37.15), but freshmen and seniors scored lower on self-complexity than sophomores and juniors in an analysis of class standing (F (3, 104) = 3.51, p < .02; Freshmen M = 32.53, s.d. = 13.90, n = 15; Sophomore M = 38.40, s.d. = 14.71, n = 30; Junior M = 38.19, s.d. = 12.59, n = 31; and Senior M = 28.78, s.d. 13.73, n = 32). Subjects who had a second family they felt close to scored significantly higher on self-complexity than those who did not (t = 2.65, p < .01; Yes M = 40.00, s.d. = 15.01, n = 34; No M = 31.96, s.d. = 13.33, n = 68.) Subjects with married parents were not significantly different from those with divorced parents, although the means are in the direction of greater complexity for those with married parents (t = .98, p > .30; Married M = 35.31, s.d. = 14.72, n = 78; Divorced M = 32.39, s.d. = 12.95, n = 28). Subjects whose mothers worked outside the home while they were growing up did not differ from those whose mothers did not (t = .70, p > .40; Yes M = 35.22, s.d. = 15.05, n = 68; No M = 33.31, s.d. = 12.88; n = 41).

Self-schematicism. Self-schematicism, as measured by the Edwards (1990) scale, was negatively correlated with the number of times the family had moved (r = -.27, p < .01), with the number of times subjects had changed schools (r = -.26; p < .01), and with the subjects' age at which their parents were divorced (r = -.46, p < .05). Schematicism was positively correlated with subjects' amount of dating (r = .21, p < .05), with how regularly they attended church (r = .25, p < .01), and with the degree of continuity they ascribed to their childhood (r = .20, p < .05; greater continuity of friendships was positively correlated with schematicism). No correlations were found for the relationships between schematicism and family size, age, number of relatives subjects felt close to, amount of television viewing, hobbies, activities, or work experience.

Females were significantly more schematic than males (t = -2.65, p < .01; Female M = 6.73, s.d. = .83, n = 36; Male M = 6.25, s.d. = .89, n = 62), but class standing did not affect schematicism (F (3, 99) = .17; p > .50). Subjects with "second families" were not more schematic than those without, although the means were in the same direction as for the significant difference for complexity (t = 1.32, p > .19; With M = 6.58, s.d. = .86, n = 31; Without M = 6.33, s.d. = .89, n = 66). Subjects with married and divorced parents did not differ (t = .62, p > .50; Married M = 6.46, s.d. = .83, n = 76; Divorced M = 6.33, s.d. = 1.01; n = 25), nor did those with working and nonworking mothers (t = .61, p > .50; Working M = 6.47, s.d. = .86, n = 64; Non-working M = 6.36, s.d. = .92, n = 40).

Canonical Correlation

A canonical correlation was performed between the two measures of self-differentiation and the childhood experiences that were measured at the interval level. The canonical correlation was significant (Hotellings = .60, approximate F = 2.03, p < .005). The social characteristics that most strongly correlated with the canonical variable were age (with a correlation of -.40 with the canonical variable), school moves (r = -.34), church attendance (r = .45), tv (r = -.25), continuity of friendships (r = .32), activities (r = .57), hobbies (r = .55), and dating (r = .39).

Discussion

The present research reveals some intriguing insights into the relationship between childhood or adolescent experiences and self-differentiation. Self-complexity and self-differentiation were only somewhat correlated and were, in general, related to different childhood and adolescent experiences. Complexity, as measured by the Ziller and colleagues scale (1977), was positively associated with the number of relatives subjects felt close to, their pursuit of hobbies, and having a second family. Freshmen and seniors scored lower on complexity than sophomores and juniors. Self-schematicism, measured by the Edwards (1990) scale, was positively associated with dating, church attendance, and amount of continuity associated with childhood friendships. It was negatively associated with age at which parents were divorced, number of family moves, and number of school changes. Females were more self-schematic than males.

Several factors may account for the relationship between complexity and self-schematicism. Both purport to measure self-differentiation, but they possess a low correlation and are associated with different clusters of social variables. One possibility is that they both tap self-differentiation, but for different domains of personal characteristics. Each measure asks subjects to respond to a list of adjectives that could describe them. The complexity scale lists 109 adjectives and the schema scale lists 23 adjective pairs (adjectives and their polar opposites such as "liberal-conservative"). The lists do not overlap substantiallyó only four of the 46 adjectives on the self-schema scale appear among the 109 adjectives of the complexity scale. In addition, neither list includes characteristics that may be important for many individuals (e.g., athletic, religious). If this explanation is valid, a linear combination of the two variables would be a better measure of differentiation than would either variable individually. This was tested with the canonical correlation. The canonical correlation revealed correlations with some variables that overlapped with the univariate correlations. In addition, it revealed correlations with tv viewing, activities, and age; none of these were identified by the univariate tests. This result supports the notion that a linear combination of self-complexity and self-schematicism may be a better measure of self-differentiation than either variable individually.

Another possibility is that the variables may also tap some other dimension of self, such as self-esteem. Both measures have been used successfully in previous research, but there is a greater body of research to support the validity of the complexity scale. Only one study has supported the predictive validity of the self-schematicism scale. Both measures have face validity, but the complexity scale is substantially easier for subjects to complete. The self-schematicism scale is more complicated; subjects must make two ratings for each characteristic (one concerning how true it is of them; the second concerning how important it is to their sense of self). This complex procedure may be advantageous in that respondents must think more deeply about themselves. In the present study, complexity was associated with fewer of the childhood and adolescent experiences than was self-schematicism. In the present study, self-schematicism was correlated with more experiences, and thus may possess greater predictive value. However, this conclusion is moderated by the specific findings of the present study.

The findings suggest that stability of childhood experiences was more associated with schematicism than were varied social experiences. Greater continuity in childhood friendships, regular church attendance, having parents divorce at an older age, few family moves, and few school changes were associated with greater schematicism. The correlation with dating may even reflect stability; the items on the questionnaire addressed amount of dating experience but not variety or stability of partners. Subjects who dated a lot may have had only one or two "serious" boy or girlfriends rather than a variety of romantic partners. The comparison of High and Low differentiated groups parallels the finding that greater stability is associated with greater differentiation.

The conclusion that differentiation is more associated with stability than with the variety of social experience raises several issues. The first is that schematicism and complexity may not be measures of self-differentiation, as discussed earlier. Symbolic interaction theory would predict that greater variety would be associated with greater differentiation, not the opposite. A second possibility is that current or recent experiences are more important in predicting self-differentiation than are childhood experiences. Thus the present study found that complexity was not correlated with many childhood experiences, but was correlated with the number of close relatives, with having a second family, and with class standing. The lives of sophomores and juniors may call for greater differentiation than the lives of freshmen and seniors. Subjects who felt close to more relatives or who had a second family in childhood may continue those relationships and present different "selves" in them.

A third possibility is that there is a moderating variable attenuating the relationship between childhood experiences and self-differentiation. This variable may relate to having a core sense of self, knowing oneself, or feeling that one has a "true" self. The core self may be the foundation necessary for differentiation, and it may result from a stable, predictable childhood. This possibility is certainly consistent with childhood development theory which emphasizes the importance of secure relationships in childhood (Peters & Kontos, 1987). These secure relationships, followed by a variety of social experiences, may be the foundation for a successfully differentiated self.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

Considering that the self and self-concept have been so central in intrapersonal communication theory, it is striking to note that the construct under study here, differentiation of self, is far from well understood. As the author points out, two measures of self-differentiationó complexity and self-schematismó have a low correlation. The reasons for this finding remain speculative. Hence, one must wonder why intrapersonal communication theory persists in maintaining that the self and self concept are central to intrapersonal communication.

 

Imaging On The Go

Richard L. Weaver II and Howard W. Cotrell

About the Authors: Richard L. Weaver II (Ph. D., Indiana University, 1969) is a professor of Interpersonal Communication at Bowling Green State University. His publications include 30 books (including all editions), 100 articles, a dozen chapters, and ten speeches in print. His books Communicating Effectively (with Saundra Hybels) and Understanding Interpersonal Communication are among the most popular in their respective areas. Howard W. Cotrell (M. S., Purdue University, 1967) is an associate professor and Assistant Director for Instructional Development in Instructional Media Services at Bowling Green. With Richard L. Weaver II, he has written and published more than thirty-five articles in the area of instructional communication and instructional development.

Abstract: To image is to create a material picture in the mind which can be scanned by a person as she or he would scan a real current event in her or his environment. Imaging has numerous functions. Some of these include doing it for fun and flexibility, for aesthetic awareness, to tune in, for evaluating, to make improvements, for basic enlightenment, or for synergistic consciousness. Five suggestions are included that may help increase imaging skills. It is not a special, unique, or extraordinary procedure involving relaxation, technical preparation, or meditation. It can be practiced daily in all situations we encounter.

Perspective:

1. On what human characteristics is our ability to image based? Why can some people image more easily than others? Are there differences between men and women in their ability to image? Why or why not?

2. Are the suggestions for increasing imaging ability reasonable and practical? What advantages are there in increasing one's imaging ability?

 

The problem was an ugly, odd-shaped set tub in a downstairs bathroom. To cover it required envisioning a box shape and mentally enclosing the bottom, much like a vanity, putting a door in the front to hide the pipes below the tub and for a place to hide pails, sponges, and cleaning fluids. The top required picturing the top of the box hinged at the back to cover the entire sink and faucet handles and yet easy to lift and lower as needed. When lowered, the top provided a surface to place toilet articles, towels for showering, and clothes. It was the image of the completed work that motivated the construction and that resulted in the finished product.

In another situation, authors were having difficulty coming up with ideas for an article. They left the computer, went to town, and wandered the isles of a hardware store. There, they searched their new surroundings for everything that struck them as unique, personally meaningful, or interesting. With their minds open to new sensations and stimulations, they were able to allow the colors, shapes, textures, and patterns to provoke, even entice, their thinking. Ideas flowed.

When leaving home to run a number of errands, the driver mentally plotted the route she would take as she drove from the driveway. Since she needed gas and money to run the other errands, she made the gas station and bank early stops; thus, these places provided the initial direction. Then it was a matter of determining the relationship of the other places we needed to go and how they were most efficiently interconnected by car.

In each of these cases, imaging was used to create a mental picture of the structure, the ideas stimulated, or the map that was followed. The first example about the set tub, although mundane and commonplace by comparison, is not unlike the imaging by F. K. von Stradonitz just before and during the illumination that led to the structure of the carbon ring, which became the foundation of organic chemistry:

I turned my chair to the fire and dozed. Again the atoms were gamboling before my eyes. The smaller groups kept modestly in the background. My mental eye, rendered more acute by visions of this kind, could now distinguish larger structures of manifold conformations, long rows sometimes more closely fitted together, all twining and twisting in snake-like motion. But look! What was that? One of the snakes had seized hold of its tail and the form whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash of lightning I awoke. (von Stradonitz cited in Koestler, 1964, p. 118)

The second example above, about picking up ideas by walking through a hardware store, is similar to one that Alex Osborn relates in his book, Applied Imagination (1963):

If you know what ideas you are hunting, a lonely walk may help a lot. But if you have no set creative aim, and want only to expose your mind to ideas, a walk through busy marts may . . . help. I asked a friend of mine why he wore a cane when visiting New York. 'I come to New York to get ideas,' said he, 'I don't want to think about my own business while here, so I carry a cane to make me feel that I am not working. My grindstone back home tends to close my mind. Here, with wide-open mind, I can walk along Fifth Avenue and Broadway and can pick up ideas which will help me when I discard my cane and become a manufacturer again (p. 222).

The third example above, mapping out a strategy and then following it, is not unlike the pre-planning reported in Time magazine (1984). According to the article, Sheriff Johnny France went after Don and Dan Nichols, wanted for the July, 1984, kidnapping of Kari Swenson, a member of the U. S. biathlon team. The Nichols had eluded lawmen in the remote Montana wilderness near Bozeman. Sheriff France admitted that imaging had taken place prior to the pursuit. Following the capture he said, "I had rehearsed this capture for a long time. I had dreamed of it, and everything I did was just as if I'd been there before" (Time, 1984, p. 21).

The point of these examples is not in their uniqueness but in their familiarity. We image like this a great deal. It is commonplace, comfortable, and natural.

In the following pages we will first define imaging. Second, we will discuss its function as an ongoing, omnipresent, practical tool for coping with everyday events and situations. Finally, we will offer suggestions for expanding the use of imaging-on-the-go to gain further insights and stimulation.

Definition

The word eidetic comes from the Greek word eidetikos, constituting a figure, from eidos meaning what is seen or the shape of something. Eidetic, then, designates mental images that are unusually vivid and almost photographically exact (Webster's, 1983, p. 580). This definition indicates why the eidetic image offers, perhaps, the most complete foundation for understanding and using the imaging process.

Ahsen's work on eidetics provides an excellent orientation as well as a more concrete definition than the one offered above. In "Eidetics: An Overview," (1977), Ahsen states that the eidetic image is "a material picture in the mind which can be scanned by the person as he [or she] would scan a real current event in his [or her] environment, and as a potent, highly significant stimulus which arises from within the mind and throws it into a series of self-revealing imagery effects" (p. 5). Notice how Ahsen blends the physical and mental, which is also highlighted in his Triple Code or ISM Model of imagery: I (imagery); S (somatic response); M (meaning) (See Ahsen, 1984 for a fuller discussion). Ahsen's is a holistic concept of imaging. For our purposes, his main contribution is pointing out that our ability to mentally reproduce images with such a high degree of sensory realism allows us to interact with them as if they were real objects.

In Imagery and Creative Imagination, Khatena (1984) further explains the eidetic image:

Other attributes [of the eidetic image] are its emerging more clearly during alert consciousness and amendable to voluntary control, healthy orientation, depth of meaning, stability and tendency towards a systematic profession of experience relevant to the central nucleus of the image, as more details appear with repetition of the eidetic. Furthermore, its spatial nature progresses to create thought. (pp. 12-13)

Because it is unlikely we will be able to separate the different kinds of imaging when they occur, and because they are likely to overlap and interact, we will briefly mention two other types of imaging and several subtypes. (Khatena, 1984, pp. 12-14) Memory imaging involves retrieving from storage images associated with the past or present or even anticipated future events and experiences, thoughts, and actions. Memory images are vivid and controllable. Imagination imaging involves images that are novel, substantial, brightly colored, and sharp. Usually they have no particular context, occasion, or personal reference.

Imagination imaging has been described by a number of different terms. Hypnogogic imaging may occur in the twilight state between wakefulness and sleep. Hypnopompic imaging may occur in the drowsy state between sleeping and waking. Creative imaging is that usually experienced by artists, poets, scientists, and other productive people. We are dealing with auditory and visual imagery, but we do not exclude the other sensory images or emotional imagery as well. All imaging has value, but its value is likely to be personal just as its rewards are likely to be different according to those who use it.

Functions

Clearly, this section could be limitless with respect to the functions of imaging because it is a personal process and is likely to serve as many purposes as those who practice and use it. Our point is more than simply suggestive. Our point is that effective imaging does not require relaxation, meditation, extensive practice, or the use of sophisticated and complex processes for effectiveness. We are not saying that these cannot be used; we are simply saying they are not required. Imaging, as noted above, is an ongoing, omnipresent, practical tool for coping with everyday events

Imaging can be used in anticipation of events or circumstances. It can be used to gain feedback. It can be used in reality acquisitionóto try to get us closer to objective reality. It can be used as a reality deterrent, tooóto try to get us away from reality. A reality deterrent may allow the imager to attain a different frame of reference. It can be used for fluencyójust to keep us involved and in touch. And it can be used spiritually as well. We will mention imaging for fun and flexibility, aesthetic awareness, tuning in, evaluating, improvements, basic enlightenment, and synergistic consciousness.

Fun and Flexibility

Imaging allows us to be imaginative, lighthearted, humorous, playful, and maybe even a little crazy. How easy it is to view the world in fanciful ways. Using imaging when waiting for a bus or meeting, doing the dishes or cleaning the house, walking or jogging, mowing the lawn or washing the car could relieve boredom, add a dash of playfulness, make such mundane experiences more interesting and entertaining, and boost ability to come up with creative new ideas. We are likely to add to our fun and flexibility when we image the following possibilities:

See everything as alive.

Think up past and future reincarnations (forms, versions, renderings, or interpretations) for things around us.

Dream up alternative meanings for the things and events around us.

Interpret things and events as the reverse of what we normally think they are.

Image new uses for things around us.

View the world as if you were an animal, a thing, or a small child.

See everything as randomly thrown together, and create a new structure or set of relationships between things.

Think of poetic imagery to express what we perceive in our surroundings.

Look for something humorous in everything we notice.

Regard whatever we're doing as a game, or figure out some way to make it a game.


Aesthetic Awareness

This involves using imaging to discover and appreciate beauty in things as they are. We can create aesthetic experiences for ourselves anytime we choose to do it. Although we all recognize the truth that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, often we do not recognize or appreciate the implications of this aphorismóthat we can train ourselves to experience beauty whenever and in whatever we wish. For some, finding beauty in puddles, rusty fences, shadows, clouds, rustling leaves, telephone poles, and crushed cans is a natural, normal experience. For others, these opportunities might add freshness and aesthetic delight to normal experiencing. We can create aesthetic awareness, by imaging the following:

Search our surroundings for everything that strikes us as beautiful or aesthetically interesting.

Look for scenes in our surroundings that would make great photographs.

View everyday things as if they were art exhibits.

Experience the world as a collection of abstract forms.

Find special or unique value in everything we notice.

Judge the degree of beauty in our surroundings using many different criteria.

Regard everything as a possible inspiration for a new work


Tuning In


Imaging to tune in involves increasing insight into what is present around us. Sometimes getting the most from an event or situation means learning more about it or integrating it with our wealth of already-present knowledge. We casually observe so many things in our surroundings that would prove fascinating if we took the time to examine them more carefully. Benefits might include increased competence, boosted arousal, and heightened understanding. To tune in, we need to image the following:

Notice things we normally wouldn't.

Search for boring things, then look for something interesting about them.

Figure out what the things and places around us communicate.

Think about the probable past and future of things we notice.

Think of something as the title of a book and image what the book might include.

Image what's going on inside each thing we notice.

Think about what we would most like to know about the people or things we encounter.


Evaluating

Evaluating involves judging something in relation to some standard or criterion. One of our unique abilities is that we can consciously choose what basis or criterion to use in making evaluations. To aid in evaluating, we might image the following possibilities:

Use unusual units of comparison to evaluate people and things around us.

Look at the world through different value systems.

Engage in an orgy of evaluation.

Figure out the cultural values implied by things around.


Improvements

This process involves imaging things as we would like them to be. These will be images of desirable future possibilities, rather than pure fantasy. Such imaging is likely to add to feelings of creativity and competence, but also it will alert us to problems and possibilities in whatever we focus on. It prepares us to take constructive action. To practice imaging for improvements, we could image some of the following possibilities:

Image improvements in already pleasant things around us.

Think up actions that would lead to improvements we image.

Image run-down things as if they were already improved.

Image what it took for these run-down things to become improved.


Basic Enlightenment

Enlightenment has many meanings. Most involve a spiritual or religious connotation. Often, it is thought of as a state of fantastically expanded consciousness, oneness with God, universal consciousness, or unimaginable bliss. Here, however, we are thinking of enlightenment as a way of experiencing that maximizes joy and fulfillment (Weaver & Cotrell, 1992). To increase basic enlightenment, we can image the following:

Think of every moment as an opportunity.

Regard whatever we're doing, thinking, or feeling as if it were our hobby.

Think of things we can learn from whatever we encounter.

For any problematic situation, focus on what we are doing and especially on what we can do.

Regard everything as perfect exactly the way it is each moment.

Imaging in these ways can be energizing and satisfying. To image in these ways makes each moment an opportunity for enriching life.

Synergistic Consciousness

Synergy refers to combined action. This occurs when contributions reinforce or compliment each other. More than any other, this type of imaging means thinking holistically, valuing the well-being of all people, and being eager to join with others to come up with creative solutions to problems and disagreements. To use imaging for synergistic consciousness, try some of the following:

Contemplate the total situation in which we are enmeshed.

Define conflicts in terms of underlying needs instead of incompatible solutions.

Look for points in other people's ideas to build on.

Think of our own and other people's ideas as gifts or invitations.

Think of superordinate goals that would resolve conflicts and excite enthusiasm.

Image what it would feel like to be the entire universe.

Think of all the interrelations we can that somehow connect things, people, and events around us to each other.

Image changes in the world that would make it easier for all of us to experience life joyfully. Image in detail how we would behave as an openly cooperative, creative, information-seeking and information-sharing, synergistic sort of person.


Suggestions

Because imaging skills differ so radically between people, the methods for increasing imaging ability are likely to differ radically as well. Ours must be accepted as suggestions only. They may help in increasing imaging skills, but there are no guarantees.

First, think of imaging as an easy, natural, comfortable process that requires no special or technical skill.

Second, do not think of imaging simply as something that requires relaxation, elaborate stress-reduction techniques, or meditation We are not saying these cannot be used; we are simply saying they are not necessary to effective imaging.

Third, try to avoid jumping to conclusions and making split second decisions. Allow time for imaging to work. We tend to be verbal animals. Be more patient. Count to ten. Back off. Try to image the situation as an outsider. Gain distance from the event or situation through time and space. This may give you more opportunity to image.

Fourth, think of imaging as a kind of inner movie. You, however, are the writer, the producer, the director, and the choreographer. You can play all of the characters, and you can choose the dialogue and how the characters interact with each other. Imaging is an act of conscious and deliberate creating through the vehicle of mental imagery.

Fifth, realize that we get better at imaging as we do it. It is like almost anything, practicing increases both skill and learning. Composers are not born with the ability to write great music; they acquire it through teaching and practice. Writers are not born with the ability to write great literature; they acquire it through teaching, practice, trial, and error. With practice, their skill improves. The more we practice imaging, the more situations that it is practiced in, and the more we apply the results to our lives, the better we will become at it.

Summary

Perhaps there is still some concern about why the process of imaging is important or beneficial. Imaging gives us access to part of our brain that we infrequently use in a conscious way. It is a key that we have for unlocking the unconscious mind. Although this is true, to think of imaging in this way alone also is limiting. Imaging is a way for gaining further information and insight as we have tried to demonstrate throughout this article.

Also, words and images work together. This gives us a depth of meaning that would be impossible with just one or the other alone. Once again, images are supplying meanings. But what is going on is more important than simply the relationship between the verbal and the images. Images open the door to inner knowing. They are a separate symbol system with their own code and meaning. Thus, through imaging we are likely to experience different kinds of material, information, and knowledge.

In these pages we have defined imaging, offered a few of its functions, and made several suggestions for increasing imaging skills. We have tried to show how imaging is not a special, unique, or extraordinary procedure involving relaxation techniques, elaborate and technical preparation, or meditation. It can be practiced on a daily basis and in all situations we encounter. In these cases, then, it is truly imaging on the go.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

The critical reader may ask: What reason do I have to believe that imaging is useful for me? Why should I focus on my imaging or make any changes in it? How do I know that I can change my imaging?

 

A Hierarchical Model of Message Selection: The Filtering Affects of Emotional Response

Larry R. Vinson

About the Author: Larry R. Vinson is an associate professor of Communication, McNeese State University, P. O. Box 90420, Lake Charles, LA 70609

Abstract: Dr. Vinson provides a way of conceptualizing message selection in which the emotional response affects preference either through habit or conscious thought. An earlier version of this article was presented at the national meeting of the Speech Communication Association, 1993. 

Hunter and Boster (1987) supported a unidimensional model of compliance-gaining message selection. According to their model this selection process is that the selector of the message compares her expectation of the receiver's emotional response to the message with her (the selector's) emotion threshold. If the expected emotional response of the receiver falls below the threshold, is too negative, the message is rejected and if it falls above the threshold the message is accepted. Vinson and Biggers (In Press), using Mehrabian and Russell's (1974) three factor model of emotional response, showed that the expected emotional response of the selector is a better predictor of compliance-gaining message selection than the expected emotional response of the receiver.

In their discussion Vinson and Biggers (In Press) called for more research into the message selection process. These authors noted that their data was consistent with a hierarchical model of message selection. This hierarchical model holds that emotional response acts as a filter in the selection process by affecting the repertoire of messages available for selection. This repertoire is then further filtered by higher order processes such as liking, preference, or attitudes until one message is selected. By examining each processing level and its relationship to the other levels, our ability to explain and predict message selection and use should be enhanced. The purpose of this article is to outline this hierarchical model and to expose it to two experimental opportunities for falsification.

A Model of Emotional Response

Prior to any explication of this hierarchical model of message selection the theoretical and operational definitions of emotional response used in this article must be clearly promulgated. Research and theory development conducted individually and jointly by J. Russell and A. Mehrabian has produced a three factor theory of emotional response which has been shown to be valid with reliable measuring instruments (e.g., Mehrabian, 1980; Russell, 1978; Russell & Mehrabian, 1974). The theory suggests that, at its most primary level, emotional response can be described with three independent dimensions; pleasure-displeasure, arousal-nonarousal, and dominance-submissiveness (Mehrabian, 1976; Mehrabian, 1980; Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Russell & Mehrabian, 1974a; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975; Russell, 1978; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977).

Pleasure-displeasure is a continuum ranging from extreme pain or unhappiness to extreme happiness or ecstasy (Mehrabian, 1980). The dimension is measured by adjective pairs like happy-unhappy, pleased-annoyed, or satisfied-unsatisfied (Mehrabian, 1981).

The arousal-nonarousal dimension refers to a combination of alertness and activity. High arousal would be characterized by both high activity and high alertness. Moderate arousal might have middle level values for both activity and alertness, high levels of alertness with low activity or low alertness with high activity (Mehrabian, 1980). The dimension is measured with such terms as stimulated-relaxed, frenzied-sluggish or wide-awake-sleepy (Mehrabian, 1981).

Dominance-submissiveness ranges from extreme feelings of being controlled or influenced to feelings of mastery and control. The dimension is captured with terms like controlling-controlled, in control-cared for, and autonomous-guided (Mehrabian, 1981).

The three dimensions combine to predict responses to a higher order construct variously called liking, preference, and attitude. Positive attitude and preference mean liking while negative attitude and lack of preference mean disliking (Mehrabian, 1978; Mehrabian & Russell, 1974). Liking relates systematically to a behavioral variable called approach-avoidance. Approach includes any expression of preference, liking or positive attitude. It also includes movement toward as opposed to away from, degree of exploration, eye contact, looking toward, turning toward, leaning toward or touching. As liking increases approach increases. If the stimulus induces disliking then avoidance will result (Mehrabian, 1981). With this model of emotional response in place the hierarchical model of message selection can be presented.

A Hierarchical Model of Message Selection

Figure One illustrates this model. The triangular shape of the message selection process

represents the restricting effects of the selection process as it moves from bottom to top. At the lowest level, the selector's emotional response serves to filter the messages available for use. Next, emotional response affects a higher order construct referred to as preference or liking which further reduces the message options. At this point selection may occur. This level of message selection is habitual and thus not consciously controlled. The circle to the left of the triangle represents conscious thought. It is disconnected with the triangle to represent the fact that message selection may occur without conscious thought (the habitual selection process). The oval coming off the conscious thought circle extends conscious thought into the message selection process. This communicates the fact that an individual may consciously choose a specific message strategy. For this model to be accurate several assumptions must be tenable.

ïTenet 1: Emotional response can occur without conscious processing.

In the seminal article, "Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences" (1980), Zajonc argued that emotional responses can occur without cognition (conscious information processing). Zajonc defined preconscious affective responses as preferences. Preferences are reflected in such questions as "Do you like your speech class?", "How do you feel about President Clinton?", "Which outfit do you like the most?" Preferences are those emotional reactions which underlie approach-avoidance responses. Recall this article's model which defines preference as a higher order construct generated from emotional responses. This position is consistent with the one developed by Zajonc.

Research defining the neurological loci of emotions also shows that emotion can occur prior to conscious processing. For example, Cannon (1927) and Papez (1938) each identified the limbic system as the emotional brain while conscious thought is known to occur because of higher order cortical processes (Leventhal, & Tomarken, 1986).

ïTenet 2: Pleasure affects the repertoire of messages available for use.

Although the exact modus operandi of mood and memory affects remains controversial, the fact that an individual's emotional state affects memory is nearly axiomatic (Leventhal & Tomarken 1986; Thayer, 1989). One example of the relationship between affective state and memory is the theory of State Dependent Memory (cf. Bower, 1981). This theory holds that perceptions and memories are partially associated with affective states. As these states shift, cognitive elements associated with these states become more or less available to conscious awareness. Thus, emotional state acts as a filter affecting the availability of cognitive elements. The cognitive elements of interest in the present research are message strategies.

An examination of the methodologies used in Bower's research clearly showed that the level of pleasure was being manipulated (cf. Bower, 1981). Thus, an individual's level of pleasure may be said to affect the repertoire of message strategies readily available for use. The assumption here is that differing levels of pleasure make different sets or repertoires of messages available for use. More specifically, that an individual will have a different set of messages available for use when she or he is happy (high pleasure) as compared with when she or he is angry (low pleasure). If this argument is correct one would predict that:

Hypothesis One:

The mean scores of likelihood to use measures for a given repertoire of message strategies will vary according to the level of pleasure reported by the selector.

ïTenet 3: Arousal affects message selection by restricting the number of strategies available within given repertoire.

This hierarchical model argues that pleasure affects the repertoire of messages available for use while arousal then restricts the

Figure 1

Model of Message Selection Hierarchy

number of strategies available within any given repertoire. Research shows that some level of physiological arousal is needed for message selection to occur (Vinson, 1986). Many of us have experienced being very tired and the resultant difficulty with finding the needed word(s). As arousal increases the number of strategies is restricted until at very high levels of arousal the restriction is so great it is hard to find any words at all. If this argument is correct then one should find:

 

Figure 2

Visual Depiction of the Size of Reprertoires

Hypothesis two:

(A) A significant negative correlation will be found between arousal and the likelihood of selecting message scores within the repertoire of messages from which an individual may select.

(B) No significant correlation will be found between arousal and the likelihood of selecting message scores within the set of messages which lie outside of the individual's repertoire.

To test these hypotheses, two studies were designed and conducted.

STUDY #1

Method

Participants. Four-hundred and eight students enrolled in communication courses at a mid-sized southern university participated in this study (Female 252, Male 156).

Table 1

Factor Analysis of Emotion Scales

Items in scaleFactor OneFactor TwoFactor Three

PleasureDominanceArousal

1. Happy-Unhappy*.97-.01 .01

2. Pleased-Annoyed*.97-.01-.06

3. Stimulated-Relaxed-.51-.03 .52

4. Jittery-Dull-.16-.26*.67

5. Controlling-Controlled .06*.77-.27

6. Satisfied-Unsatisfied*.98 .01-.04

7. Dominant-Submissive-.17*.76-.03

8. Excited-Calm .15 .17*.79

9. Influential-Influenced .10*.80 .20

* meets .6-. .39 criteria for factor definition

Stimulus Materials. Stimulus materials were presented in a packet of written materials. This packet included two sections which were randomly ordered. The packets were introduced with the following instructions:

Participants then were exposed to one of two sections, an angry or happy manipulation. For example, they would read, "Now we want you to remember the most recent time that you were very happy! Take a moment and recall what it felt like." Recollection of past emotionally charged events has been shown to induce emotion changes

which are consistent with the emotion of the events (e.g. ., Thayer, 1987). These instructions were followed, on the same page, by Mehrabian and Russell's (1974a) emotion scales (see Table 1). This served as a manipulation check and it helped reinforce the emotion manipulation. The next two pages of the packet included, in random order, two scenarios. One scenario was a compliance gaining situation:

These instructions were followed by nine compliance-gaining responses (See Table 2). The other situation was a responding style scenario:

These instructions were followed by seven types of responses (Vinson, 1990, see Table 3). The other section of the packet was the emotion manipulation for anger. The instructions and scenarios in this section were identical with those in the section described above except the word angry was substituted for the word happy.

Procedure. Packets were randomly ordered in two ways. The two sections (angry or happy) were randomly ordered and the order of the two scenarios was randomized. These packets were then administered to intact classes. Participants were asked to read the instructions carefully and to complete packets.

Data Analyses. The data were analyzed using the SPSSX (1990) statistical package. Data were checked for out of range scores using the program frequencies. Factor structures were explored using principle components extraction and varimax rotation. Hypothesis one was tested using

Table 2

Compliance-Gaining Messages

(1) I would say something like, I wish I could get my new jacket but I am short the money. This way I could remind my friend to pay.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(2) I would not exactly tell the truth but would say something like, I need the money to buy my father a birthday present.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(3) I would ask for my money back.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(4) I would say: Are you going to be able to pay me the $50 that you borrowed? Do you know when?

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(5) I would explain that I need the money because something has come up.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(6) I would say that I am in some kind of trouble and need the $50.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(7) I would ask very nicely for the money back and explain that I didn't want to be pushy but things have come up and it can't be helped.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(8) I would just say that $50 was borrowed from me and I need it back.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(9) I would tell my friend that it is owed to me, that I won't loan anything else unless it is paid back.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

RESPONDING STYLES MESSAGES

(1) You should go to school it will pay off in the long run.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(2) You're a good person, everything will work out.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(3) That's not such a big problem.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(4) Sounds to me like you just can't make a decision.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(5) What do you want to do ?

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(6) You sound really frustrated about this.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

(7) I'd tell my friend that I couldn't talk about this right now.

Very Likely____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____Very Unlikely

 

the program MANOVA (multivariate analysis of variance). The statistical demarcation of .05 was set for rejection of the null hypothesis while power set at .99 with a moderate effect size (.25) required a per cell N of 148 (Cohen, 1969). This study had 204 per cell.

Results

Data Preparation. The factor structures of the manipulation check and the two dependent variables were identified. A criteria of loading at least .6 on one factor and not more than .39 on any other factor was established.

The factor analysis of the emotional response data (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974, the manipulation check data) showed the expected three factor model (72.9% of variance explained; see Table 1). The level of pleasure was the variable of interest for this study. Thus, the three items measuring pleasure were averaged and used in the subsequent manipulation check. If the manipulation of emotion (angry-happy) was successful one would expect that the levels of pleasure reported for each section

Table 3

Factor analysis of compliance-gaining messages

MessagesFactor/Factor/Factor/

Repertoire OneRepertoire TwoRepertoire Three

**1.-.09.06.46

2..01.07*.82

3.-.16.35.32

4..59.42-.44

5..12*.83.10

6..39.16*.75

7.-.26*.81.12

8.*.87-.03.03

9.*.83-.33.07

* meets .6-.39 criteria for factor definition

** see Table 3 for wording of each message strategy

of the study would correspond to the manipulation (i.e., the happy section would be rated significantly more pleasurable than the angry section). A one-way analysis of variance showed that the manipulation of emotion (anger & happy) worked (F(1,406)=11441, P<.00001: Happy mean = 8.52, standard deviation = .66; Angry mean = 1.53, standard deviation = .67).

The factor analyses of the two dependent variables (compliance-gaining message strategies and responding styles) were done to determine the repertoires of message strategies. For the compliance-gaining scenario, using the .6-.39 criteria, three factors or repertoires were defined explaining 62.5% of the variation (see Table 3). Items eight and nine were identified as repertoire one, items five and seven were identified as repertoire two, and items two and six were identified as repertoire three. The items defining each repertoire were averaged and used in the subsequent test of hypothesis one.

For the responding styles scenario, using the .6-.39 criteria, two factors or repertoires were defined explaining 50% of the variation (see Table 4). Items two, six, and seven identified repertoire one, and items three and four identified repertoire two. The items defining each repertoire were averaged and used in the subsequent test of hypothesis one. In sum, a total of five repertoires were defined for the two scenarios.

 

Hypothesis One

Hypothesis one predicted that the mean scores of likelihood to use measures for a given repertoire of message strategies would vary according to the level of pleasure reported by the selector.

This hypothesis was tested by contrasting the mean likelihood of use scores for each of the five repertories of messages for sections which manipulated the two emotional states: happy, angry.

A multivariate analysis of variance showed significant multivariate effects (Hotellings F(5)=12.41, P<.0001). Subsequent univariate one-way analyses of variance generated some support for hypothesis one. While no significant differences were found for responding styles (repertoire one or two), or for the third compliance-gaining repertoire, significant differences were found for the first two compliance-gaining repertoires (Compliance-gaining repertoire one (F(1,406)=61.6, P<.00001, eta2=36.3%, Happy mean=3.40, standard deviation=2.1; Angry mean=5.28, std. dev.=2.7; Compliance-gaining repertoire two (F(1,406)=9.90, P<.002, eta2=15.4%; Happy mean=6.93, standard deviation=2.0; Angry mean=6.25, std. dev.=2.4).

STUDY #2

Method

Data Base . The data used for testing hypothesis two were taken from Vinson and Biggers (In Press). A brief description of these data is presented next.

Table 4

Factor Analysis of Responding Style Messages

MessagesFactor/Factor/

Repertoire OneRepertoire Two

**1. .52 .04

2.*.73-.18

3.-.05*.73

4. .01*.84

5. .54 .36

6.*.64 .11

7.*.68 .28

* meets .6-.39 criteria for factor definition

** see Table 2 for wording of each message strategy

Participants . Sixty five students (38 female and 27 male) enrolled in undergraduate communication courses at a South-Central and Southern University participated in this study.

Materials/Procedures. Stimulus materials were taken from Miller, Boster, Roloff, and Seibold (1977). These materials consisted of two scenarios each followed by 16 compliance-gaining messages (representing Marwell's and Schmitt's Taxonomy, 1967). Participants read a scenario and then read the 16 compliance-gaining messages. After reading each compliance-gaining message the participant completed the dependent variables. The variables of interest for the present study were: (a) the likelihood of selection score for each message. Participants rated their likelihood of selection using a nine interval scale ranging between very likely and very unlikely, and (b) the selector's predicted level of arousal caused by using a specific message. This was measured using three semantic differential scales developed by Mehrabian (1980).

Results

Data Preparation. Reliability of the arousal dimension was determined by computing an alpha coefficient (final alpha =.71). The three items measuring arousal were averaged producing one score. That is, for each 'likelihood to use' score there was one score representing the selector's predicted level of arousal caused by using said message.

To test hypothesis two the repertoire of messages available to the individual had to be discriminated from the set of messages that were not available for use. This was done by dichotomizing the sample into two groups. Group one (the repertoire of usable strategies) was comprised of those messages which were rated as likely to select. In practice messages were assigned to group one if the selector rated the likelihood of selection from 6 through 9 (higher scores mean more likelihood of use). Group two was comprised of those messages which were rated as neutral or as unlikely to select (those scores from 1 through 5). A 'select if' command allowed the linear relationship between arousal and likelihood of selection to be tested for both groups independently.

Hypothesis two was tested using the SPSSX (1983) program Pearson Correlation. The analyses supported both parts of hypothesis two. Specifically, a significant negative correlation (r=-.39, P<.01, corrected for attenuation r=-.55) was found between arousal and likelihood of selection for those messages in the individuals repertoire of choices. Further, no significant correlation was found (r=.06, P>.05) between arousal and likelihood of selection for those message strategies which were not within the individual's repertoire of usable messages.

Discussion

The two experiments reported here provide evidence consistent with the hierarchical model proposed in this article. An individual's reported level of pleasure affected the likelihood of use scores for 2 of 5 repertoires of messages. Thus, the degree of pleasure may act as a filter in the message selection process. The individual's reported level of arousal was negatively correlated with likelihood to use scores for those messages within their repertoire of selectable messages. Thus, the degree of arousal may act to restrict the message choices available within a given repertoire.

What can or should be done next? This theoretical position holds that experienced emotions are the filter in the selection process. The manipulations of affect used in these two experiments were not what one would call strong affective manipulations. A strong manipulation of anger and happiness should make the emotional states so different that the cognitive elements available under each state would also be very different. A strong manipulation of arousal should highly restrict the repertoire of messages and once high enough should slow the ability of an individual to generate a response. This author has developed a method for manipulating anger and happiness and is in the process of collecting more data on this issue.

One interesting implication of this model is what it suggests about training or educating. These data suggest that we should train people in the emotional state that she or he will be in when the message needs to be used. Thus, if an individual needs to use certain messages in the face of anger we need to teach them in an intense, angry environment. The second option is that we need to teach the individual to remain calm and unaffected by the situational cues for emotion. In this case we can train her or him in a calm environment. Kind of reminds me of a coaching tenet; practice like you play.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

Can we trust that a paper and pencil test of "how I'd react if" predicts how in fact I'd react if?

 

"How Embarrassing" Intrapersonal Coping Mechanisms

Audra L. Colvert

About the Author: Audra L. Colvert (M.A., Bowling Green State University, 1991) is on the faculty of James Madison University, Harrisonburg, Virginia 22807, where she is an instructor and co-director of the individual events team in the School of Speech Communication.

Abstract: Intrapersonal coping mechanisms help diminish the emotional reaction that embarrassment causes. Embarrassment is a mechanism for self-control. It is closely related to shame. Individuals use emotional catharsis to maintain a comfortable safety net. Embarrassment disrupts the psychological safety and creates a feeling of disease. Coping mechanisms provide a way to alleviate the pressure perceived by individuals in embarrassing situations. Four intrapersonal methods are discussed; apologies, accounts, avoidance, and humor. Coping with embarrassment is handled differently by different people. How well it is done depends on individuals' willingness to evaluate situations and then evaluate themselves.

Perspective:

1. What is the next state of adjustment when the coping mechanisms fail to alleviate the dis-ease associated with the embarrassment?

2. What other steps can people take to alleviate embarrassment intrapersonally?

3. If meaning attached to an event is changed, then how can we ever learn what really happened at that event?

 

Intrapersonal coping mechanisms provide a useful base for dealing with the consequences of embarrassment. Embarrassment is generally regarded as a form of social anxiety closely related to shyness, audience anxiety, and shame (Edelmann, Asendorpf, Contrarello, Georgas, Villanuava, & Zammuner, 1987; Buss, 1980; Schlenker and Leary, 1982). Some researchers believe embarrassment is a negative consequence of failure to present a desired image to others whom we regard as evaluating our performance (Edelmann et al, 1987). Others regard it as a psychological state of dis-ease reflecting a threat to the presented self, or public image (Modigliani, 1968). Yet, one author believes it is more useful to call embarrassment a mechanism of self-control rather than a reaction to fear of negative evaluation by others (Babcock, 1988). All of these definitions and approaches encompass parts of the emotion of embarrassment, yet none go far enough to present a full definition which will encompass a positive or negative reaction. I will argue that embarrassment is a mechanism for self-control of a positive or negative feeling of concern which is likely to arise when there is a perceived discrepancy with one's public image or with one's own personal standards, and the reaction from real or imagined others. I will argue further that strategies for dealing with embarrassment, intrapersonally, help to diminish embarrassing events. It is the goal of this article to show how our emotional awareness can change our perceptions of events and even our attitude towards the events.

Embarrassment and Shame

Embarrassment is often compared with and contrasted to shame when trying to describe the emotion. In fact, the terms embarrassment and shame are often used interchangeably. They are both characterized as a feeling of exposure and heightened self-awareness generally accompanied by feelings of distress, inappropriateness, and inadequacy (Sattler, 1965; Lynd, 1958). We must attempt to distinguish between the two emotions, so there will be a clearer understanding between the reactions of each.

Lynd describes embarrassment as "an initial feeling of shame before shame is covered up or explored as a means of further understanding oneself and of the situation that gives rise to it" (Lynd, 1958, p. 38). Modigliani distinguishes embarrassment from shame through common usage. He states, "In common usage one is primarily ashamed of oneself, while one is primarily embarrassed about one's presented self. This may mean that shame is the more personal extension of embarrassment, or it may mean that it is a quite distinct psychological state" (Modigliani, 1966, p. 10).

Babcock supports Modigliani's view when she describes embarrassment as "resulting when an individual perceives a discrepancy between his persona and the facts of the matter. In contrast, shame results when individuals believe they have violated a shared, objective standard of what it is to be a worthy person"(Babcock, 1988, p. 463).

Edelmann summarizes Buss's research and describes the differences between shame and embarrassment in this way:

Embarrassment is recognized as a perceived or real discrepancy in one's own behavior and may be positive or negative. The distinguishing factor between embarrassment and shame is that shame violates a shared, objective, real standard of what it means to be worthy and is almost always negative. It is a fine line between the two emotions and it is difficult to distinguish at times. During shameful events the reactions of others are usually not positive either. The stigma people attach to shame is difficult to eliminate. Shamed people are outcast from groups, where as, embarrassed individuals are the center of attention. It should be noted that because of the differences some techniques used for reducing embarrassment will not reduce shame.

Emotions and Intrapersonal Communication

Emotions such as embarrassment and shame can be controlled through the locus of meaning. If the meaning attached to an event can be changed, then any stigma attached to it may also be changed. Intrapersonal communication extends beyond self-talk. The intrapersonal process includes problem solving activities, conflict resolution, imaging, feeling, introspection, and the evaluation of ourselves and others (Cunningham, 1989). Feelings or emotions impact how people react to situations. The first step in controlling the emotion of embarrassment, intrapersonally, is to look at the concept of emotions in general. Emotions are more than physiological reactions to stimuli. The James-Lange Theory of Emotion provides a classical definition.

Notice the perception step in the stimulus-response model.

Our perceptions of the world and of ourselves are formed through our life experiences, others perceptions of us, the situations we are born into, and our bodies. If we have a poor self-concept our outlook on embarrassing situations will usually be negative. We search for psychological safety. When an embarrassing event occurs individuals feel a great amount of dis-ease. Their first reaction is to fade into the woodwork. However, when we are aware of how the inner-self controls the outward physiological response to the stimulus, it is possible to change the perceptions of events and possibly perceptions others have of the same situation, thus diminishing the feeling of embarrassment.

Coping Mechanisms

Through intrapersonal coping mechanisms, embarrassment can be minimized. Embarrassment is usually classified as a short-lived phenomenon. If the initial reaction to embarrassment can be softened, then the embarrassing scene will pass without having a major impact on any of the parties. Metts and Cupach have identified several researchers who have classified embarrassing predicaments into types of circumstances (1989; 1992). Metts and Cupach summarize the research:

Remedial strategies for coping with embarrassment have generally focused in four areas, apologies, accounts, avoidance, and humor (Metts & Cupach, 1989). This article focuses on using these strategies intrapersonally. It is the goal of this article to show how our emotional awareness can change our perceptions of events and even our attitude towards the events.

Apologies

Apologies are statements which acknowledge blameworthiness and seek atonement for an inappropriate or untoward act (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). Simple statements such as "I'm sorry" and "Please excuse me" are most often sufficient interpersonal remedies. The other parties involved in the event will acknowledge the statements and all will be forgotten. However, intrapersonally, the event may continue to be unresolved. The mind will replay the event over and over. Depending on individuals, they might try to seek an apology from the inner-self. For example, if a guest spills a glass of wine on her host's white carpet, the guest would immediately apologize (lack of competence). However, intrapersonally, the guest may repeat the apology over in her head all night long until she has resolved the crisis with herself by accepting her own apology.

Accounts

An account may take the form of excuses (statements which minimize the actors responsibility for an act) or justifications (statements which minimize the pejorative consequences of an act) (Metts & Cupach, 1989). Providing excuses to others about incidents is a remedial strategy with which many are comfortable. No one is hurt by a white lie. However, some individuals when they are in embarrassing predicaments go so far as to deceive themselves. They can convince themselves that the excuse is justified. They may even begin to believe the specific excuse. For example, if a teenage girl receives a note from a boy, the boy might say a friend sent the note instead of initiating a conversation with the girl (afraid of being conspicuous). Thus the boy avoids a potentially embarrassing episode of talking to a girl, and the boy may begin to believe his friend sent the note. The feeling of embarrassment is minimized by both parties.

Another form of accountability is justification. Kenneth Burke proposes two forms of justification which will reduce the feeling of guilt or shame associated with embarrassment. The first act of purification for Burke is mortification. Mortification is the act of self-sacrifices that relieves man of his guilt, (or in this case embarrassment), through a scapegoat that symbolizes guilt (or the emotion one is feeling) (Brock, 1972). There are three types of scapegoats that individuals can assume.

Scapegoat A deserves what it gets. Embarrassed individuals will accept the situation by saying they deserved it. They may use one remedial strategy interpersonally, but, intrapersonally, they will accept the predicament for what it is. This scenario is usually a humorous event. For instance, someone who plays a lot of jokes on people may finally get one played on him. The individual will get his just reward.

Scapegoat B assumes a teleological stance. This situation was destined to happen. It could not be avoided. When people walk into or perceive an embarrassing situation as inevitable, they will assume the role as scapegoat and allow this predestined event to happen. "Surprise" parties are positive examples of such situations. Individuals may be embarrassed that they are receiving attention, but, they will allow themselves to be the scapegoat because it is a positive experience and everyone benefits.

Scapegoat C is too good for this world. These people are the perfect sacrifice for the event because they are above it anyway. Individuals may feel as if they were put in this situation because they were the only ones who could handle it properly. They will justify the situation by placing themselves in the center of the event and look upon it as an actor on center stage. A disc jockey may agree to be the scapegoat for a pie-throwing contest. The DJ may believe he is the only person with a sense of humor who could make the event a success. A little embarrassment is all right because DJ's are funny people and can handle it.

The second type of justification Burke identifies is victimage. Victimage is the purging of guilt through a scapegoat that symbolizes society's guilt. Rejection of hierarchy results in psychological guilt, purification, and redemption (Brock, 1972). If individuals accept themselves as victims of society then they will purge themselves of the guilt by placing the burden on society. In other words, the victim will blame it on someone else. For example, young children who have accidents while in the center of a group of adults would purge themselves of the embarrassment by blaming it on the parents and everyone who is laughing at the situation.

Avoidance

The third remedial strategy for coping with embarrassment intrapersonally is avoidance. Avoidance refers to a variety of tactics which enable an offending actor to avoid explaining untoward behavior. There are many tactics commonly associated with avoidance, however, two methods are specific to intrapersonal communication; self-deception and selective recall.

Self-deception or deceptive communication hides intended messages from communicators. Parrott, Sabini, and Silver call this "transparent pretexts" which refers to pleasant, fictitious, but blatantly false, reasons that are advanced to conceal less pleasant, but real, reasons for some action (1988). Normally, senders will deceive receivers. If nothing much stands to be gained or lost by lying, both parties may store deceptive messages in short-term capacities and eliminate actual events from memory. In embarrassing predicaments senders may feel dissonance. To resolve this feeling they may lie to themselves about the event. Apple believes individuals can learn to consciously alter their perceptions so as to select emotional responses to stimuli in a highly conscious fashion (1989, p. 325). In changing feelings toward an event, people would alter the perception of the event that is deceiving the mind. Individuals may even believe there was no feeling of embarrassment. Imagine telling your date that you are a good jitterbug dancer, knowing your partner is an expert. When you get out on the dance floor you are so inept that your partner decides to stop dancing. You may deceive yourself into believing that there were too many people on the dance floor or your styles were just too different. It definitely wasn't anything you did! Your partner may even go along with the idea to help alleviate the feeling of embarrassment.

I would go one step further and claim that individuals may consciously or nonconsciously eliminate passages of time from memory. Selective recall allows embarrassed people to continue the scene without interruption because they do not recall the event that has just occurred. Individuals eliminate the scenarios from memory so they do not have to deal with them. Jensen supports this conclusion:

When consistency is at risk, the brain will protect itself by blocking information. Embarrassed people may remember the scene up to the point of embarrassment then jump to the next comfortable spot in the scenario. Continue the dance scenarioóinstead of deceiving yourself, you block the whole scene from memory. The date proceeds as if nothing happened. However, you may never attempt to jitterbug with that person again. When individuals completely block out the event, their body may respond accordingly. There would be no physiological responses such as blushing or perspiring. The interaction will go on as normal for the embarrassed person. In fact, embarrassed people may not even recognize the reactions that other members are having in the group.

Humor

The other intrapersonal coping mechanism for dealing with embarrassment useful in restoring individuals' public-image and self-image is humor. "It diminishes the importance of the event because the identity of the 'victim' can be transformed to 'coactor' and the label 'embarrassing' transforms into 'humorous'" (Edelmann, 1987, p. 86). Laughter can be used by both victims and observers. Humor enables embarrassed individuals to minimize their embarrassment by decreasing the intensity of the situation and recognizing their real or perceived mistakes. For example, tripping over one's feet while walking with a group of people would be funny. Everyone in the group would laugh at the situation. Having the ability to laugh at oneself shows a positive self-image. It is when individuals cannot laugh at the situation that embarrassment can become a harmful emotion that stays in people's memory. That is when it may be necessary to evaluate self-concept and discover why it is difficult for people to laugh at themselves.

Conclusion

This article has looked at the concept of embarrassment and how intrapersonal coping mechanisms help diminish the emotional reaction. Embarrassment is a mechanism for self-control of a positive or negative feeling of concern which is likely to arise when there is a perceived discrepancy with one's public image or own personal standards and the reaction from real or imagined others. Intrapersonal communication uses emotional catharsis to maintain a comfortable safety net. Embarrassment disrupts the psychological safety and creates a feeling of dis-ease.

Coping mechanisms provide a way to alleviate the pressure perceived by individuals in embarrassing predicaments. Four intrapersonal methods were discussed: apologies, accounts, avoidance, and humor. Coping with embarrassment is handled differently by different people. How well it is done depends on individuals' willingness to evaluate situations and then evaluate themselves. It is people who have positive images of themselves and the world around who will best be able to cope with embarrassment.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

Colvert says: "It is the goal of this article to show how our emotional awareness can change our perceptions of events and even our attitude towards the events." Has she done that? She distinguishes embarrassment from shame, and then lists four mechanisms that are used to cope with embarrassment? How do we know that "it is people who have positive images of themselves and the world around who will best be able to cope with embarrassment?"

Cognitive Structuring for Uncertainty Reduction:

Invariants Under Transformation

Maurine Eckloff

About the Author: Maurine Eckloff, Ph. D. is a professor at the University of Nebraska at Kearney. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Central States Communication Association Convention, Cleveland, 1992

Abstract: Communication encounters are semantic transactions which include predictions for the future based on correlations from the past. Individuals reduce uncertainty by discovering structural "invariants" which increase predictability and lessen uncertainty in interpersonal communication.

Perspective:

1. How does perception of structural "invariants" in communication aid in selecting appropriate communication behavior?

2. Explain invariance under transformation and discuss how this applies to communication strategies for the reduction of uncertainty.

3. Korzybski states that structural data is the only content of knowledge. How is this concept of structure related to the area of probability? How does knowledge of structure, relations and order work to reduce uncertainty?

 

Research in uncertainty reduction in communication interaction began in the 1970's (Berger, 1979; Berger & Bradac, 1982; Berger & Calabrese, 1975). The central assumption presented was that when strangers meet, the primary concern is to reduce uncertainty. In later research, Berger (1986), Sunnafrank (1986a, b) and Kellerman (1986) discussed the significance of predicted communication outcomes as perceived by the communicator as related to the communicator's need for selecting effective uncertainty reduction strategies. There are indications that several conditions create an increased need for reduction of uncertainty: when the conversational partner seems to deviate from the norm, when future interaction with the conversational partner is likely, and when the partner has high incentive value--a source of high costs and rewards. Grove (1991) notes that if one does not care very much about the communication outcome, one may be quite comfortable with conversational uncertainty, at least temporarily.

Neuberg & Newsom (1993) observe that individuals can lessen their uncertainty through avoidance strategies or by cognitive structuring, the use of simplified generalizations of previous experience to draw inferences about new events. Brouwer and Sorrentino (1993) propose that perceived intrinsic and extrinsic rewards (satisfaction and social approval) and the arousal of fear through threat appraisal increase the need for effective uncertainty reduction strategies.

General semanticists (Korzybski, 1958; Bois, 1983; Weinberg, 1959) explain that the reduction of situational uncertainty occurs by individual identification of structural "invariants" from past experiences and use of these to make predictions of future communication interaction outcomes. The importance of the uncertainty

Figure l

Individuals as Semantic Transactors.

A semantic transaction has at least seven aspects or dimensions.

Adapted from Bois, J. S. (1983). The art of awareness. Dubuque: W. C. Brown, p. 29.

reduction to the communicator is dependent on the

communicator's perception of the personal value of the communication outcome. Figure 1 shows individuals as semantic transactors. As Bois(1983) states: "The individual may be described as a thinking, feeling, self-moving, electrochemical organism in continuous transaction with a space-time environment." Each transactor communicates in the present environment influenced by past experiences and future expectancies.

Korzybski (1958); Bois (1983); and Weinberg (1959) propose that communication encounters are semantic transactions which include predictions for the future based on correlations from the past. Individuals reduce uncertainty by discovering structural correlations which increase predictability and lessen uncertainty in interpersonal communication. Structural correlations, constructs, are thought of as invariants under transformation. Although there are ch