Part II: Definitions

Large file: Patience please.

Intrapersonal communication is more than just thinking. Intrapersonal communication is how one communicates with oneself. Intrapersonal communication includes the concepts of inner speech, communication planning and control, perception, listening, and other elements that serve as the foundation for all communication interaction. In this section, authors clarify the process of defining this area of teaching and research. Articles are included that show how communication scholars view the intrapersonal communication process. 

The Modular Mind and Intrapersonal Communication Processes (Don W. Stacks)

An Emotional Call for Pure Cognitivism (Melissa M. Spirek)

Intrapersonal Communication as Cognitive Style: Perceptions of Excellence in the Secondary School Context (Lori J. Carrell)

The Healing Power of Self-Talk (Julia E. Weikle Blackwood)

A Socio-Cultural Approach to Information Processing: Exploring the Combined Roles of Thought, Language, and Context (Terre Allen, Nicole David, and Rick Kung)

Letters as Intrapersonal Communication (Marvin D. Jensen)

 

The Modular Mind and Intrapersonal Communication Processes

Don W. Stacks

About the Author: Don W. Stacks is on the faculty of the University of Miami-Coral Gables.

Abstract: The role of the brain, both in processing and interpretation of information, is examined as a function of mind. Advanced is an argument for the MODULAR MIND and its impact on understanding and predicting communication. Issues and directions for neurophysiological/bio-social research are examined.

Perspective:

1. How can we evaluate the way the brain or mind operates? How might the findings of other disciplines help us better understand intrapersonal communication?

2. The modular hypothesis suggests that parts of the brain operate to create "mind." Take this concept through intrapersonal, interpersonal, small group, and mass communication contexts.

3. The role of "chaos" in communication is unique in that it suggests the beginning of communication stems from "confusion." How is this possible and what ramifications does it have for daily communication 


The purpose of this article is to examine an approach to intrapersonal communication that focuses on the communication processing structures of the brain which leads to the function we normally label, "communication." Since the middle 1970s communication researchers have been interested in the general question of how the brain processes and interprets messages. Further, researchers have been interested in how that processing affects normalñas well as "abnormal"ñcommunicative situations, leading a number of intrapersonal communication theorists (cf., Hickson & Stacks, 1985, 1989; Stacks, 1983; Stacks & Andersen, 1989; Stacks & Sellers, 1986, 1989) to focus on brain processing; a focus away from a dominant function for specific brain structures to the stylistic functions associated with the brain, or the current modular functioning approach discussed here.

The Modular Model

The concept of modularity in general is not new (cf., Fodor, 1983) and it is not the purpose of this article to review it in great detail. Instead a general review of the modular mind sets the stage for the future study of this approach to intrapersonal communication. Gazzaniga, as early as 1978 (Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978; Gazzaniga, 1985), suggested that the human brain operates on a modular basisñlike a federation of governments, each module consisting of a state which has the independent abilities of cognition, feeling, memory, and action. Hence, as with any federation, one state or module can influence the actions of the other modules or the entire federation. The analogy to the brain is consistent with neurophysiological research which suggests that a number of distinct memory systems exist in each individual's mind (Witelson, 1987). These systems are functionally organized and each is independently capable of learning. Damage to one system may have little or no effect on memory.

In a similar theoretical perspective Stacks (1983) posited a parallel model which described how preverbal brain "centers" prepared the individual for communication. Both Gazzaniga and Stacks theorized that their components are (a) capable of independent action and cognitive activity; (b) that each is able to receive and process external, as well as internal, information; and (c) that each is capable of providing us with unified cognitions and behavior. Hence, it follows that modular functioning may be directly related to "feelings" as differing modules interpret internal and external stimuli.

The modular mind, however, is not simply a psychological concept, it exists within the various parts of the brain (Ojemann, 1986). The brain's modules have specific duties and functions, are specialized from birth for those functions (Andersen, Garrison, & Andersen, 1979; Witelson, 1987), and are arranged functionally in hierarchical groupings (Stacks, 1983). As Gazzaniga (1985) concluded, it is "clear that modularity has a real anatomical base" (p. 128).

The mind's modularity as it relates to the intrapersonal processes of communication becomes important as it influences the cognitive manifestations of communication. As suggested, the preverbal stage, the preinterpersonal stage of communication, serves as a "loading" mechanism for an individual's verbal and nonverbal communication (Stacks, 1983; Stacks & Sellers, 1989). "This stage is generally unconscious, intrapersonal, and serves as a screening mechanism for subsequent behavior. This stage serves to establish the intrapersonal system, operating as a storage center for such concepts as attitudes, values, scripts, goals, plans and beliefs; concepts which make us human" (Stacks & Andersen, 1989, p. 279). As has been established by a number of researchers, the intrapersonal impact on subsequent communication is both predictable and important (cf., Barker, 1986; Borden & Stone, 1976; Cunningham, 1989; Goss, 1982).

Of importance to our study of communication, then, is the way in which the various brain modules receive, process, and communicate the stimuli (information) they work with. The next section examines the processing mechanisms and modular networks which interact to produce hemispheric modular cooperation and dissonance, the brain's way of sorting our information used to produce perceptions and messages.

Modular Processing

Perhaps the largest of the brain's modules are the two cerebral hemispheres themselves. Each brain hemisphere can be conceived as an alliance of federations with a particular aim or function in mind. This metaphorical analysis clearly is close to the earlier held notion that each brain hemisphere was dominant for a particular function of communication (i.e., verbal or nonverbal functioning). However, it is clear that the modules located in the left hemisphere have a particular style of operation that may be characterized as more logical and verbal, while the right hemisphere's style is more affective and nonverbal (Stacks & Sellers, 1986, 1989). In reviewing the previous literature, it is clear that the right hemisphere's input is stylistically and functionally different than its left counterpart. These stylistic differences, then, underlie the nature of the processing itself.

Hemispheric Communication. At one level we can operationalize hemispheric communication as the communication of the "cerebral hemispheres. . .[as] central superprocessing modules" (Zaidel, 1985a, p. 135). Such communication is limited, however, by the anatomical boundaries of the brain and lack of interconnections, other than the corpus callosum, between them. As Zaidel (1985b) noted, the brain hemispheres "have sharp anatomic boundaries and some apparently sharp functional demarcation as well. The interaction between hemispheres thus becomes a paradigm case for information transfer within the cognitive-cerebral network" (pp. 54-55). The implication is clear: the modules located within each hemisphere work together in some loose federation under the guiding control of the "superprocessing" mechanism of that hemisphere. Further, it is conceivable that "backup" modules may exist within the other hemisphere which approximate the function of the other. As Zajonc (1984a; 1984b) has pointed out, affect (right superprocessing module) and cognition (left superprocessing module) are independent, separate, and parallel systems which often function together. Support for this cognitive-affective dichotomy is offered by Swain et al. (1987) who propose that the cognitive system is designed for classification and assessment while the affective system is designed to provide rapid responses to the individual's safety.

Other research suggests that this analytic-holistic difference may be a function of the detail (left hemisphere) and novelty (right hemisphere) of the information being processed (Sergent, 1983). Additionally, studies of language acquisition and the "neuromaturational" process indicated a left hemisphere predisposition for language processing. As a child matures, however, the right hemisphere becomes more involved in language activities. Between ages five to 13 years of age such predisposition for language (cognition) begins to equalize (Keith, 1981; Williford, 1978). Sergent (1983) suggests that a child's predisposition to right hemispheric processing of less refined or larger stimuli (e.g., letters) is established when learning to read. These findings strongly suggest that both brain hemispheres analyze and process the same information; however, each hemisphere's function differs as to the interpretative processes it is best suited to conduct.

The type of communication employed by the brain's major modules has been studied for a number of years as interhemispheric communication, communication between brain hemispheres, cross-callosal interaction, and as cross-talk between left and right hemispheres (Andersen, Garrison, & Andersen, 1979; Bogen, 1985; Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978; TenHouten, 1985; Sperry, 1985). The transfer of information between the hemispheres, then, is an important function in the creation of the mind. Essentially one brain becomes a sender of a message which is transmitted through the corpus callosum (channel) to the other hemisphere (the receiver).

In the approach proposed herein it is this transmission of messages between hemispheresñand within hemispheresñthat constitutes the intrapersonal processing of communication. Such communication is not "thinking," since modules and hemispheres can "think" and operate on information independently. The modular approach clearly implies that complete messagesñ"thoughts"ñare communicated within and between modules, each impacting on the processing of each other and the final interpretation of the communication situation and the ultimate communicative behavior exhibited by the individual.

How do these modules operate in the process of "normal" communication? As of now we know that hemispheric communication occurs, but as Gardner (1983) argued, "communication between modules occurs, only subsequently in ways that remain obscure" (p. 132). Stacks and Andersen (1989) suggest that "In a metaphorical sense brain modules and hemispheres behave much like individual interpersonal interactions in everyday communication; they inhibit, struggle for control, compete, cooperate, facilitate, create paradoxes, coexist, and promote harmoniousness" (p. 281). As such, we can conceptualize "normal" communication as the healthy interpersonal relationships of modules within first the superprocessing module they exist and, second, between the two major modules themselves. This form of communication may be termed "modular cooperation" and "modular dissonance."

Modular Cooperation. From the modular approach, normal communication is a function of cooperation between the hemispheres. In the interpersonal analogy previously offered, this cooperation includes both harmonious and disharmonious conflict. To what extent is each hemisphere's cooperation necessary for the processing of normal communication? This will differ according to a number of factors, including the complexity of task, processing of certain types of information, creativity, and dialectical thinking (Stacks & Andersen, 1989).

How the brain receives and processes information has been detailed elsewhere (cf., Shedletsky, 1981, 1983; Segalowitz, 1983; Stacks & Sellers, 1989). A brief review of the processing mechanisms in relation to modular cooperation should help flesh out the role of information and task in hemispheric cooperation. Recent research has demonstrated that while the left hemisphere is primarily responsible for verbal communication, both brain hemispheres have the capacity for language and contribute to the final analysis of intent. How that analysis is carried out and with what effect, however, is a result of the particular hemisphere's function and style.

In most daily communication the left hemisphere's ability to logically interpret events and information makes it truly "dominant" for most processing tasks. In this manner the modules contained in the left hemisphere federation exert more influence and ultimately control the situation. This occurs, however, only when the interpretation of the situation fits with the logical processes associated with current cultural mores, rules, and laws. The function of the right hemisphere federation is more affective in nature and serves to guide the left in situations where the "norm" has been deviated from (Hickson & Stacks, 1989; Zaidel, 1985b) and in situations where anxiety may be present.

A large body of clinical research demonstrates the integrative function of hemispheric cooperation. Research on split-brain patients, for example, suggests that when the left hemisphere must interpret messages without right hemispheric input due to a severing of the corpus callosum, that message is interpreted literally. As such, sarcasm, emotion, and humor are lost to the processor of the message. Moscovitch (1983) has suggested that high imagery or highly affective tasks require processing through the right hemisphere, which then functions as a "priming mechanism" for the left's logical interpretation of the affective mood or intent of the message. This priming is a major function of normal intrapersonal communication. Safer and Leventhal (1977) support this interpretation in "normal" people. They found that use of both hemispheres produced more accurate ratings of message content and the tone of voice used to present messages. However, subjects who processed messages via the left ear (right hemisphere processing) primarily used tone of voice to rate messages, whereas right ear (left hemispheric processing) subjects primarily used message content to rate messages.

Behavioral research has demonstrated that, in normal situations, the left hemisphere can and does operate basically alone. Stacks & Sellers (1986) presented messages of varying intensity to either one hemisphere or the other and noticed no apparent behavioral changes for messages characterized by low to moderate language intensity. However, when exposed to highly intense messages, the left hemisphere only subjects perceived the message as more positive and persuasive and the source more credible than their right hemisphere counterparts. They explained these findings in part due to a lack of the right hemisphere's "priming" function. That is, without the priming function in operation during message processing the left hemisphere had to make interpretations based on the literal meaning of the message, interpretations were then sent to the right. Hence, they suggest that when communication situations are outside the accepted norms associated (such as inappropriately high language intensity) with a communication (and these may change as the individual becomes assimilated to a particular environment), increased right hemisphere processing is necessary, especially "priming" the left for non-normative information. This right hemispheric function is carried out through transfer of information through the corpus callosum (cf., Shedletsky, 1981, 1983).

Other research has demonstrated that hemispheric cooperation is necessary for tasks requiring creativity or dialectic types of thinking. TenHouten (1985) found that split brain patients showed a lack of creativity, that is, they failed to verbally express fantasies, symbols, insights, or feelings. Obviously, the processing of both hemispheres is superior to that of one. Many times, however, it is more parsimonious for the "dominant" hemisphere to process and interpret information leading to communication. This is possible during "normal" communicative situationsñwhere societal rules are followed. However, there are times when for a variety of reasons "normal" communication is not possible. The next section details both "normal" disharmony and pathological disharmony and its effects on communication.

Modular Dissonance. At times the harmonious interchange of information between modules and hemispheres becomes disrupted. This develops along the line of Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, one of the more developed models of consistency and change (Stacks & Andersen, 1989). When modules "collide" regarding a belief, attitude, or processing nuance two things may happen. First, change occurs. The reasons for such conflict are worked through, stored in the affected module's memory and the mind moves to another state. Second, however, is a chaotic, unorganized, and fragmented behavior. Stacks and Andersen believe that the experience of dissonance and its reduction are beneficial to the mind. If "there was no means for resolution or dissonance reduction, mental confusion and disarray would predominate. The human brain may be constructed for this process to prevail" (p. 285-286). Gazzaniga (1985) further proposes that dissonance allows for the constant testing and retesting of beliefs, yielding an array of modules harmoniously testing new situations, retesting old situations, and possibly pretesting situations into the future.

Modular dissonance, then, can be perceived as a function of normal hemispheric processing. It occurs when either internal or external stimuli produce changes in processing such that memories or predisposed processing mechanisms come into conflict. Such conflictñand its resolutionñis good, promotes growth in the individual through a constant reevaluation of beliefs and attitudes, and serves to test the "normalcy" of the current situation. There are times, however, when this modular dissonance gets out of control. That is, one module temporarily interferes with normal processing and inhibits the other module. At the hemispheric level this modular inhibition may produce confusion and anxious behavior. These minor inhibitions may explain how logical-affective discrepancies are resolved through intrapersonal communication. Along this same line, Swain and colleagues (1987) posited that people are often caught in a "cognitive-affective crossfire" whereby the cognitive system infringes on the affective system over time. This interference yields a change in the affective "coloring" of the situation, making it more normal than it had previously been (cf., Sarason & Sarason, 1986) and may be part of the basis of cognitive therapy "which encourages patients to reinterpret negative events" (Stacks & Andersen, 1989, p. 286). As with many affective interpretations, the conscious (left) module may actively suppress the information to the less conscious right hemisphere, thus ensuring that any distress, grief, or agony not overcome the conscious awareness of the situation.

Summary

The modular mind represents a model of brain processing encompassing both the structures and the functions of those structures in the creation of messages. It presupposes a relationship between function and structure such that one cannot be examined without the other. Hence, the modular mind is a bio-social model of communication. Our communicative focus necessarily centers on the functions associated with modules; an area of concern, however, is with potential disruptors of the structureñeither in terms of actual modular function disintegration or modular network disruption. The next section focuses on several issues important to the study of intrapersonal communication from this perspective; it also suggests that holographic theory, dissipative structure, and chaos theory may produce new directions for both theory and research in intrapersonal communication.

Issues and Directions In Intrapersonal Communication: Modular Processing

The preceding discussion of the modular model and its implications for the study of human communication confronts several issues that have been faced by past intrapersonal researchers. Many of those issues were addressed by the participants of the 1988 SCA New Orleans debate. It seems clear, however, that the issues concerning neurophysiological research and theory can be identified in three areas: understanding theory, measurement, and analysis of intrapersonal communication processes. In this regard, the modular model, or any processing model of the brain associated with the mind, is open to criticism addressed to any bio-social approach to communication (see Stacks, Hill, & Hickson, 1991). The issue here reflects a concern with reductionism. However, there should be no problem with reductionism if the focus of the theory and research is an understanding of how and why the individual communicates with (a) self and (b) others.

Issues of Understanding

Tied to the issue of understanding is a concern with the unit(s) of analysis studied by the intrapersonal researcher. This concern is reflected more in understanding how the mind operates and less on methodological issues. The concern is focused on how the mind operatesñhow the brain processes the information. An important consideration here is the focus on chaos as an explanatory principle. The mind's modules operate on a chaos principle, much as advocated by Ilya Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) and James Gleick (1987).

Why chaos? Four reasons suggest that chaos theory may play an important explanatory role in understanding modular communication. First, chaos theory and bio-social theory are interrelated. They both seek answers to questions of natural systems, of which the human is one. Second, chaos theory provides an explanation for very complex behavior via a simple (but revolutionary) organizational pattern. Third, chaos theory helps to further understand modular cooperation and dissonance, providing further evidence that modular dissonance is a required condition to mind. And, finally, chaos theory helps explain some of the research findings associated with mind and communication.

A chaos interpretation of the brain's information processing suggests that a function of hemispheric processing is to manage the amounts of information it receives. That is, the brain is predisposed to make order out of disorder. Consider, for instance, that the human mind can create a past, a present, and a future from information gathered from any of those time frames. Consider, too, that while processing such information, additional external information is being processed. Some of this information is consistent and some is inconsistent with the "internal" information. Chaos reigns, yet order prevails. It appears that normal intrapersonal communication processing requires the stimulation that chaos provides. An interesting finding, one that really shouldn't surprise us, is that the idling brain (the brain without disorder) yields a brain that loses awareness (Taubes, 1989). A study reported by Paul Rapp (1989) on epileptics found that petit mal seizures produce less rather than more brain wave activity; the brain becomes more ordered during the attack than chaotic. As noted in our model, modular dissonance helps control the natural chaos, moving the mind from one level to another. Hence, the process of dissonance produces normal functioning.

Chaos theory also suggests two important processing functions. The first concerns change and may help us understand how the "normal" mind operates. Simply put, chaos theory predicts that the greater the number of variables active in the system, the more the order. That is, as the brainñthrough its various modulesñprocesses chaos, the more ordered it becomes. On the other hand, a few key variables can produce extreme chaos and abnormal communicative behavior. This fits well with Sellers and Stacks (1990) explanation of communication competence and avoidance. They suggest that modules important to a communicative situation may weigh more heavily on interpretation of that situation, producing communication apprehension.1 Most of us realize that some apprehension is necessary to produce competent messages; however, there are times when all of us are apprehensive about communicating. This apprehension can be caused by internal or by external stimuli. In most cases we can reason through the dissonance caused by the situation ("I am giving a speech to my colleagues and I'm scared;" "I talk to students each day about this, there is little difference,") and produce normal competent communications. However, self-concept may be low, a bad experience in the last presentation may be remembered, or someone is in the audience who is important may in itself produce abnormal behavior. Attempting to add variables to the equation (arguments as to why we shouldn't be apprehensive) should increase modular dissonance and produce less apprehension.1

Second, chaos theory argues that complex systems are best explained by simple organization. If intrapersonal communication were truly reductionist we would be interested in the networking of individual neurons and synapses as they pass information from cell to cell, building to the level of hemisphere module. In fact, we are not. We are interested in how the modules process information, exchange information, and yield conclusions that may or may not be verbalized. Further, as Prigogine argues, and Edward T. Hall (1984) suggests, it may be that the simplest interpersonal reason for communication is an ability for two people to synchronize their brain waves, thus producing understanding.3

Based on this logic we might re-examine our earlier findings of the persuasibility of the left hemisphere (when it receives information in isolation from the right hemisphere module). In normal persuasive situations the two hemispheres work together, each producing information that is ultimately processed by the left supermodule's analytical style. That processing is chaoticñhigh language intensity should produce dissonance between modules; the right module focusing on the emotive impact of the word or metaphor and this interpretation causing dissonance when related to the left hemisphere module's interpretations. Dissonance reduction yields an interpretation by the left hemisphere that the message is out of the normal "range" of accepted behavior and it is rejected. However, if normal reception is interrupted and one key module (the right hemispheric module that interprets emotion, for instance) produces hemispheric cooperation rather than dissonance the message may be accepted as novel and persuasive. However, if the message was composed of numerous highly-charged arguments, it follows, that, in such a case, the over use of intensity would produce order rather than disorder, no change rather than change.

Issues of Methodology and Analysis

Methodological and analytical issues are of less concern than theoretical ones. Why? First, objections to either method can be equally argued. However, we must triangulate physiological, behavioral, and qualitative methods to really understand how the brain processes information. Brain waves, heat indices, and NMR or PET plots provide data that something is happening when a message is presented, when a communicator is preparing to present a message, or even when that communicator is meditating. However, what that internal behavior represents requires amplification from personal and external behavioral measures. For instance, suppressed right hemispheric alpha EEG readings recorded while a person hears a highly intense message is indicative of right modular functioning; if that person also indicates agreement with the message or argument via a pencil and paper measure, then we have some idea that the two (suppressed alpha and persuasion) are related. However, we might also ask the person what they were thinking while listening to the message (risking, of course, the fact they may not know what they were thinkingñor could not reflect back on the process of making a decision about the argument).

More complex are questions of analysis. This is so because the brain is not a linear decision maker. Traditional, linear, analytical models may not reflect modular processing. It makes more sense to examine the impact of modular processing nonlinearly. That is, from an exponential perspective; certain modules are more important than are others, but are important at different times. This also suggests that systems analysis may yield more profitable results than rule- or law-governed analyses. Experimentalists, however, will still see a need for all types of analysis, from simple linear to the more complex nonlinear models.

Sooner or later intrapersonal modular research will examine the neural networks associated with modular processing. At that time variables such as memory may begin to play a larger role in communication processing than they currently do; perhaps along the lines of Pribram's (1971) "holographic theory" and the search for the elusive engram. It may be that memory and synchronicity are highly related with modular functioning, accessed via the speed of neural transmission (as measured by wave length).

Obstacles

Several obstacles must be overcome for neurophysiological or bio-social research to accomplish its goals. What are the most important? First, there are the discipline-related, turf-protectionist arguments against the study of intrapersonal communication. We need to be more open to intradisciplinary research, to create research teams that include the behaviorist and the rhetorician, a post hoc analysis of speech-making based on such things as formal training, handedness, and other variables for example. Consider President Carter's speech making (as an engineer his orientation would be left modular) compared to President Reagan (as an actor his orientation might be more right modular) or President Ford (handedness). Such research teams would make use of the best we have. Second, we need more interdisciplinary research, we need to open up and work with professionals in other fields. In the neurophysiological area we need to be reading (and be read by) audiologists, physicists, psychotherapists, sociologists, and anthropologists to name a few areas of related interest. Third, we must open our minds to ideas from other societies. What do we really know about thought other-than-Western? What could we learn?

A second concern is related to method and is focused on the equipment necessary to measure internal states. We need to understand how biofeedback and other devices work, the type of data gathered from such machines, their limitations and where they should be employed. We need to be proficient in their use. In this regard understanding how biofeedback operates could answer our research questions. Obviously, however, we must be concerned with learning how to operate the machines at our disposal, to use different types of analysis for different types of data, and to focus our answers back to our communication questions.

Summary

This essay has attempted to explicate a model of intrapersonal communication. It laid out the basic model and then examined several important issues. The mind, however, is a constantly changing phenomenon. Hopefully, research from this model will be disseminated in our journals and tests of the ideas presented herein opened to discussion. In the end, understanding how the mind operates, within the biostructure of the brain, should provide us with a better understanding of the human condition. It may be a chaotic trip, one fraught with the fears of the past presaged on the hopes of the future, but one surely worth taking.

Notes

1They also suggest that pathological abnormalities within key modules may produce trait-like apprehension. For the purposes here, this is not considered, but could be considered a "stage attractor" in chaos terminology. For more on this see: Ferguson (1980), Prigogine and Stengers (1984), and Taubes (1989).

2Stacks and Stone (1984) report findings supportive of this interpretation.

3It is way beyond the scope of this paper to examine this phenomenon. For more information see: Hickson & Stacks (1989), pp. 180-183, 217-219.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

Stacks attempts to locate and define intrapersonal communication in "the communication processing structures of the brain." From the outset, the building blocks of this theoretical excursion ask for definition. What is a communication processing structure of the brain? Is the processing of communication or of, say, stimuli? What is a module of the brain? And how do brain modules relate to modules of the mind? At various points in this article, the concept of module refers to stages of cognitive behavior, brain structures (e.g., hemispheres), modules within hemispheres, and something different from the hemispheres. A host of such concepts are briefly pointed to along the way: processing style, the conscious (left) module, the less conscious right hemisphere, the modular mind as a bio-social model, self, and normal intrapersonal communication processing. Moreover, the building blocks of this theoretical excursion call for connection. Just how do we connect the brain to the mind, communication (intrapersonal or not) to brain structures, stages to modules, cognitive dissonance to modules, information to messages, transmission between brain structures to intrapersonal communication? Is transmission communication?

An Emotional Call for Pure Cognitivism

Melissa M. Spirek

About the Author: Melissa M. Spirek (Ph.D., Purdue University) is an assistant professor in the Department of Telecommunications at Bowling, Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403-0235/ (419) 372-8641.

Abstract: Emotional variables need to be examined if the cognitive science paradigm is to provide a more complete explanation of human behavior.

Perspective:

1. Why are emotional variables typically ignored in cognitive explanations of human behavior?

2. What are the implications of omitting emotion from "pure" cognitive sciences?

3. How might scholars proceed in the direction Dr. Spirek suggests? 

Within the fields of communication, psychology and sociology, social scientists continue to embrace a cognitive approach in increasing numbers. Cognitive science appears to have displaced behaviorism as the dominant paradigm for guiding research that seeks to predict, explain, understand, control and describe human behavior. Even critics of cognitive psychology have come to acknowledge the fact that cognitive science has made significant contributions to our understanding of mental capacities. Williams (1987) writes:

The field has revealed much concerning how information can be measured, how information is (or is not) used by a person in certain proscribed settings, and how individuals might be constrained in their learning and thought by time, by capacity, or by aspects of the environment. An examination of the cognitive research literature leaves one impressed by the creativity, sophistication, and even the cleverness of the research. (p. 212)

Nevertheless, cognitive science is not a perspective without caveats; it is not a panacea for understanding human behavior. The objective of this essay is to briefly highlight an area cognitive science has yet to adequately address if this paradigm is to provide a more complete explanation of human behavior. I find the avoidance of emotion variables to be the most powerful argument against cognitivism or computational functionalism.

Emotional variables are typically ignored in cognitive explanations of human behavior. As a result of this neglect, scholars in the area of cognitive science are presenting a less than "complete picture" of human information processing. The void of emotional variables in cognitive science has not gone completely unnoticed in the academic community. I will briefly summarize the arguments proposed by four investigators who stress the importance of emotion interacting with cognition.

The impoverishment of cognitive theory because emotional variables are not included was noted by Norman (1980; 1981). Norman views emotion as one of 12 essential issues cognitive science needs to address in order to continue to develop. Norman (1980) states that the "pure cognitive sciences" (cognitive science without emotion) from the 1960's and on through the 1980's resulted in research that only taught us minimally how people learn to read, converse, write, remember and forget.

Another scholar who shares Norman's view is Robert Zajonc. Zajonc (1980) also comments on cognitive theorists' avoidance of emotion variables. Zajonc & Markus (1985) write that it is "remarkable that even though cognitive content is rarely processed without the participation of affect (Piaget, 1981), cognitive theories have no conceptual elements that reflect the contribution of affective factors" (p. 73).

In a similar vein, Tucker calls for researchers to examine affectivity when investigating cognitive processes. In 1981 Tucker reviewed the experimental and clinical literature on lateral brain functions. Tucker concluded from his review that the left and right brain hemispheres are involved in varied emotion and cognitive processes. Tucker also concluded "that without the neurophysiological processes that give rise to emotion there is no cognition" (p. 19).

One developmental cognitive theorist who acknowledged the salience of emotion when providing a cognitive explanation of human behavior was J. Piaget. Piaget, however, only made vague references to emotion interacting with cognition. Piaget described emotions as being the gasoline that drives the engine (the assimilating and accommodating mental structure or mind) of a car (the human body). The only time Piaget specifically addressed affectivity was in a series of lectures on intelligence and affectivity at the Sorbonne in 1953. The content of those speeches focuses on the development of egocentrism and empathic ability (Piaget, 1981). Unfortunately the reader is not offered an explanation as to how and or why affectivity interacts with cognitive processes. It would seem then that although Piaget recognized the importance of emotion in providing a cognitive understanding, he did not explicate the emotion and cognition interaction.

Psychophysiologist Sven Swebak (personal communication, February 23, 1990) appears to have captured the essence as to why communication and psychology scholars have not included emotion variables in their models. "When emotions are examined along with human cognitive processing, the picture (of human behavior) becomes difficult, muddy and messy, but the researcher needs to understand that this is a trade-off for achieving a more accurate picture."

Even though a powerful argument against cognitivism is that the plethora of cognitive investigations to date fail to address the role emotion plays in cognitive processing, the status quo is slowly beginning to address this issue. Social scientists have begun to examine emotion as something other than merely an extraneous control variable (Izard, 1985). Bower's (1981) studies on emotion and memory retrieval are one such example. Bower proposes that emotions act as nodes which are linked to propositions. As additional studies examine both the independence and interaction of the cognition and emotion systems, I believe that "pure cognition" studies will erode in the 1990's, as will the powerful argument made against cognitivism for not including emotion variables.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

If cognitive science has given short shrift to the study of emotion, behaviorism defined emotion out of the realm of psychology. What may be key now, with a cognitive paradigm, is just how to conceive of emotions: are they separate from cognition and interactive with cognition or contained within the same domain as cognition? It is the metaphor that is in question, e.g., the engine/car or pure versus impure cognition? Possibly, what is holding us up on this one is an impasse created by our bifurcation into objective and subjective realities. On the methodological side, emotions are difficult to produce as independent variables.

Intrapersonal Communication as Cognitive Style:

Perceptions of Excellence in the Secondary School Context

Lori J. Carrell

About the Author: Lori J. Carrell teaches communication education and intercultural communication at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh. She previously taught at the secondary level and is engaged in communication education research K-undergraduate. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1992 annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association.

Abstract: This study explored intrapersonal communication processes by examining the influence of cognitive style on perceptions of teacher and student excellence in the secondary school context. Cognitive style (Gregorc, 1982a ) is a concept representing patterns of intrapersonal communication; it is similar to the concept of "communication style" which is indicative of patterns of oral communication. The sample consisted of 87 secondary teachers and 86 of their students from four high schools in suburban Denver. The following results were found: The cognitive style "concrete sequential" for teachers was positively correlated with student evaluations of teachers. There was a main effect of cognitive style match on student evaluation of teachers. Supplementary analyses revealed a relationship between student evaluation of teacher and teacher evaluation of student.

Perspective:


1. What factors affect the perceptions high school teachers and student have of one another? Do these perceptions affect classroom communication and actual learning?

2. Does a universally excellent "model" teacher exist? If so, what are the characteristics of such a teacher? If not, why not?

Intrapersonal communication is at the heart of learning. Critical thinking, test anxiety, lesson organization, instructional planning, memory. . .all processes which affect "learning" and all intrapersonal processes as well. Teacher excellence and student success, goals in the educational context, are products of intrapersonal communication. Perceptions of teachers and students about one another are indicators of whether or not those goals have been attained.

That intrapersonal processes of both teacher and student impact the nature and degree of learning is generally accepted; but the specific ways in which intrapersonal communication affects interaction in the classroom context need expanded exploration. This research operationalizes "intrapersonal communication" with Gregorc's concept of "cognitive style" (1982a, b) and examines the influence of teacher and student cognitive style on perceptions of excellence in the secondary school classroom.

Style

As early as 1965, "style" was recognized as a possible intervening variable in the process of education. Researchers began to investigate this "style" possibility in the early seventies (Dunn & Dunn, 1975). According to Guild and Garger (1985) those exploring educational contexts are now "actively engaged in understanding and recognizing individual differences" (p. 14). In both in-service training and teacher preparation during the last ten years, teachers and potential teachers have been asked to identify their styles and then to employ strategies to insure that they teach to all styles represented in their classrooms, rather than just their own (Johnson, 1989).

Andersen & Bell-Daquilante (1980) found communication behaviors and learning style tendencies to be related in high school students. Ekstrom (1974) hypothesized that a match between teacher and student cognitive style would facilitate student learning. Abruzzese (1979) recommended to teachers that they assess their students' cognitive styles using the results to personalize their communication with each student. Several other educators dispense advice to teachers regarding the styles or "patterns" of intrapersonal processes (Butler, 1984; Dunn, 1982; Guild, 1982; Keefe, 1982; Kusler, 1982).

Style theory initially materialized from within the brain research field (Johnson, 1989; Restak, 1979). The trend of recognizing right or left brain tendencies as well as the counter-arguments for holistic brain functioning (Brennan, 1982; Stacks & Andersen, 1987) and multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1983) all support the viability of a relationship between consistent patterns (styles) of thought and communication.

"Style" and Evaluations of Effectiveness

According to Roueche and Baker, in their 1986 book, Profiling Education in American Schools, effective teachers exhibit consistent characteristics. Others have also searched to describe the "excellent teacher" (Astin, 1985; Brannon & Holley, 1989; Gardner, Mason & Matyas, 1989; Kuehl, 1979). Does this elusive prototype exist - a particular type of teacher that is "best?" Both education and speech communication scholars have examined specific communicative behaviors as vital elements of determining teacher excellence (Csikszentmihalyi & McCormack, 1986; Kearney, Plax, Richmond & McCroskey, 1985; Lynn, 1977; McKinney, 1988; Owen, 1984; Richey & Richey, 1978; Rubin & Feezel, 1986). Norton and his colleagues completed several studies based on the premise that some "communicator styles" may be more effective than others in the classroom (Norton, 1977; Norton & Nussbaum, 1980; Nussbaum 1982; Nussbaum & Scott, 1979, 1980). The relationship between spoken language and thought processes as postulated by Vygotsky (1934) and delineated in Dance's Speech Theory of Human Communication (1967) leads from the investigation of communication styles inward to the investigation of cognitive styles, or patterns of intrapersonal communication.

Stanford and Roark define teaching as "providing relationships and environmental conditions which facilitate increased differentiation of personal perceptions and accurate integration of new data into personal perceptions" (1974, p. 7,8). Decentering to students' cognitive perspectives is necessary for this kind of excellence in teaching to occur. Homogeneity of cognitive styles between a student and teacher could contribute to more effective teaching and learning, as the ease of decentering would be increased (Ekstrom, 1974).

Evaluations of Excellence in the Secondary School Context

The intrapersonal communication processes employed as students contemplate their teachers' merit are complex. Student perceptions of teacher excellence are frequently debated for their worth or lack thereof (Harris, 1986; Myers, 1978; Rosenshine, 1970; Wright & Saunders, 1976). In Successful Teacher Evaluation, McGreal explained that "(secondary) teachers generally lack faith in the students ability to accurately rate their performance" (1983, p. 134). In a large study of secondary students, Traugh and Duell found that 44% had never evaluated a teacher (1980).

One of the major misgivings about adolescents evaluating teachers is that "personality" factors will obscure sound judgment (Simpson, 1966); Jones (1989) argued that "This is valid" since personal qualities of teachers and the relationship between teacher and pupil do affect the quality of learning (p. 158). Brown (1977) concluded that there is a positive significant relationship between learner perceptions of instruction and achievement. Hart, in his extensive 1934 study, also concluded that secondary students learn more from teachers they "like" or evaluate favorably. In addition, Boser and Poppin (1978) found a direct relationship between dropout rate and teacher liking. A "liked" teacher's ability to influence students appears stronger than the influence of teachers who are not rated favorably by students (Csikszentmihalyi & McCormack, 1986).

Although immaturity or personal vendetta could influence a student's opinion of a teacher, the student's view of that teacher is still valid to that individual and hence, that assessment could affect the student's learning. In fact, Haukoos and Penick found that science achievement was influenced by teacher personality characteristics which provided dynamic classroom interaction (1987). Perceived personality types of teachers also were found to influence agricultural students' learning on the secondary level (Guild & Garger, 1985). Psychology students felt they learned more from extroverted teachers in a study conducted by Hart and Driver (1978). In addition, gender was seen as an issue in student perception of teaching and learning (Basow & Distenfeld, 1983).

What can affect teacher evaluations of students? Driscoll and Reynolds found that teachers use similar descriptions when talking about excellent students and when talking about themselves (1984). Teachers positively evaluate students whom they see as being like themselves. Paisey and Paisey discovered that high school students' grades were significantly related to their personality type (1982). In fact, students rated by teachers as "extroverted, affectively oriented individuals," generally rated their teachers higher than other students did (Kagan, Tixier & Vigil; 1987). Perhaps the similarity between teacher and students impacts evaluations of both. This study first examines whether a particular cognitive style is related to perceptions of excellence and then examines the possibility of shared cognitive style as a factor which could influence perceptions of excellence both in student evaluation of teachers and teacher evaluations of students.

The following hypotheses were tested: 1) There is a relationship between cognitive style and teacher or student evaluations; 2) There is a main effect of matched teacher and student cognitive style on teacher evaluation; 3) There is a main effect of matched teacher and student cognitive style on student evaluation.

Method

Subjects

Four large suburban Denver schools participated in this study. Schools were selected based on administrator willingness to participate. Teachers were randomly selected from these four schools for participation in the first phase of the study. A response rate of 80% produced a sample of 87 teachers. Follow-up investigation of non-respondents indicated a high percentage of both males (77%) and of teachers who had already taken the Gregorc instrument (63%). The teacher sample was comprised of 34% males and 66% females. Subject areas represented by the randomly selected group included: English-21%, Math-18%, Science-10%, Social Studies-9%, Foreign Language-9%, Business-9%, Special Education-3% Home Economics-3% and Other 18%.

Following the first phase of data collection (teachers' cognitive styles), teacher and student subjects were selected for the second phase. Five to seven teachers from each of the four schools (the maximum number allowed by each principal) were randomly selected from lists of teachers who had participated in the first phase of the study. For each of those teachers, a class period of the day was randomly selected. Five students enrolled in each of those class periods were randomly selected. Students were identified in this way to assure that they were all being taught the same subject in the same way, since many secondary teachers teach a variety of subjects. Each of the selected students was assigned a number related to their teacher's number. If a student happened to be selected twice (for two different teachers), her or his instruments were administered only once, and coded for only one teacher. The total student sample size was 86.

Measurement

The concept "cognitive style" was measured with the Gregorc Cognitive Style Delineator. Evaluations of students by teachers were made using the Student Evaluation Survey and student evaluations of teachers were made using Bentley and Starry's Purdue Teacher Evaluation Scale.

All of the data were collected via self-report instruments, the most common method of assessing style (Guild & Garger, 1985). The basic premises of this study encompasses the idea of differing realities and that the reality of an individual's own cognitive style is most efficiently ascertained by asking that individual. To access a person's perceptions of excellence (teacher or student), self-report data is a viable method. Some instruments ask the teacher to assess the student's style; then the teacher's style influences the perception (Dunn & Dunn, 1975). The individual's perception of reality is an "objective" way of determining that individual's intrapersonal processes.

Cognitive Style

Five self-report cognitive style inventories are suggested by style researchers (Guild & Garger, 1985). These five include Dunn, Dunn and Price's Learning Style Inventory (1975), the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (1943, 1976), Mok's Communicating Styles Survey (1975, 1989), Kolb's Learning Style Inventory (1976) and the Gregorc Style Delineator (1978, 1985). Both the Dunn and Kolb instruments assess modality preference; Myers-Briggs and Mok examine personality type.

Gregorc's cognitive style instrument was selected based on the matching of its conceptual foundation with that of this study. "Each of the four scales of the Gregorc Style Delineator exhibits a strong degree of internal consistency ranging from 0.89 to 0.93" (1985, p. 18). "The test-retest correlation coefficients are all significant at the 0.001 level or less ranging from 0.85 to 0.88" (1984, p. 18). All correlations for predictive validity are also significant at the p<.001 level.

An indirect, self-report instrument of non-situationally bound items, the Gregorc Style Delineator has a five minute time limit. Individuals are asked to quickly rank four words, using "the real you" as the "reference point" (Gregorc, 1985, p. 3). A rank of "4" indicates the word which is the "best and most powerful descriptor of you" whereas "1" should be placed next to the word which is "the least descriptive of you" (Gregorc, 1985, p. 3). The directions encourage first impression reactions. The scoring of this instrument results in classification of each individual into one of five cognitive styles: abstract random, abstract sequential, concrete random, concrete sequential or square (a rare combination of the other four styles). Scores of 27 or more on any given style identify that style as dominant. For the few subjects who were dominant in two styles, the style with the highest score was selected as the person's dominant style for the categorical analyses.

Student Evaluation of Teachers

Of the few instruments designed for high school students to assess their teachers, the Purdue Teacher Evaluation Scale emerged as the most comprehensive and useful (Bentley & Starry, 1975). Other instruments frequently cited or recommended [Learning Environment Inventory, (Anderson, 1973); My Class Inventory, (Anderson, 1973); and The Class Activities Questionnaire, (Walberg, House, & Stule, 1973)] focus on other-than-teacher classroom information.

The concept "student evaluation of teacher" includes the following dimensions as delineated in the Purdue Teacher Evaluation Scale: motivation, control, subject, communication, methods, fairness and total evaluation. The Purdue Teacher Evaluation Scale was tested for reliability using a split half technique (with 28 teachers with 20 students each) yielding correlations of 0.83 to 0.90 on each of the six dimensions. According to Bentley and Starry:

There is no truly relevant criterion on which to judge the validity of an instrument of this nature. . . Peer ratings, evaluations by administrators, etc. obviously have very limited relevance as a criterion of the validity of student ratings. To the extent that students agree with one another, are self-consistent in their ratings, and content validity is exhibited, at least adequate validity may be assumed (1970, p. 4).

Although some other instruments address the evaluation by students of learning context, or classroom activities (Anderson, 1973; Walberg, House & Steele, 1973) no other published secondary "student evaluation of teacher" documents were available. This 60 item instrument asks students to respond to items with answers of "very much like my teacher" (four points) to "very much unlike my teacher" (one point) on a four point scale. Subcategories include ability to motivate students, subject matter orientation of the teacher, teaching methods and procedures, ability to control students, student-teacher communication and fairness of teacher.

Teacher Evaluation of Student

Instruments which allow teacher assessment of student have been developed primarily around specific handicapping conditions (Burks, 1961; Chess & Thomas, 1969; Elrod, Franklin & Sorgenfrei, 1988; Loutlit, 1957; Rimm, 1982; Palmer, 1970; Walker, 1970). A more holistic evaluation (which was not designed with a specific "condition" in mind) is the Student Evaluation Scale, developed by professional in-house staff with Psychologists and Educators Press (1970). This evaluation tool includes academic and social or emotional components without specifically directing teachers toward a "handicapping condition." The Student Evaluation Scale was deemed appropriate for the current study which asked teachers to evaluate randomly selected students, presumably many of whom would not have "special needs." Although widely used, SES validity and reliability information was not available. Conceptually, teacher evaluations of students include both academic and social-emotional judgments. The Student Evaluation Scale allows assessment in both these areas, rather than limiting the evaluation to academics.

Procedure

Packets containing Gregorc's instrument and instructions were distributed to participating teachers in their faculty mailboxes, with the researcher's phone number provided for questions. Subjects were instructed to return instrument packets to a locked box in their faculty lounge within three weeks. Reminder notices were sent after two weeks and additional copies of the packets made available for those who had misplaced the originals. Teachers were assigned a number which appeared on each of the instruments (as well as each of the student evaluation forms in the second phase). After the instruments were scored, all participating teachers received a summary of their own results, with explanation sheets about each of the styles.

Student instruments were administered in a group setting at each school with parent permission (for those under 18) established by mail before the group meeting. Individual assistance and follow-up were provided for students on an individual basis. Evaluation instruments were clearly marked with the name of the teacher whom the student should evaluate. Students were assigned numbers which corresponded with the appropriate teacher number. Following the study, students (and their parents, if under eighteen) were provided with results and explanation sheets.

Teachers in the second phase of the study evaluated the same five to seven students (selected from one of their classes) who had evaluated them. Teacher-subjects received the Student Evaluation Forms and explanation sheet in their faculty mailboxes, with a three week deadline for completion. Again, forms were returned to the locked box in the faculty lounge. Evaluation results were not given to subjects.

Results

Data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences - X release 4.0 (1991). Alpha for all analyses except correlations was set at .05. Correlations were tested at an alpha level of .01 to reduce type I error rate, due to the number of variables correlated.

Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between cognitive style and teacher or student evaluation. Correlations were conducted to examine the possible relationships between different cognitive styles and evaluations of excellence. A negative relationship between student evaluation of teachers and teachers' scores on the cognitive style "Concrete Random" (CR) was found (p<.001). A positive correlation (p<.001) was found between total evaluation score of teachers and teachers' scores on the "Concrete Sequential" (CS) cognitive style.

Hypotheses two and three were offered to investigate the possibility of a main effect of teacher and student matched cognitive styles on evaluation. To test these hypotheses, a nested design was used with a mixed-model multivariate analysis of variance statistic (Manova). Expectations were calculated to determine the appropriate F test. Students (1-86) were nested in teachers (1-19). Of 86 cases, 52 matched on Gregorc styles and 34 did not match. To determine if there was a need to nest teachers in districts, two one-way analyses of variance were calculated to investigate a possible main effect of district on teacher evaluation and on student evaluation. Results were nonsignificant at a liberal alpha of .20. Since there was no effect of district, nesting teachers in districts for the Manova was not deemed necessary. The independent variables for the test were 1) students nested in teachers and 2) matched or not matched on Gregorc styles. Total teacher evaluation of student and total student evaluation of teacher were the dependent variables.

Box's M was 83.84 for Gregorc match, so the Pillai's trace was utilized, rather than Wilk's lambda. Where multivariate significance was found, univariate tests were also conducted. A significant main effect of cognitive style match was found on teacher and student evaluation. Univariate analysis revealed significance specifically of cognitive style match on student evaluation of teachers (p. < 002).

Categorical variables gender and subject taught were analyzed (using the Chi square statistic) for possible associations with Gregorc styles for students and teachers. No associations were found.

Discussion of Results

Hypothesis 1 was tested to determine if there was a relationship between cognitive style and teacher or student evaluation. A negative relationship between student evaluation of teachers and teachers' scores on the cognitive style "Concrete Random" (CR) was found (p<.001). The "motivation," "fairness," and "methods" subdimensions of teacher evaluation as well as the total teacher evaluation score were negatively related to teachers with a CR cognitive style. Characteristics of the CR style include: intuitive, independent, random ordering preferences, practical proof needed, competitive and ego-centric ( Gregorc, 1982a & b). The CR style for teachers was consistently evaluated negatively, regardless of the cognitive style of the student completing the evaluation.

A positive correlation (p<.001) was found between total evaluation score of teachers and teachers' scores on the "Concrete Sequential" (CS) cognitive style. The characteristics of a CS cognitive style include: instinctive, methodical, deliberate, concrete, sequential ordering preferences, step-by-step linear progression, product oriented, practical, stable, conformist (Gregorc, 1982a & b). The primary difference between the concrete sequential and concrete random intrapersonal styles is the difference alluded to in the terms "random" as opposed to "sequential." Random thinking secondary teachers were not seen positively by their students; whereas, sequentially thinking teachers were viewed positively. This evidence points to the possibility of particular cognitive styles affecting perceived teacher excellence.

Supplementary correlations found positive relationships between several dimensions of teacher evaluation of students and student evaluation of teachers. The total evaluation of teacher score was correlated with the total evaluation of student score at p<.001. A style match was not necessarily responsible for this finding, as had been anticipated. Rather, students evaluated teachers highly who evaluated them highly, and vice versa. Driscoll and Reynold's research (1984) suggested the likelihood of this result. In a discussion of attraction, Devito states that "The most obvious statement we could make about interpersonal attraction is that we like those who like us and dislike those who dislike us (1980, p. 434). Reinforcement is a key force in attraction; regardless of context. In student-teacher relationships in the secondary school reinforcement appears to play a crucial role in teacher and student evaluations. Social exchange theorists (Foa & Foa, 1974; Roloff, 1981) characterize interpersonal communication as intentional and goal directed; giving something to get something in return. Affection and prestige are two of the commodities thought to be exchanged between individuals (Foa & Foa, 1974); conceivably, teachers and students make similar "exchanges." The student may give open, attentive, friendly classroom communication and a favorable evaluation of their teacher in exchange for positive evaluation from their teacher. Reinforcement of the positive exchange process guarantees its continuance. Social exchange theory can imply a self-centered premeditation which may not be palatable to some interpersonal communication theorists (Infante, Rancer & Womack, 1990). Perhaps the case is more simply stated: good students and good teachers appreciate one another.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 stated: There is a main effect of matched teacher and student cognitive style on H2 teacher evaluation and on H3 student evaluation. A significant main effect of cognitive style match was found specifically for student evaluation of teachers (p=.002). If a student shared patterns of intrapersonal communication, or cognitive styles, with her or his teacher, evaluations were affected. Matches between their own and their teachers' cognitive styles mattered to students. One might argue that teachers are trained to be objective, so that student characteristics do not affect evaluation. One misgiving about secondary students evaluating teachers has been their lack of "objectivity" (McGreal, 1983). A more functional explanation of these results might be that a match between patterns of thinking in teacher and student may actually affect learning; causing the student to believe that instruction which comes from her or his own perspective is more effective. Brown (1977) supported such a possibility. Teacher decentering becomes increasingly important in light of this evidence, if one accepts the supposition that a student's opinion of her or his teacher does indeed impact the quality of learning (Jones, 1989).

In summary, the research hypotheses in this study received mixed support. A significant positive correlation coefficient was found between one teacher cognitive style (concrete sequential) and student evaluation of teacher, suggesting that a particular cognitive style might have universal appeal among students; however, the idea of matched cognitive styles impacting evaluation was supported for cognitive style match and student evaluation of teacher. Supplementary analyses revealed a strong relationship between teacher evaluation of student and student evaluation of teacher.

Further research which investigates the impact of intrapersonal processes on actual learning is needed. Other research has shown that favorable opinions about their teachers can influence student learning (Boser & Poppin, 1978; Brown, 1977; Hart & Driver, 1978; Haukoos & Penick, 1987) and this study has shown that cognitive style can influence student opinion. Studies are needed which specifically address learning as a possible outcome of teacher cognitive style.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

That cognitive style affects classroom communication is a powerful idea. And dissecting the relationship between aspects of both teacher and student cognitive style makes good sense. But can we define "intrapersonal communication" as cognitive style? It could be argued that one's style of doing something is not the something itself.

The Healing Power of Self-Talk

Julia E. Weikle Blackwood

About the Author: Julia E. Weikle Blackwood, a graduate of Bowling Green State University, is the Executive Director of Greenbrier Community Services., Inc., a non-profit, community-action agency in Ronceverte, West Virginia.

Abstract: In recent years, people in the medical profession and communication scholars (specifically intrapersonal) have studied the role the mind plays in health. This article examines self-talk as a health behavior and discusses how the use of self-talk can affect health.

Perspective:

1. In what ways can the mind be used to control a person's state of health?

2. How can "positive" self-talk be harmful and "negative" self-talk beneficial?

"We may not be what we think we areñbut what we think, we are." (Michaelis, 1956).

This quotation implies that our minds dictate our states of being. Physical health is just one of the states the mind has the capacity to affect. Self-talk, part of intrapersonal communication, is a function of the mind that can have outward manifestations. Specifically, people can control their health by monitoring internal messages (i.e. . , what they say to themselves). This essay will examine the link between self-talk and health, and how inner speech may be used for optimum benefit.

The connection between self-talk and health stems from the belief that inner speech is another control system of the body. These systems include electrical, chemical, and mechanical functioning, which are in turn linked to behavior. Since behavior is an outward manifestation of inner thought (Apple, 1989), this lends credence to the assertion that the language of intrapersonal communication is also a control system. Physicians are taking note of this mind-body connection. Viewing the mind as an untapped resource in healing disease is an approach called holistic medicine.

Holistic healing transcends the traditional model of healingñthe biomedical, which focuses on the disease and not the whole person (a problem also recognized by Antonovsky, 1979). This perspective examines "the person in her or his environment with no artificial separation of body-mind-spirit" (Flynn, 1980, p. xv). It takes Hippocrates' view, in that it considers illness "a disruption in the balance of body-mind-spirit in one's life and environment" (p. xv). Considering this viewpoint has guided researchers to study people's health behavior.

Self-talk is a health behavior that has potentially extensive effects. Although it will most likely be used by those who have a high internal locus of control and place a high value on health, it can also help relatively "well" people in health maintenance programs. Self-talk is categorized as positive or negative. As its label implies, positive self-talk has good implications for people's mental and physical well-being. However, the negative is not all bad. The key to using self-talk constructively is to strive for an appropriate balance between the two. All this hinges upon recognizing inner messages.

Levine (1991) expands on the idea of noticing thought patterns. Whatever the thought type (positive or negative), she suggests people reflect upon the antecedents to and the feelings about a particular thought. When people determine which thoughts improve their sense of well-being, they can make those thoughts occur more frequently. This developing of a positive mental attitude does not require self-delusion, as posited by Braiker (1989). It is more of a "reality check": recognizing self-talk for what it is, dealing with negative messages, and harnessing the positive for the greater good of individual persons. Self-talk is a tool for, not an end-all, be-all means of, improving health states.

Secondly, negative messages may trigger warning signals in high-risk conditions. The object is to deal with the underlying message and move to correct the situation without using what McGonicle (1988) terms "harmful negativity." This includes being "awfulistic" (everything is catastrophic), "absolutistic" (using "must," "always," "never"), or using "should-have" self-talk ("I 'should have' done this"). Other cognitive traps to avoid are mindlessly-used clichés that relate to health or emotion, such as "I'm a nervous wreck," or "Only the good die young." (Levine, 1991) When these negative thoughts surface, they can undermine any positive thinking people try to achieve. Therefore, they must be replaced with something else.

In a society where peopleñespecially femalesñare taught to downplay their good points, developing positive self-talk might be difficult at first. By taking a personal inventory, people will discover they are a lot "better" (performance or health-wise) than they previously concluded. The key is to concentrate on the good points. To make positive inner speech beneficial, people need to take active roles in shaping the events in their lives, not to let life just "happen" to them. Keeping a journal, using their name as they talk to themselves, and releasing pent-up feelings are some ways Levine recommends people use to become aware of and constructively use their thoughts.

The use of positive self-talk has been linked to the reduction of stress. Less stress, in turn, affects other positive health changes. Callahan (1991) cites research at the Mind-Body Clinic at Deaconess Hospital where patients experienced "a significant drop" (p. 282) in blood pressureñ10 points or moreñby incorporating mental focusing techniques. Other possible benefits include boosting immunity, successful treatment of back pain, premenstrual syndrome symptoms, and infertility.

With potential applications like these, the old cliché of "mind over matter" rings true. The mind is a powerful tool. Self-talk is one way to tap into the body's greatest resource. By using self-talk constructively, people can change their health outcomes for the better.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

The mind is powerful in health and well being. Any questions?

A Socio-Cultural Approach to Information Processing: Exploring the Combined Roles of Thought, Language, and Context

Terre Allen, Nicole David, and Rick Kung

About the Authors:Terre Allen is an assistant professor of Speech Communication at California State University, Long Beach. Nicole David received an M. A. from California State University, Long Beach, in 1994. Rick Kung is a Masters candidate at California State University, Long Beach, Long Beach 1250 Bellflower Blvd., Long Beach, CA 90840-2407, telephone (310) 985-5133. An earlier version of this article received a top paper award in Intercultural Communication and was presented at the Western States Speech Communication Conference, San Jose, CA, 1994.

Abstract: Ultimately, a comprehensive theory of social information processing is one that addresses the impact of culturally relevant information. The purpose of the current study was to set a perspective for an integrative approach to the study of cross-cultural social information processing by investigating the combined roles of thought, language, and context. Specifically, the current study reports the results of an exploratory examination of how an element of social cognition, Imagined Interaction, was used by monolingual and bilingual communicators to envision the act of discoursing for anticipated interpersonal encounters. The current study distinguished context-different language acquisition from same-context language acquisition in an effort to explore the combined roles of thought, language and context on information processing. Suggestions for future research are discussed in terms of a "socio-cultural" based approach to processing social information.

Perspective:

1. Should research on social information processing explore the role that culture plays in the cognitive processing of social episodes?

2. Besides a linguistic relativity approach, how can a theoretical model of social information processing include culturally relevant information?

3. What cognitive processes are involved in utilizing culturally relevant information for anticipated communication encounters?

In general, research regarding social information processing seeks to study the thought processes that influence one's perceptions of individuals, social situations, and behaviors related to social interaction. While an extensive body of research exists regarding information processing across cultures, few direct linkages have been made to specific aspects of information processing related to interpersonal communication. The purpose of the current study was to set a perspective for an integrative approach to the study of cross-cultural social information processing by investigating the combined roles of thought, language, and context. The current investigation explored the roles that context and language play in influencing thought processes about interpersonal interactions. As such, the present study focuses on developing a theoretical approach to investigating language and culture as knowledge structures used in social information processing.

Berger (1993) asserted that research regarding the social cognitive aspects of interpersonal communication has begun to shift from descriptive types of investigations to studies that provide theoretically motivated attempts to understand the basic cognitive processes underlying social interaction. Specifically, the current study explored how an element of social cognition, Imagined Interaction, was used by one-language and bilingual communicators to envision the act of discoursing for anticipated interpersonal encounters.

Research Problem and Rationale

Traditionally, the study of language has been separated from the study of the communicative experience (Ellis, 1992). Much the same can be said regarding the role that language plays in intercultural and cross-cultural communication experiences. Upon reviewing current literature that exist regarding language and culture, there seem to be few direct linkages to interpersonal communicative experiences (see Ting-Toomey & Carson, 1989).

Since Plato scholars have argued the significance of the role that language plays in shaping thought processes. The debate over the influence of language on thought processes remains at the forefront of recent scholarship regarding language, communication and culture (see Steinfatt, 1989). In the processing of social information relating to interpersonal communication there seem to be at least three interrelated influences: thought, language, and context. Yet, little attention has been focused on developing a theory of social information processing from a cultural perspective that simultaneously encompasses all three of these influences.

While scholars cannot escape the role that language and thought play in social information processing, intercultural scholars are also acutely aware of the role that context plays in the communicative experience. A large body of literature exists regarding the role that context plays in processing social information. While a number of theorists have explored the role that context plays in intercultural communication, Hall's (1976) conceptualization is perhaps the one that is most clearly focused on information processing. Hall (1976) argued that since individuals are faced with so many perceptual stimuli it is impossible to process them all. He suggested that one of the functions of culture is to provide a screen between the person and the stimuli. This cultural "screen" serves as a means of identifying what perceptions to process and how to interpret those perceptions that are processed. Hall's (1976) widely accepted information processing approach suggested that cultures differ on a continuum that ranges from high-context to low-context. He defined high-context cultures as those who rely more on the physical setting or the individual's internalized beliefs, values, and norms for the processing of social information. Hall (1976) defined the opposite end of his continuum as low-context cultures. In low-context cultures interactants rely mainly on explicit codes for the processing of information. Furthermore, Hall (1976) argued that in a high-context culture there is a large emphasis on nonverbal codes and much more is taken for granted and assumed than in a low-context culture. Hall's (1976) conceptualization has centralized context as a means of social information processing. Yet, few studies examine context from an information processing perspective.

According to McCann and Higgins (1990) there are two convergent influences on the lack of attention placed on information processing related to interpersonal communication. First, McCann and Higgins (1990) suggest that classical models of communication highlight the role of the impact of the message on the recipient. Second, they suggest that most models of social information processing have concentrated on how the cognitive structures of the actor serve to influence the encoding and retrieval of social information. McCann and Higgins (1990) further contend that from a cognitive perspective, the effects of contextual or data-driven processes on social information processing have been virtually ignored.

The following sections explore current research on intercultural communication in terms of the biases toward investigating the impact of the message and cognitive structures of the actor that influence encoding and retrieval of social information.

Impact of the Message on the Recipient

Conceptualizations of interpersonal communication have been heavily influenced by Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson's (1967) axiom that all communication has a content and a relationship dimension. In essence, the content level of a message refers to what is being communicated, while the relationship level dictates how the message will be perceived by the recipient and how one should interpret the content. Understandably, then, interactants from different cultures and different realities hold differing perceptions and therefore, understanding of content and relational dimensions of messages may be impeded.

Accordingly, two approaches to investigating the impact of the message on the recipient have been developed; one that focuses on the content or verbal aspect of the message, and another that focuses more directly on the relationship or nonverbal aspect of the message. We will briefly review each of these approaches in the following sections. These sections categorize verbal messages and nonverbal messages in order to understand how they impact recipients across cultures.

Verbal Messages. Upon reviewing the body of literature in intercultural communication regarding the impact of verbal messages on the recipient, three general topics have been systematically investigated: (1) self-disclosure (e.g., Borrego, Chavez & Titley, 1982; Blum, 1973; Cunningham, 1981; Gudykunst & Nishida, 1983; LeVine & Franco, 1981; Melikian, 1962; Nakanishi, 1986; Plog, 1965; Ting-Toomey, 1987; Wheeless, Erikson, Behrens, & Segars Behrens, 1986); (2) verbal immediacy (e.g., Bradac, Bowers, & Courtright; 1979; Conville, 1975; Hecht & Ribeau, 1984; Mehrabian, 1967; Powell & Collier, 1990; Sanders & Wiseman, 1990); and (3) persuasive messages strategies (e.g., Burgoon, Dillard, Doran, & Miller, 1982; Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986; Miller, Reynolds, & Cambra, 1982).

Nonverbal Messages. According to Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988) culture serves as the normative frame through which expectations concerning appropriate nonverbal behaviors are perceived. Therefore, a great deal research has focused on nonverbal communication within and across cultures. Space does not permit a complete review of research regarding nonverbal communication and culture, however, below is a brief review of nonverbal studies that focus on the impact of the nonverbal message on the recipient. There are three major areas of nonverbal research that directly focus on the impact of the message on the recipient: (1) Proxemics (e.g., Bond & Iwata, 1976; Bond & Shiraishi, 1974; Burgoon, 1983); (2) Haptics, (e.g., Almaney & Alwan, 1982); (3) Nonverbal Immediacy (e.g., Bradac, Bowers, & Courtright; 1979; Collier & Powell, 1986; Conville, 1975; Hecht & Ribeau, 1984; Mehrabian, 1972; Sanders & Wiseman, 1990).

Cognitive Structures

Perhaps one of the most widely investigated culturally relevant linguistic phenomena is the Sapir-Whorf linguistic relativity hypothesis (Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956). Prior to Sapir's (1921) hypothesis , it was assumed that language was a neutral medium that did not influence the way individuals experienced their environments. However, Sapir (1921) dramatically changed conceptualizations of the role of language and experience when he hypothesized that language was directly influential in human thought processes.

Steinfatt (1989) provided one of the most comprehensive reviews, to date, regarding linguistic relativity. In his review of research on linguistic relativity, Steinfatt (1989) suggested that research in this area can be categorized to a set of independent variables and a set of dependent variables. He classified the independent variables as those based on differences between languages in phonology, grammar, or semantics. He suggested that according to linguistic relativity, these independent variables influence a set of dependent variables. These dependent variables are made up of logic, cognitive structure and world-view, and perception and areas of cognition (each of which are manifest in observable behavior).

Studies pertaining to linguistic relativity cover a variety of areas related to the independent and dependent variables discussed by Steinfatt (1989). Generally, studies have centered on such topics as: (1) Language Acquisition (e.g., Chomsky, 1965); (2) Language and Processes of Thought (e.g., Sapir, 1921; Worf, 1956); (3) Bilingualism (e.g., Aaronson & Ferres, 1987; Bloom, 1981; Hockett, 1950).

In summary, Steinfatt's (1989) review revealed that support of the linguistic relativity hypothesis is generally limited to studies of "semantic or category boundary differences, which may be overcome by learning new words and categories" (p. 64). He further suggested that overall, support for linguistic relativity is low and that at best a "weak" form of it exists. Therefore, there is a need to develop new theoretical approaches to investigating how the combined roles of language, communication and culture influence thought processes.

Imagined Interaction and Planning Processes

Interpersonal encounters necessarily involve at least two people. Communicators can, and typically do, adopt the other's standpoint in their communication interactions with others (e.g., Mead, 1934; Edwards, Honeycutt, & Zagacki, 1988). In fact, many conceptualizations of communication competence rely, in part, on how effective and efficient communicators are at adapting or modifying one's message to the listener (Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1950). In order to develop an understanding of how individuals process information it is necessary to explore cultural variations in the ways that individuals engage in the cognitive activity of adopting the other's standpoint. Furthermore, a recent body of research has developed that explores plans and planning processes as the primary means through which individuals access knowledge structures in an effort to generate goal-directed action during social interaction (Berger, 1993; Berger & Jordan, 1992; Edwards, Honeycutt, & Zagacki, 1988).

Edwards, Honeycutt & Zagacki (1988) operationalized the planning process via imagined interaction or "a process of cognition whereby actors imagine themselves in interactions with other" (p. 24). What makes imagined interaction unique as a means of operationalizing planning processes lies in the fact that imagined interactions involve actors engaged in internal dialogue using both verbal and visual imagery. In general, other means of operationalizing planning involve only verbal processing. Edwards et al. (1988) suggested that combined verbal and visual processing of an interaction episode allows the individual having an imagined interaction to move back and forth over the "panel" and even "rewrite" the interaction script if necessary. The importance of this function lies in the fact that imagined interactions (II's) are visual and verbal, and that during imagined interaction activity interactants may possess powers of conversational control that are not afforded in actual interactions.

Furthermore, it has been theorized that imagined interactions allow individuals to activate and perhaps reconstitute procedural records which may inform them about behavior related to specific situational exigencies. They also provide individuals with information to be used during actual conversations. Imagined interactions, like, scripts may be abstractions of an ongoing stream of behavior that functions to extract and store themes or central tendencies (Edwards et al., 1988).

Edwards and colleagues (1988) developed the Survey of Imagined Interaction (SII) in order to assess the functions and characteristics of individuals II's. Research has uncovered eight dimensions and three functions of imagined interaction. The first dimension is known as discrepancy and reflects how discrepant individual's II's are from their actual interactions.

The second dimension is known as pleasantness and it reflects the degree to which individuals' II's tend to be pleasant (or unpleasant) across a variety of topics, situations, and interaction partners. II's may be pleasant or they may elicit conflict and negative affect. Activity, the third dimension, refers to how often individuals report having II's. The fourth dimension is dominance, it refers to how much individuals report talking in their II's compared to their interaction partner. Specificity is the fifth dimension and it refers to the degree of detail and development individuals' report in their II's. Sixth is proactivity which refers to II's that occur prior to an actual interaction. Retroactivity, the seventh dimension, refers to II's that take place after an interaction. It is important to note that proactivity and retroactivity are not mutually exclusive. For example, some II's that occur after an interaction (retroactivity), may serve as a rehearsal (proactivity) for the next anticipated encounter. Finally, variety is the eighth dimension and it represents the diversity of topics and individuals that social actors report having in their II's.

Research indicates that II's serve three distinct functions. First, II's serve as a vehicle for self-understanding. Subjects reported that they talk more than their interaction partner and that they self initiated the dialogue approximately 70% of the time. Edwards et al. (1988) suggested that these results indicate that II's may provide social actors with opportunities to express their emotions and obtain a greater sense of their feelings.

The second function of II's is catharsis. Honeycutt (1990) suggested that II's may relieve tension and reduce uncertainty about another's actions. In this way they function as a cathartic experience for some social actors.

The third function of II's is known as the Rehearsal function. Individuals may use II's to plan and mentally rehearse or practice for upcoming encounters. By using the rehearsal function of II's, social actors may engage in "off-line" planning for anticipated interactions. Empirical investigations also validate the claim that II's function as a form of cognitive planning (Allen & Edwards, 1991a, 1991b).

Allen and Edwards (1991a) investigated the effects of an individual tendency to rehearse mentally (operationalized as the rehearsal function of imagined interaction) and induced mental rehearsal (operationalized in terms of an experimental condition which manipulated mental rehearsal) on compliance-gaining message strategy use. Allen and Edwards' (1991a) study revealed that participants who engaged in the rehearsal or planning task used a greater number and variety of compliance-gaining messages during a subsequent role-playing activity than participants who engaged in a task aimed at distracting them from mental rehearsal or planning. Allen and Edwards (1991a) concluded that mentally rehearsing or planning for an anticipated encounter may allow the social actor to devise more detailed and well developed plans for actual interaction. In investigating participants' tendency to rehearse mentally (operationalized via rehearsal function of II's) Allen and Edwards (1991a) found that individuals who reported a high tendency to rehearse mentally (whether they were in the distractor task or the planning task) used more message strategies during the subsequent role playing activity than those individuals who reported a low tendency to rehearse mentally.

In explanation, Allen and Edwards (1991a) contended that individuals who engaged in planning for the role playing activity accessed more information from memory, procedural records, and knowledge structures related to the situational exigencies than individuals who did not engage in planning. As Allen and Edwards (1991a) concluded "the current investigation supports the notion that II's function as a way that communicators plan and rehearse for actual communication and that mental rehearsal affects communication behavior" (p. 29).

Berger and Jordan (1992) suggested that the body of literature on imagined interaction and other investigations of planning support the notion that plans and planning exert considerable impact on the generation of goal directed action in ongoing social interactions. However, they also suggested that more research should focus on what sources of knowledge persons use to develop an action plan. The current investigation contended that both language and context provide individuals with related sources of knowledge that they employ in developing plans for interaction. Therefore, an underlying source of knowledge that individuals may utilize during planning processes is cultural context.

Hall (1976) organized cultures according to the amount of information implied by the setting or "context" regardless of the specific words spoken. He further argued that context provides an interpretive screen for social interactions by providing a map of what perceptions to notice and how to interpret those perceptions. Hall (1976) divided cultures on a continuum ranging from high to low context. Since cultures vary in the degree to which context plays a role in determining interaction patterns and context also provides interactions with a perceptual screen for viewing interactions, context should also play a significant role in how interactants process information regarding social interaction.

The current investigation theorized that individuals from low-context cultures, where most of the information is vested in the explicit code, will have more imagined interaction activity than individuals from high-context cultures, where most of the meaning is implied by the physical setting or is presumed to be a part of the individual's internalized norms, values, or beliefs. In essence, for individuals from low-context cultures imagined interaction activity functions to activate and process verbal and visual data necessary for communicating in a more "explicit" mode. Yet, this type of imagery may be less relevant to information processing in high-context cultures since the communication relevant data lies more in an "implied" mode. Therefore, the following research question was generated:

Research Question 1: Do subjects from low-context cultures and subjects from high-context cultures significantly differ in their use of imagined interaction activity?

One of the primary criticisms of studies that hypothesize about the role of language in shaping thought and thought in shaping language is that language does not take place in absence of some broader cultural context. In an effort to examine the interrelated roles of context, language and thought, the current study also investigated second language acquisition. Specifically, the current investigation sought to determine if context-specific differences between L-1 and L-2 can lead to cognitive processing differences during the second language acquisition process.

Studies related to the linguistic relativity hypothesis have investigated bilingualism in an effort to uncover cognitive structures related to language and information processing (e.g., Aaronson & Ferres, 1987; Au, 1984; Bloom, 1981; Hockett, 1950). In particular, Aaronson and Ferres (1987) supported the cognitive hypothesis that language-specific differences between L-1 and L-2 can lead to cognitive performance differences between bilinguals and monolinguals in processing sentences. This research leads to questions concerning social information processing.

Since context plays a central role in how individuals process social information, some aspects of social information processing should change as a result of learning a second language, particularly if the second language occurs within a differently "framed" context (e.g., high-context, low-context). Therefore, evidence for the shifts in cognitive processing may be found in the imagined interactions of individuals learning a second language that is different, contextually, from their first language. If individuals use context as a "frame" or "screen" for processing social information, then those individuals who are acquiring a second language that is practiced within a different context or "frame" (from their first language) should report that their imagined interaction activity changes during second language acquisition. Therefore, the following research question was advanced:

Research Question 2: Do context-different L-2 leaners report changes in imagined interaction activity?

Methods

Subjects

Participants in the present study were 37 (25 female, 12 male) undergraduates enrolled in beginning level interpersonal communication class at a large western university. Sixteen participants spoke a second language, and twenty-one participants spoke only English. This course fulfills general education requirement; thus students enrolled represented a variety of backgrounds, ethnicity, and area of study.


Dependent and Independent Measures

Context served as the independent variable in the first question under investigation. Context was operationalized according to Hall's (1976) high-low continuum. High-context cultures were defined as follows: Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Mexican, and Latino (Lustig & Koester, 1993). Low-context cultures were defined as follows: German, Swedish, Euro-American, and English. Imagined Interaction activity served as the dependent variable in the first question under investigation. Imagined Interaction activity was operationalized in terms of Edwards, Honeycutt and Zagacki's (1988) definition. The self-reports from the Survey of Imagined Interaction (SII) served as the dependent measure for the first research question (See Appendix A).

The independent variable for the second research question was context-different second language acquisition. Context-different L-2 was operationalized as second language learners who are acquiring a language that is practiced in a context that is different from their first language. Again, context was operationalized according to Hall's (1976) definition. Therefore, context-different L-2 occurs when the first language is, for example, Japanese and the second language is English.

In the present investigation of the 16 bilingual participants, 12 of the participants indicated that their first language was associated with one of the high-context cultures previously defined and that they were in the process of acquiring English (a low-context culture). Three of the participants indicated that their first language was associated with one of the low-context cultures and that they were in the process of acquiring a language associated with a high-context culture. The remainder of the subjects were learning a language that was within the same cultural context. The average amount of time spent speaking the second language was 7 years, with a range of 3 to 16 years. The dependent measure for the second research question was an open ended survey that assessed various characteristics of Imagined Interaction and second language acquisition (See Appendix B).

Measuring Instruments

Demographics. In order to assess imagined interactions with second language learners, demographic data were necessary. Each participant filled out a demographic section of the survey. The demographic section asked for the participant's age, sex, native country, years spent in native country, native language, years of speaking native language, second language, years of speaking second language, other languages spoken, and amount of time spent in the United States.


The Survey of Imagined Interaction (SII). The Survey of Imagined Interaction (SII) begins with a short explanation of imagined interactions followed by instructions necessary for completing the survey. The survey is comprised of forty-eight seven-point Likert-type questions ranging from strong disagreeing "No!" to strong agreeing "Yes!" The dimensions of II's assessed by the survey were activity (Cronbach's Alpha= .76), proactivity (alpha= .73), retroactivity (alpha = .80), self-dominance (alpha = .77), specificity (alpha = .73), variety (alpha = .67), pleasantness (alpha = .85), and discrepancy (alpha = .84). In addition to assessing the dimensions, the survey also assessed functions of rehearsal (alpha = .75), self-understanding (alpha = .70), and catharsis (alpha = .51) in II's.


Open-Ended Survey. Upon completion of the demographic questions and the SII, participants who reported that they spoke more than one language were asked to fill out an open-ended questionnaire which posed a series of questions regarding imagined interactions in the language acquisition process (see Appendix B). This questionnaire was designed to triangulate with the imagined interaction scale. The open-ended questions asked the respondents questions concerning language fluency and imagined interaction activity, translation from first language to second language in II's, variety of II's, the influence of context on II's, and the purpose of using II's while learning a second language.

Procedures

Participants were informed of the general nature of the current study and asked to participate. They were told that participation was voluntary and they were free to decline if they wished. The participants were also told that there were sections of the survey for everyone and a second section for bilingual subjects only. Subjects were debriefed regarding the specifics of the research.

Results

The first research question sought to determine if imagined interaction activity differed according to the cultural context of the subject. In order to address this question the sample was divided according to Hall's (1976) definitions of low context and high context cultures. A T-test between groups was used to determine if differences existed. Results from the T-test indicated that there was a significant difference between the subjects from low-context cultures and subjects from high-context cultures (T = 2.79, df = 34, p < .009). An examination of the group means indicated that subjects in the low-context (N = 21; X = 27.6) culture group reported significantly higher amounts of imagined interaction activity than subjects in the high-context

(N = 15, X = 24) culture group.

Although no formal research questions or hypotheses were generated in the current investigation, analyses were performed on all other characteristics and functions of II's according to cultural context. Results from these analyses also indicated that subjects from low-context cultures reported greater amounts of imagined interaction variety, specificity, self-dominance, proactivity, retroactivity, and rehearsal, yet most of the differences were only marginally significant.

While the first research question relied more on the self-reported, quantitative aspects of imagined interaction activity, the second question dealt with more qualitative aspects of imagined interaction activity. The second research questions sought to determine if context-different L-2 acquisition would result in changes in certain aspects of imagined interaction. Subjects were asked to respond to seven open-ended questions regarding changes in their imagined interactions while acquiring a second language. The qualitative results of those responses are reported in the following section.

Responses to Open-ended Questions

The First Question Asked Subjects: "Did you notice your imagined interaction activity change when you became more fluent in your second language?" In the sample of international students, approximately 56% reported that their II activity increased as second language fluency increased. The respondents reported that as they gained fluency they were able to increase the level of their vocabulary, and found themselves planning less for interactions in their second language. One subject also reported she "imagined more openly in boy & girl relationships."

The Second Question Asked: "Did you find yourself using imagined interactions to translate from first language to second language?" Responses to question two varied greatly. Respondents found that when initially learning the second language they used II's to translate from their first language to their second. Other responses to the question depended upon length of time since language was spoken, situation, and importance of encounter.

The Third Question Asked: "Is there any topic that you have more imagined interaction in second language than in your first language?" Seventy-five percent of our subjects reported that there were specific topics that dominated their II's. Specifically, these topics pertained to self and encompassed philosophy, politics, career, education, past experiences, cultural differences and sex. Topics not pertaining to self included simple everyday phrases, and information about the United States.

Fourth, Subjects Were Asked: "Did imagined interaction activity increase at any time while learning a second language, or did imagined interaction activity increase when you were moving to a country where that second language was mostly used?"

Eighty-five percent of our sample reported that II activity increased when they first began to speak the second language. Another dominant theme that emerged from this question dealt with the anticipation of using the second language. Subjects responded that when they anticipated using a second language or knew they would be interacting with someone who spoke the language, II activity increased.

The Fifth Question Asked Subjects: "In imagined interaction, do you sometimes speak in your native language and the other person speaks in second language?"

The responses to this question were mixed, yet over half our subjects (56%) reported that there was no need to mix languages in their II's. Interestingly, although only 37% of our respondents said that they did mix languages, their reasons for doing so were attributed to their comfort level in second language, and lack of capacity (vocabulary) in their second language.

The Sixth Question Asked: "In your imagined interactions, do you and the other person both speak in your native language even though this person doesn't speak your native language?

Sixty-nine percent of our subjects reported that they did not assign their native language to the interactant(s) in their II. Reasons for this ranged from country that second language was spoken in to recipient's language. Those subjects who answered that they did assign their recipient their native language (25%) reported they did so because it aided self-expression and was convenient for the conversation.

Finally, Subjects Were Asked: "Are there some words that you just can't express in your second language, so while you have an imagined interaction and you want to express that word in your second language you use a similar word from your first language?"

Seventy-five percent of our sample responded that there were definitely some words that they could not express in their second language so they adapted a word from their first. These words tended to refer to emotional feelings or expressions, and slang phrases. Subjects also reported this adaptation was necessary because they became frustrated in trying to explain themselves and felt their first language could help them express themselves more accurately. The following section will discuss the results and implications of the present investigation.

Discussion

First, it is important to note that the present investigation was exploratory in nature. Because of an extremely low sample size, all results are to be interpreted with extreme caution. However, results from the present investigation provide a somewhat new theoretical look at an old topic: how does language influence thought? The current investigation theorized that both language and context provide interactants with simultaneous knowledge structures that underlie planning processes. As such, the first research question sought to determine the role that cultural context played in one type of message planning process, imagined interaction.

As theorized, results from the current study indicated that subjects from low-context cultures (e.g., American, European), where most of the information is vested in the explicit code reported significantly greater amounts of imagined interaction activity than individuals from high-context cultures (e.g., Japan, China, Mexico). However, it is important to note that subjects from both high and low context cultures reported relatively high levels of imagined interaction activity. One question for future research should focus on the universal nature of planning. In essence, scholars should seek to determine what elements of planning are found across languages and cultures.

While specific conclusions regarding the role that context plays in imagined interactions are not possible at this time, future research should look at how context serves as a knowledge structure interactants utilize during planning processes. Theorists such as Bock (1982) suggested that information processing occurs within different processing arena's. She suggested that at the referential level of information processing individuals code nonlinguistic representations of thought into a format that can be used by the linguistic system. Future research should work toward exploring at what level context relevant data is utilized in social information processing.

The second research question sought further exploration of the role that context and language play in imagined interaction. This question explored how context-different second language acquisition influenced or changed imagined interactions. The methods used to explore the second research questions were qualitative in nature.

Overall, respondents indicated that for context-different second language learners imagined interactions changed in a number of ways. First, in the initial stages of acquisition respondents reported that their II activity increased, as they became more fluent in the second language, their II activity decreased. When asked it there were any topics that were more prevalent in the second language II's, respondents reported that there were, particularly in regard to the self and to cultural philosophies. Interestingly, some respondents reported that upon becoming bilingual they often mix languages in their II's and would give a second language to individuals that they knew were only monolingual. These subjects indicated that this aided in their self-expression. Finally, respondents reported that there were some words or phrases in their first language that were difficult to express in the second language, and often in their II's they would simply use the word or phrase from their first language, even though the intended target would not ordinarily understand the word or phrase.

The qualitative data reviewed in the current study leads one to conclude, tentatively, that at least, learning a second language leads to changes in the quality of II's. Since we only examined subjects from what we termed "context-different" cultures, the research question under consideration needs further exploration. In order to draw in concrete conclusions, it is necessary for future research to include comparison samples of L-2 learns from "same-context" and "different-context" cultures. For example, research could investigate German speakers learning English compared to Japanese speakers learning English.

Finally, the current investigation has proposed that language and cultural context should be studied from a social information processing perspective. In order to understand fully how individuals process communication episodes, access and utilize knowledge structures, and put these knowledge structures to use, future research on social cognition must address the cultural aspects of information processing. Since plans and planning exert considerable influence on the generation of goal directed interaction, it is necessary to explore planning processes from a cultural perspective. Ultimately, a comprehensive theory of social information processing is one that addresses the impact of culturally relevant information.

References

Appendix A

Survey of Imagined Interactions (Sample Questions)

Below is a sample of questions from the Survey of Imagined Interactions. The questions detailed below assess the activity dimension of imagined interactions.

1. I have imagined interactions all the time.

No! No no ? yes Yes Yes!

2. I frequently have imagined interactions.

No! No no ? yes Yes Yes!

3. I rarely imagine myself interacting with someone else.

No! No no ? yes Yes Yes!

4. I rarely use imagined interactions to prepare for upcoming encounters.

No! No no ? yes Yes Yes!

 

Appendix B

Characteristics of Imagined Interaction and Second Language Acquisition

(Sample Questions)

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky


High- and low-context remains a puzzling concept to this reader. Greater reliance upon "the individual's internalized beliefs, values, and norms for the processing of social information" is difficult to grasp. Just how does imagined interaction relate to language and thought?

Letters as Intrapersonal Communication

Marvin D. Jensen

About the Author: Marvin D. Jensen is an assistant professor of Communication Studies, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA 50614. This article was assisted by funding from the Graduate College of the University of Northern Iowa. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association in Atlanta, GA, 1991.

Abstract: Letters are declining as a form of interpersonal dialogue, but remain an important record and means of intrapersonal communication. This article considers three kinds of letters that reflect and process inner communication: literary letters which disclose states of mind, letters that are monologues in dialogic form, and therapeutic letters which allow self-revision.

Perspective:


1. Sometimes, what appears to be communication to another person is really "thinking out loud"ñan intrapersonal act that appears to be an interpersonal statement. How often are letters like that? How often have your personal letters already achieved their purpose before being sent?

2. Are word processors destroying one record of intrapersonal communication? Are not the crossed out words in a hand written letter an important indication of second thoughts?

3. Can a grieving person find peace of mind by writing a letter to a person who has died?

Letters as expressions and records of interpersonal dialogue are becoming less frequent. In this age of telephones, tapes, and computer exchangesñbiographers of public officials are finding relatively few letters (see Isaacson, 1987). The 1990-91 Library of Congress exhibition of letters from Members of Congress to their spouses spanned 1791 to 1944, but it is improbable there could be a similar exhibit for later years. Similarly, the rich correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams has no known parallel in contemporary America. Future historians of our time will also lack the commonplace observations about daily life that ordinary letters contain. We can read the letters of pioneer women in Let Them Speak for Themselves (Fischer, 1977), witness the maturation of a mother-daughter relationship in Letters to May (Sarton, 1986), and appreciate the twenty-year correspondence between a New York woman and a London bookseller in 84 Charing Cross Road (Hanff, 1970); but these letters reflect earlier times and there will be few comparable records from the late twentieth century.

As the decline in letter writing eliminates some records of interpersonal dialogue, it simultaneously diminishes one means and evidence of intrapersonal communication. While letters are obviously instruments of dyadic communicationñthey are also conscious or unconscious records of thoughts and second thoughts, a way of sorting priorities, defining the self, resolving inner conflicts, and forging aspirations. The self-exploration visible in the voluminous letters of Stephen Crane and the torment disclosed in Virginia Woolf's correspondence will have few parallels as letter writing declines. The primary concern, however, is not the loss of an intrapersonal record, but the diminishment of an intrapersonal process that finds its best means in the letter form.

While recognizing that this process is threatened by the decrease in dialogic letter writing, this article will focus on letters in which intrapersonal communication is the primary purpose rather than a corollary to interpersonal dialogue. Among these self-oriented forms are literary letters which disclose states of mind, letters which appear to be dialogic but are actually self-talk, and therapeutic letters written after the death of the person addressed. Such letter writing may continue and increase even as traditional dyadic correspondence declines.


Letters as Literary Devices

Letters have occasionally been used as literary variations on the essay form. Because these letters are intended or available for publication and have usually developed particular topics, they impose a structure that may not directly mirror the authors' intrapersonal communication. Nonetheless, the nature of this letter form still reveals subtexts of inner speech.

Pope John Paul I wrote and revised a series of letters which are entitled Illustrissimi (Luciani, 1978). The letters are commentaries on social issues and philosophical questions, but they often focus on "smaller matters" such as fashion, adolescent infatuation, vacations, music, and "fishwives' language" (female cursing)ñand are filled with light-hearted parables. These often whimsical letters are addressed to Mark Twain, Maria Theresa of Austria, and Pinocchio, among many others. In his introduction to the published letters, Father Angelo Beghetto describes the simplicity and serenity of John Paul and believes these qualities are consistently revealed in his letters regardless of particular subject matter. John Cardinal Wright, in a foreword to the letters, finds them reflecting a man whose manner contrasts to the "sarcastic people, stridently indignant people speaking in glib phrases with a certain acid cleverness; but people without humor." Wright suggests that Christians have lost "the gift of laughter." He believes the letters reveal a frame of mind which perceives the world with a gentle humor, and contends that the real teaching of the letters is their example of a "light, confident, and happy manner" (Luciani, 1978, pp. ix, xii). The consistency of this tone suggests that the letters accurately reflect the inner voice of John Paul.

Another example of literary letters which reveal intrapersonal communication are The Hogarth Letters (Forster et al., 1985). These letters, first published in book form in 1933, were written at the invitation of Virginia and Leonard Woolf and John Lehmann. The authors (including E. M. Forster, Viscount Cecil, Rebecca West, and Louis Golding) were commissioned to write to "anyone, dead or alive, real or imaginary, on any subject" (Forster et al., 1985, p. vii). This concept of private letters made public is reminiscent of the eighteenth century devices of Swift, Burke, and Chesterfield. Virginia Woolf encouraged the letter writers to seek "the right relationship . . . between the self that you know and the world outside." Her admonition makes the letters relevant to this article, but was not easily followed by the writers. The "revealed self" easily becomes subordinated to social commentary and literary flare in an exercise of this kind. In her 1985 introduction to the letters, Hermione Lee asks: "What happens to the writer's privacy, sensuality, lyricism, dreams, magicñ'beauty'ñwhen the shocks and jolts of political reality, social conditions, scientific facts or colloquial speech are taken on board?" (Forster et al., 1985, p. xix). Virginia Woolf, herself, was apparently disappointed by some of the letters, finding those by Cecil and Golding too polemical. Her intentions were conveyed in a letter to John Lehmann: "I think your idea of a letter most brilliantñTo a Young Poet, because I'm seething with immature and ill considered and wild and annoying ideas about prose and poetry" (Nicolson & Trautmann, 1978, p. 381). Ultimately, the letters did convey a way of thinking which transcends the issues of the time, satisfying Woolf's intentions and making them relevant to an inquiry about intrapersonal communication. Lehmann (1955) wrote in retrospect:

The letters reveal the "tone" of "thinking liberals" of the 1930s and sometimes moreñe.g., Virginia Woolf's anxiety about her own work-in-progress in her letter about modern poetry (Forster et al., 1985, pp. xv, xxii). Lee invites us to view the letters not as discourses on dated topics, but rather as "an attractive repository of . . . inquiring, flexible, skeptical, unconforming intelligence" (Forster et al., 1985, p. xxviii).

Letters as Monologues in Dialogic Form

In a 1914 letter to Conrad Aiken, T. S. Eliot wrote: "Letters should be indiscretionsñotherwise they are simply official bulletins" (Valentine, 1988, p. 2C). John Cheever's letters, recovered and published by his son, are indiscretions in the sense that they reveal a dissonance which contrasts to the decisive voice in his completed fiction. Cheever's letters show, among other recurring patterns, his attempts to define his personal identity and refine images he later used in his stories.

Ben Cheever (1988) writes of his father's "inner struggle" to reconcile his sexuality: "My father was a man of massive and fundamental contradictions. He was an adulterer who wrote eloquently in praise of monogamy. He was a bisexual who detested any sign of sexual ambiguity" (p. 18). In the 1970s and 1980s, Cheever's inner struggle was reflected in love letters to both men and womenñletters which not infrequently discussed his wife and family. The following excerpt from a 1977 letter to a young man is representative and shows Cheever engaged far more in an intrapersonal reflection than an interpersonal correspondence.

In another letter several months later, Cheever seems to have been totally preoccupied with self-definitions when he wrote:

Cheever's need to emphasize his family life even as he envisaged an alternative is illustrated in the following letter from early 1978.

The inner conflict that is recorded in Cheever's letters was ultimately not a dissonance about his sexuality, but a struggle to find language encompassing enough to express his complexityña stretching toward an enlarged self-definition.

Cheever also used letters to try out images that he was mulling for possible use in his fiction. The following is the final paragraph of a letter to his wife in 1942.

His son Ben writes of the above letter:

Numerous other instances similar to the above can be found by comparing Cheever's letters to his fiction. For example, in a 1950 letter, he describes a cook at the family's summer camp as a "crazy Pole" who goes out to "feed the chipmunks, porcupines, birds, and fishes," shouting "eat, eat, eat" (B. Cheever, 1988, p. 146); in his short story "Goodbye, My Brother," he describes a "Polish woman" who was a summer cook and "fed the songbirds in the orchard and the chipmunks in the yard," calling "eat, eat, eat" (J. Cheever, 1978, p. 11).

Clearly, Cheever used letters as a means of trying out descriptions and searching for sense in his experiences. On some days, Cheever described the same events in several letters, each description somewhat different. Cheever inadvertently indicated the monologic nature of his letters in a 1968 message to Tanya, a Russian friend. He noted that his recent letters to her may have gone astray, but added that it really didn't matter (B. Cheever, 1988, p. 260). Possibly those lost letters had served their actual purpose as a means for Cheever to test his thoughts and refine his second thoughts.

Cheever is not unique in consciously or unconsciously turning a dialogic form into a monologue. During Václav Hovel's three-year imprisonment as a Czech dissident, his early letters to his wife emphasized their relationship. He made many references to her activities, and even commented about her way of dressing and her hair styles. His humor underscored his warmth toward her. But as an emotional distance widened between them, it was reflected in Hovel's letters. Franks (1990) writes: "His communications during the last year of his imprisonment deal almost exclusively with philosophy and his own moods and healthñOlga's name is barely mentioned, except in the salutations" (p. 146). Like Cheever in his letters to Tanya, Hovel seems to have continued a habitual form of communication, but the purpose had become meditative and the true receiver was now within himself.

Letters Without Living Receivers

Rachel Lavin (1991) is a professional grief therapist, and describes her approach in the following way.

Charles Ben Bissell discusses his own experience of addressing persons who have died. In a preface to his published letters to family members and friends, Bissell (1983) describes the experience of writing the first letter to his grandfather:

Although Bissell used the vehicle of a simulated dialogue, the experience he describes is essentially an intrapersonal one. He writes: "More and more the words relieved pressure I was not even aware existed. I felt like the man who did not realize how his shoes hurt until he took them off. I was removing weight and loosening vises that had been the culprit of headaches and fatigue for over twenty-five years" (1983, p. 4). Unlike true diologic letters which usually have a preconceived purpose, Bissell emphasizes that he never preplanned a word. He simply "found a quiet time, sat, and wrote whatever came to mind" (1983, p. 4).

Jean Steffey discovered a similar process during a three-year period of writing to her father who had died over two decades before of suicide. Her early letters in 1987 are primarily expressions of anger and a dredging to the surface of painful memories. In 1988, a turning point occurred when she asked her father to "please sit here and have a cup of coffee." She continued: "I have written many angry letters. This letter is to say hello." Finally, in 1989, she wrote: "Dad, I have let myself love you through these letters." This three-year process of moving from anger to forgiveness could be described as an interpersonal experience of making peace with her father; it may equally be described as an intrapersonal search for her own peace of mind. Steffey stresses that writing the letters was the means of developing a new internal response, not just a recording of stages already reached in her mind. Like Bissell, she emphasizes that the letters were not preplanned and she did not anticipate that she would "come to forgiveness." She finds that "she doesn't know what she is thinking until she writes it." She believes that "one reason it [the letter writing] helps is the necessity to be alone to do it" (Personal interview by M. D. Jensen, October 10, 1990, Cedar Falls, IA). As described by both Bissell and Steffey, the nature of this simulated dialogue requires a solitude which apparently frees the mind to process memories and emotions, and approach an inner resolution.

Early in the letter-writing process, Steffey was also painting a portrait of her father. She repainted it at least six times. She believes this nonverbal process helped resolve some pain and self-conflict before she was able to formulate honest and ultimately healing words. The creative act of painting, even though she describes herself as a "violent painter," allowed a physical release of emotion. She describes the importance of "making something tangible that is not distant, that can be touched and felt." She found it important to paint directly with her hands on the canvas, to involve the bodyñbecause "that's where the grief is: in your heart and stomach, not in your head" (Steffey, 1990).

The combined nonverbal and verbal expressions of Steffey's anger and grief parallel in many ways the processes reported by persons who have sewn memorial panels for The NAMES Project AIDS Memorial Quilt. Each panel is created for a person who has died of AIDS and most panels are accompanied by letters which are preserved in the archives of The NAMES Project Foundation in San Francisco. Approximately fifteen percent of the letters are addressed to the person who has died; others are addressed to The NAMES Project, and many have no salutation. In the 2615 letters studied by this author, a recurring theme is the letter writers' descriptions of the symbolism woven into the panels. Each panelmaker has chosen particular colors and textures and many have woven personal objects into the clothñincluding photographs, musical scores, jewelry, clothing, locks of hair, teddy bears, military medals, and a host of other symbols. Similar to Steffey's description of repainting as a physical means of releasing and resolving her inner conflict, panel makers describe the importance of sewing the panels and physically creating a pattern out of a chaos of emotions. One panelmaker wrote about her knitted lettering on the panel: "It took me several times to get it just right, but I keep saying this is the sweater I never got to make for Billy" (Letter to The NAMES Project, #192G).1 Another person wrote: "So many images come to mind about Bill, too many to put on a 3 x 6 foot piece of material. But that is one of the purposes of this project; to give us another time to sit and reflect on Bill who had such a great impact on our lives" (NP, #192G). Many panelmakers describe a violence, as in Steffey's painting, as they poured their frustration and grief into a tangible object. One panelmaker wrote in the accompanying letter:

Bruneau (1989) notes that "the word 'respect' literally means 'to see again' or 'to re-see.'" He believes that one dimension of intrapersonal communication is the "respecting" or "revisioning" of others. "We hear their voices and words again in our heads. . . . We re-cycle their images, acts, signs, symbols, events, social interactions" (p. 76). When Steffey wrote to her father and when survivors of persons lost to AIDS write letters, they are respecting, or enlarging, their vision of the other person. But simultaneously, and sometimes unconsciously, the writers "revision" or re(ins)pect themselvesñand often reach a larger self-definition. Steffey not only made peace with her father; she also found a new vision of herself as a daughter and parent. One writer to The NAMES Project said: "I must continue to take pride in the things that I think he would have liked in me; try to live up to the things he saw and wanted to nurture when I was too young to appreciate or understand" (NP, #648). A brother echoed this when he wrote: "I suppose the greatest tribute I can offer. . . is to simply live my life the very best way I know how and, at the same time, reflect the values of love, compassion, tenderness, and understanding that my brother taught me while he was alive" (NP, 871G). A friend of 19 years wrote: "I kept a cool distance from this man who was more like me than he knew or I would confess. . . . His search for love and self mirrored my own, yet his was in light and mine hid in darkness" (NP, #630). A father wrote: "If I can live with the dignity he showed in the face of the known, then I owe it to David, my son, for showing me the way!" (NP, #563). A sister wrote: "Since he has died, I have found within myself a gentle woman" (NP, #210). Another sister realized: "Those who survive must continue to nurture when they can no longer nurture their loved one" (NP, #767). A mother, after caring for her dying son and making his quilt, wrote that she had decided to finish her degree in nursing (NP, #35G). A lover wrote: "Knowing Richie . . . didn't change my life, it made it better. As a result I want to be more successful, more creative, more loving" (NP, #1413). A sister realized a larger definition of kinship when she and her husband were welcomed in Los Angeles by her dead brother's "family" (NP, #284G5).

Letters which are addressed to the person who has died often contain pledges. An example is this letter's final paragraph:

A cousin wrote:

In a stream of consciousness vein, a mother wrote:

Many of these letter writers are reinspecting, respecting, and enlarging their self-definitions as parents, lovers, friends, or caregivers. The most frequent descriptive words used by letter writers to the Quilt are "courage" and "dignity." They use these words in tributes to the persons being remembered; but their letters show, whether they realize it or not, that they have also grown in courage and dignity. Internal "reality maps" (see Roberts, Edwards, and Barker, 1987, p. 3) have been redrawn as self-perception has been tested and deepened. The movement from despair to heightened resolve which echoes through many of the letters seems captured in these lines about the young man for whom the first panel in the Quilt was made: "Marvin is somewhere up there. . . . He expects a lot from us, and we're not going to let him down" (NP #1241).

Conclusion

Letters have always served a secondary purpose of self-reflection even as they were an important means of dialogue. Now the dialogic purpose is diminishing, but the intrapersonal dimension continues and is sometimes more conscious. Letters will therefore survive in this technological age and continue to be an important means of communication. But these letters may be increasingly self-addressed.

Note

1The NAMES Project guarantees confidentiality to letter writers. The author, by permission of The NAMES Project, has coded the letters and these codes are preserved in archives maintained in San Francisco. Citations in this text refer to the codes and subsequent citations will use the abbreviated formñNP, #_ _ _. Many letters are undated but all fall within the period of 1987-1990. See also: Brown, J. Ed. (1992). A promise to remember: The NAMES Project book of lettersñremembrances of love from the contributors to the Quilt. New York: Avon.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky


In case we thought that communication is about sending information (transmission of ideas), Jensen's discussion of the intrapersonal versus dialogic function of letters sets us straight. Some letter writing, he argues persuasively, is for reflection and even self-reflection. It is a kind of thinking and "talking" out loud, exploring and discovering as we go. Could it be that such letter writing is a special case of a wide range of activities that masquerade as the prototype of communication, sending and receiving information between people, but are fundamentally reflective?

 

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