Part I: Foundations

Large file: Patience please

This first section contains articles that demonstrate the unique conceptualizations scholars have about intrapersonal processing. It seems useful to begin by discussing some of the controversies in this field of study. You will find topics at the core of this growing area of scholarship.

Where Do We Locate 'Intrapersonal Communication' Within The Cognitive Domain? (Leonard J. Shedletsky)

Gender-based Differences in Intrapersonal Communication (Kari L. Baumgartner)

Intrapersonal Perception and Epistemic Rhetoric: Playing Ball with the Neglected Umpire (Scott D. Johnson and Russell F. Proctor II)

Where Do We Locate 'intrapersonal communication' within the Cognitive Domain?

Leonard J. Shedletsky

About the Author: Leonard J. Shedletsky is on the faculty of the Department of Communication, The University of Southern Maine, 51 College Avenue, Gorham, Maine 04038. An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Scholars' Views, Western States Communication Association, Phoenix, Arizona, 1991.

Abstract: In this article, Dr. Shedletsky defines intrapersonal communication. He discusses the relationship of sensation and perception in advocating a cognitively-based definition. He ties the study of communication to the notion of meaning.

Perspective:

1. Does this article give you insights into the points of view expressed in Dr. Shedletsky's responses at the end of articles in this book?

2. What is meaning and how does it work in intrapersonal communication?

3. What sorts of cognitive operations are involved in the act of communication?

4. How do you define intrapersonal communication? Explain and defend your definition.

If we fully appreciate the role of the imaginative aspects of reason, we will give them full value, investigate them more thoroughly, and provide better education in using them. Our ideas about what people can learn and should be learning, as well as what they should be doing with what they learn, depend on our concept of learning itself. It is important that we have discovered that learning for the most part is neither rote learning nor the learning of mechanical procedures. It is important that we have discovered that rational thought goes well beyond the literal and the mechanical. It is important because our ideas about how human minds should be employed depend on our ideas of what a human mind is. (Lakoff, 1987)

Intrapersonal communication is about communication at the level of the individual. Some would define this level of communication as communication with one's self (Barker & Edwards, 1980; Weaver & Cotrell, 1985). While there is a sense in which such a definition is true, it is also misleading and not specific enough to be useful. It suggests that we are talking to our selves, as if we are both sender and receiver. But when would we say we are talking to our self and when would we say we are thinking about something? These do not seem to be the same thing. Is one intended to be intrapersonal communication and the other not? Such a definition suggests that the number of people involved is somehow critical but the number of selves is not, nor is the nature of self. Such a definition does little to differentiate between the individual and the self. Such a definition says something about the structure of the event, but tells us nothing about the nature of the event, the processes underlying the event. In this essay, I will offer a definition of 'intrapersonal communication' that is based in the cognitive processes that underlie intrapersonal communication; in that way I will attempt to locate intrapersonal communication1 within the cognitive domain. I hope you will bear with me, because I will take a giant step backward and several hops, skips and jumps to the side before I gather in the oomph to take a baby step forward.

Robert Fulghum (1989) got me wondering about what school is all about. He is the author of the best seller in which he proclaims that all he really needed to know he learned in kindergarten. He says he learned ideas like: put things away where you found them and don't hit people. At first, what he had to say sounded right to me, but it led me to wonder about what I learned after kindergarten. (To be honest, all I remember learning in kindergarten was how to zip up my jacket, or was that first grade?) Perhaps because I value speculation so much, it occurred to me that everything I needed to ponder engaged my mind during junior high school years. During those years, I took to peering through my microscope at creatures found in a drop of water. What gripped my imagination then was the response of a microscopic organism to the stuff of its environment. It seemed to me that even one cell paramecia bump into objects and adjust their trajectory; they seem to go around obstacles. In some way these simple organisms react to stimuli.2 This image of a one cell organism colliding with a speck and seeming to respond to it set in motion for me a curiosity about how living things negotiate their way about. I believe that some of the questions that struck me then are still the questions that motivate my interests in communication today.

What does my microscopic microcosm hold for one interested in communication? Picture, if you will, the image of a paramecium bumping into an obstruction. Further, picture the paramecium working its way around the obstruction. What can we say of this contact? Is this communication? If not, why not? What is missing? In essence, the question that is raised here is this: Is communicative behavior a special case of behavior, or is all behavior communication? For instance, are there particular internal, cognitive behaviors that are criterial to communication? Recently, Motley (1990) argued that not all behavior is communicative behavior and therefore that the Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967) axiom that one cannot not communicate is false. In this article, I agree with Motley's rejection of the Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson axiom, but for different reasons.

I will argue that the paramecium responding to the obstruction is not performing an act of communication, but it makes for behavior that is easily mistaken for communication, since, from the human perspective, at least from the Western human cultural perspective, we conceptualize this behavior as avoidance (see end note 2). It is worth noting that here, as elsewhere, the way we decide whether or not communication is occurring is not simply by reference to the outward behavior, but rather by the inward, cognitive behavior. That is to say, the concept avoidance suggests an act as opposed to a behavior, it suggests a plan (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). When we avoid something we act on a mental model of the situation. Such a cognitive reference is, of course, exactly what is required by the widely held view that intention is a criterial feature of communication.

The paramecium example, however, takes us headlong into the world of sensory psychology and not communication. Sensory psychology, where organisms and parts of organisms respond to the stimuli of their environment, is similar to a widespread concept of communication in that it is concerned with the transformation of energy into codes which deliver information to the organism (See Mueller, 1965). Roughly speaking, sensory psychology is involved with how the organism gains information from its environment, and roughly speaking that is what communication is about. But "roughly" needs to be smoothed out a bit, because sensory psychology and "communication" are not the same thing.

The study of sensation is concerned with the ways in which stimuli provide information, such as sound, vision, touch, temperature, movement, and smell. More specifically, sensation is about such variables as pitch and loudness, color, pressure, force, adaptation, intensity, acceleration, speed, location, size, weight, electrical change, sensitivity, threshold, discrimination, noticeable difference, acuity, and masking. It takes a close look at the relationship between the physical environment and the physiology of the organism. It is concerned with the physics of stimuli and the cellular and organ structure of the organism.

It is not clear just where sensation ends and perception begins. In fact, William James begins the second volume of his The Principles of Psychology with this: "Perception always involves Sensation as a portion of itself; and Sensation in turn never takes place in adult life without Perception also being there. They are therefore names for different cognitive functions, not for different sorts of mental fact" (p. 1, Vol. II).

At the same time, let us keep in mind that most theories of human communication are cognitively based. That is, theories of communication are concerned with perception, with how the mind assigns meaning. They are concerned with how we gain information about the environment, what that information is, and how we respond to it. If we are to sharpen communication theory, we need to examine closely its semantic and cognitive roots. We need to take a close look at the pervasive idea within communication theory that communication is an active rather than passive process. The idea that communication is an active process, by which reality is constructed, clearly has its roots in theories of perception.

Neisser (1967) reminds us: "The notion that perception is basically a constructive act rather than a receptive or simply analytic one is quite old. . .and was eloquently advanced by William James in 1890" (p. 94).

It is, I think, instructive to take note of some of the distinctions that James draws for us between the two mental functions, sensation and perception. Here is how James differentiates between sensation and perception: sensation is closer to a simple quality like hot, cold, red, noise, pain; perception is closer to a complex quality. The more the object cognized is ascribed with relations, the more it is something placed in a class, named, measured, compared, assigned to a function, the closer it approaches perception. Sensation, according to James, is a receptive act. Perception is a constructive act. Sensation is, in terms of knowledge, "mere acquaintance with a fact. Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge about a fact; and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication" (p. 2, Vol. II). I will propose to you, sticking with James' language, that when we "complicate" a sensation, we are engaged in (intrapersonal) communication.

But first let me say a few more words about what I think James means when he speaks of knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge about. Knowledge of acquaintance is to know something by way of direct experience with it. James gives the example of knowing the flavor of a pear when we taste it, knowing a second of time when we feel it pass, and knowing an effort of attention when we make it. Knowledge about is to have conceptual knowledge. Knowing about is "to operate upon it with our thought" (p. 222, Vol. I). James exemplifies the distinction this way:

In training-institutions for the blind they teach the pupils as much about light as in ordinary schools. Reflection, refraction, the spectrum, the ether-theory, etc., are all studied. But the best taught born-blind pupil of such an establishment yet lacks a knowledge which the least instructed seeing baby has. They can never show him what light is in its '"first intention;" and the loss of that sensible knowledge no book-learning can replace. (p. 4, Vol. II).

To summarize, then, sensation is closest to acquaintance and perception is closest to conception.

So where are we with regard to intrapersonal communication? If we hold that the act of communication is active, constructive of reality (as opposed to receptive of reality), then it would follow that we locate intrapersonal communication at least at the level of perception within the cognitive domain. Similarly, if we characterize intrapersonal communication as symbolic behavior, as involving encoding and/or decoding, then we locate intrapersonal communication at least at the level of perception. That is, if we define intrapersonal communication in terms of the cognitive operations involved, then, at the very least, it is an act involving conceptual thought. In Jamesian terms, to communicate is to come to know about. It follows from this formulation that we do not tell each other about our direct experiences (which we know of) ñinstead, we tell one another about what we know about, and, more generally, we communicate about what we know about as we make meaning.

This idea may seem like a transparent statement, and you may wonder why I bother to make it. I think that it is important for us to keep in mind that the study of communication is intimately tied to the notion of meaningñafter all, meaning is a central feature of conceptual thinking. If we are convinced that a behavioristic psychology, in which a mindless creature responds to stimuli, is not an adequate description of communication, then we must recognize the significance of meaning for our enterprise, and we must ask what is meaning and how does it work. Further, going back to the question title of this article, we can ask just where in the cognitive domain of meaning-making does communication first appear? Moreover, a focus upon cognition leads us to questions concerning individual differences and the influence of goals, motivation, language, discourse structure, context, memory, social rules, and imagination. It points to the significance of perception vis-à-vis overt behavior. With regard to a focus upon cognition, we can point to numerous studies that teach us that the perception of behavior is at least as important as the behavior itself and that the perception is a function of the individual and her or his perception of the context (e.g., see Argyle, Furnham, & Graham, 1981; Berger & Bradac, 1982; Fisher, 1983; Shedletsky, 1990; Zahn, 1989). Moreover, it would seem to follow from this view of communication that contextual variables influence communication by means of their impact upon perception. Put in other words, we ought to expect social-psychological variables to operate differently in differing contexts, and they do (see Amir & Sharon, 1987, 1990; Sharon & Amir, 1988). Still, another way of getting at the point here is to note that much (perhaps all) of ordinary human communication is not limited to literal meaning (see Shedletsky, 1989; Stubbs, 1983; Tannen, 1988, 1990). Having said that, just what literal meaning and indirect meaning are, and just how we make literal and indirect meaning, are precisely the questions begging for exploration.

This point is where we return to a definition of intrapersonal communication. If what has been said so far leads us to the conclusion that meaning-making, either encoding or decoding or both, is a defining feature of communication, then we must consider that communication may occur whenever an individual makes meaning. It is just that I would call intrapersonal communicationñmeaning-making. "Whether or not what is decoded originates inside or outside the body of the intrapersonal communicator, and whether or not what is encoded is actually expressed, leaked, or given off, intrapersonal communication has occurred" (Shedletsky, 1989, p. 94; see Goffman, 1959).

Intrapersonal communication concerns the processes of assigning meaning (e.g., the mental structures and the retrieval processes of memory) and the products of assigned meaning (e.g., schemata, labels, and memoriesñor more generally, representations).

This view of communication places emphasis on the interpreter (the receiver). No interactant is required. Nothing is implied about the intentions of the sender or the source of stimuli, the type of stimuli, the relationship between the stimuli and the idea, or the level of consciousness of either the sender or receiver. According to this view, if you think something like, "I have to get the laundry done," you have experienced (intrapersonal) communication. Or, when you think that a scene is beautiful, you have experienced (intrapersonal) communication.

What I am trying to say here and what I invite you to think about is the question: What sorts of cognitive operations are involved in the act of communication? I have been defining communication broadly, to include all instances of symbolic thought (see Cronkhite, 1986). If one limits communication to the prototypical case, where there is intended messages between two people having a face- to-face conversation, where do we place the cognitive behavior involved in deciding whether or not messages have been produced and sent, and whether or not they were intended? The answer is: within intrapersonal communication.

One great benefit in considering the cognitive operations involved is that it leads us to look more closely at meaning and meaning-making, rather than at information transmission. I am proposing that the process of acquiring knowledge of is not communication, but the process of acquiring knowledge about is. In other words, communication is located in the cognitive domain precisely where the cognitive processes underlying knowledge about occur. We may communicate about our knowledge of, but we do not communicate our knowledge of itself.

To summarize, meaning-making is closely connected to, and perhaps indistinguishable from, communication. I do not think my old paramecia friends were engaged in communication with their obstructions. I think that by now it should be obvious what I am about to say. They were not performing intrapersonal communication, even when they practiced their avoidance reaction, because they were not conceptualizing.3 Perhaps they were experiencing obstructions, but they were not knowing about them. They were, however, (unintentionally) communicating something to me.

Notes

1Italics mark concepts.

2My memory of my observations from thirty-four or so years agoñi.e., my memory of the response of paramecia to objectsñand my understanding of the event was shaky enough, so that after writing here my comments about paramecia seeming to go around objects, I sought out the biological literature, and was shocked to discover there talk about the avoiding reaction. For instance, Jones, 1974, writes:

The animal usually continues on a steady course until it meets some form of obstruction. The obstruction may be physical or it may be chemical (e.g., a region of high salt concentration). Upon meeting such an obstruction many ciliates perform an avoiding reaction in which they reverse the beat of their cilia, swim backwards a short distance, then recommence forward swimming in a slightly different direction. This maneuver they repeat until the obstacle is skirted. (p. 65)

Jurand and Selman (1969) also discuss the avoiding reaction in the ciliate protozoan Paramecium aurelia.

3An educated guess on my part.

References

Amir, Y., & Sharon, I. (1987). Are social-psychological laws cross-culturally valid? Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 18, 383-470.

Amir, Y., & Sharon, I. (1990). Replication research: A "must" for the scientific advancement of psychology. In J. Neuliep (Ed.), Handbook of replication research in the behavioral and social sciences. [Special Issue]. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 5(4) 51-69.

Argyle, M., Furnham, A, & Graham, J. (1981). Social situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Barker, L., & Edwards, R. (1980). Intrapersonal communication. Dubuque, IA: Gorsuch Scarisbrick.

Berger, C., & Bradac, J. (1982). Language and social knowledge. London: Edward Arnold.

Cronkhite, G. (1986). On the focus, scope, and coherence of the study of human symbolic activity. The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 72(3), 231-246.

Fisher, B. (1983). Differential effects of sexual composition and interactional context on interaction patterns in dyads. Human Communication Research, 9, 225-238.

Fulghum, R. (1989). All I really need to know I learned in kindergarten. NY: Ivy Books.

James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology II. New York: Dover.

Jones, A. (1974). The Ciliates. NY: St. Martin's.

Jurand, A., & Selman, G. (1969). The anatomy of Paramecium aurelia. New York: St. Martin's.

Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Miller, G., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Motley, M. (1990). On whether one can(not) not communicate: An examination via traditional communication postulates. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 54(1), 1-20.

Mueller, C. G. (1965). Sensory psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Sharon, I., & Amir, Y. (1988). Cross-cultural replications: A prerequisite for the validation of social-psychological laws. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), The cross-cultural challenge to social psychology. Newbury, CA: Sage.

Shedletsky, L. (1989). Meaning and mind: An intrapersonal approach to human communication. Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Shedletsky, L. (1990). Cognitive style, family handedness, and degree of laterality account for inconsistent sex differences in direction of gaze. In J. Neuliep (Ed.), Handbook of replication research in the behavioral and social sciences. [Special Issue]. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 5(4), 403-430.

Stubbs, M. (1983). Discourse analysis: The sociolinguistic analysis of natural language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Tannen, D. (1988). Conversational style: Analyzing talk among friends. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Tannen, D. (1990). You just don't understand: Women and men in conversation. NY: William Morrow.

Watzlawick, P. , Beavin, J., & Jackson, D. (1967). Pragmatics of human communication. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Weaver, R., II, & Cotrell, H. (1985, November). Imaging as intrapersonal communication: A conceptualization. Paper presented at a meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Denver, CO.

Zahn, C. (1989). The bases for differing evaluations of male and female speech: Evidence from ratings of transcribed conversation. Communication Monographs, 56(1), 59-74.

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

Shedletsky attempts to answer the question: "What is 'intrapersonal communication'?" His approach is to consider which cognitive operations are criterial to communication and to locate intrapersonal communication with them. He decides that meaning-making is the key. Implicit in his discussion is the idea that purely mechanistic stimulus- response interactions are not instances of communication, that communication is a symbolic, active, complex behavior. Moreover, he recognizes that he can only guess about what is or is not going on cognitively in another (species). In taking this stance, has he simply shifted the problem to the problem of understanding how meaning-making works? What do you think of the distinction he makes between the paramecium communicating to him but not itself engaging in intrapersonal communication, as he defines it?

Gender-based Differences in Intrapersonal Communication

Kari L. Baumgartner

About the Author: Kari L. Baumgartner is on the faculty of the University of Toledo. She is a doctoral student in interpersonal communication at Bowling Green State University.

Abstract: This article will draw connections between gender communication and intrapersonal communication and shed light on gender-based differences in intrapersonal communication. It will explore how it is that, as a rule, women and men hold different meanings for similar experiences, and what causes women and men to create different meanings and speak in different conversational styles. The paper proposes that the answer can be found in how the two sexes process information and how they communicate differently intrapersonally. A call is made for increased awareness about how females and males are conditioned to communicate using different styles with the hope that awareness of this phenomenon will improve the effectiveness of communication between genders.

Perspective:

1. How do differences in the ways women and men communicate intrapersonally impact the way they communicate with each other?

2. What implications arise for teachers from the argument that girls and boys are taught to communicate differently (from early childhood on) leading to problems in communication between the sexes later?

 

This article will extend the findings of gender communication research to intrapersonal communication and draw conclusions about how women and men communicate differently intrapersonally. First, this article will consider gender communication, next the field of intrapersonal communication and how it relates to gender will be discussed, and, finally, conclusions will be drawn about the link between gender and intrapersonal communication. Also, suggestions will be offered for countering any negative effects of gender-based differences in intrapersonal communication.

Gender Communication

This section will first present information from a review of the literature dealing with gender communication and how female and male children are taught to interact with others differently. The differences between female and male speaking patterns as well as the differences between female and male interpretations of and meanings for similar experiences also are considered.

Coates (1986) discusses how children learn language differently and how male and female children learn to 'think' differently because of their differences in gender. She contends that "language is an important part of the socialisation (sic) process, and children are socialised (sic) into culturally approved sex roles largely through language. Learning to be male or female in our society means among other things learning to use sex-appropriate language" (p. 133).

Graddol and Swann (1989) "explore the possibilities of a synthetic view in which language both helps construct sexual inequality and reflects its existence in society" (p. 165). Graddol and Swann discuss the claim by Maltz and Borker that women and men come from different sociolinguistic subcultures, "the rules of 'friendly interaction,' they argue, are learnt (sic) between five and 15, when a large part of the children's interaction with one another takes place in single-sex peer groups. Girls and boys adopt certain usages to signal their respective group membership and to differentiate themselves from the contrasting gender group" (p. 90). Problems arise when men and women interpret conversational features differently, "the differing interpretations can give rise to miscommunication between the sexes" (Graddol & Swann, p. 90).

Hill (1986) describes characteristics of female language traits as studied by Lakoff and discusses the double bind these put women in. Hill explains that "girls are taught to speak this language in order to become 'ladies,' but the results are unrewarding. Having internalized these rules for feminine parlance, women find that they are not taken seriously" (p. 11). A few of the female language traits are hedges, intensives, hypercorrect grammar, and superpolite forms.

Sheldon (1990) explains her research; "the boys' pickle fight fits Maltz and Borker's claim that boys use language 'to assert one's position of dominance.' The girls' pickle fight fits their claim that girls use language 'to create and maintain relationships of closeness and equality' and 'to interpret accurately the speech of other girls'" (p. 28). Sheldon argues that "the ways that conflicts are resolved, or whether they are resolved at all, have immediate consequences for the continued construction of the oral texts that embody their social interactions" (p. 29).

Sadker and Sadker (1985) report that "most teachers claim that girls participate and are called on in class as often as boys. But a three-year study we recently completed found that this is not true; boys clearly dominate the classroom. When we showed teachers and administrators a film of a classroom discussion and asked who was talking more, the teachers overwhelmingly said the girls were. But in reality, the boys in the film were outtalking the girls at a ratio of three to one" (p. 54). They claim that "the message is subtle but powerful: Boys should be academically assertive and grab teacher attention; girls should act like ladies and keep quiet" (p. 56). Women and men's styles of communicating begin to develop at a young age as a result of teacher reinforcement of 'correct' behavior. Sadker and Sadker explain that "the sexist communication game is played at work, as well as at school. As reported in numerous studies it goes like this: Men speak more often and frequently interrupt women. Listeners recall more from male speakers than from female speakers, even when both use a similar style and cover identical content. Women participate less actively in conversation" (p. 57). Women and men learn the 'appropriate' ways to communicate in school and continue to communicate using these styles throughout their lifetimes.

Warshaw (1992) claims that people are often misunderstood "because men and women frequently speak different languages. Sociologists, linguists, and psychologists are discovering that when a man and woman talk to each otherñespecially if they are intimatesñwhat the man hears is filtered through often unconscious beliefs about 'correct' roles for men and women, based on messages men receive from infancy on" (p. 67). The unconscious beliefs that Warshaw describes are components of intrapersonal communication and demonstrate a link between gender and intrapersonal communication. Teaching girls and boys differently in terms of communicating with others not only has an impact on their communication with others, but on their communication with themselves as well. Just as women and men generally communicate with each other using different styles, they also communicate differently intrapersonally.

Cameron, McAlinden, and O'Leary (1988) explain the Lakoff hypothesis by separating it into substance and explanation. The authors claim that the substantive claim details the existence of a typical female speech style. This style involves certain linguistic features such as hesitation, intensifiers, qualifiers, tag questions, rising intonation on declaratives, "trivial" lexis and "empty" adjectives. Cameron, McAlinden, and O'Leary explain that "what links these rather disparate linguistic phenomena is their alleged common function in communication: they weaken or mitigate the force of an utterance" and Lakoff's "explanation of why women use a 'nonforceful' style links unassertiveness with social norms of womanhood" (pp. 75-76). This adds to the already large body of research that concludes that women and men communicate differently because they were taught to do so.

Cameron (1985) agrees with Spender that women's experiences are different on the whole than men's experiences and that they generate differing meanings because of these differences. She explains that "the problem is that men control the processes by which meanings are encoded in language, and therefore language represents only male experience, excluding female 'meanings'" (p. 116). Tannen (1990) supports this idea when she states that it is women who must adapt to men's norms. Tannen explains how women may find differences when working in a mixed gender group versus an all female group, while men argue that there are no differences. This perception can be explained because it is the women who adapt to the men in the group and to their norms for behavior.

Spender (1985) contends that "males are not required to modify their understandings; they are never referred to as she/woman" (p. 154). Spender cites Smith, "women have largely been excluded from the work of producing forms of thought and the images and symbols in which thought is expressed and realised (sic)" (p. 143). Women adopt and adapt to men's symbol system rather than utilizing a symbol system of their own.

Aries (1982) claims that:

While females were verbally more dominant than males in over-all rates of interaction, they remained nonverbally more submissive. In addition, females' body positions became less dominant in the presence of men; their outspokenness verbally was tempered by their nonverbal behavior. . . . it is important now for women to become aware of what they are communicating nonverbally to provide themselves the opportunity to change behaviors that may be problematic for them. At the verbal level, while women may bring a style of interaction that is more reactive than that of men, in so doing they may help to promote an atmosphere in which individuals feel heard and responded to. (pp. 132-133)

Brown (1990) argues that:

Close attention to these situation-specific kinds of speech events will improve our understanding of how and when gender is implicated in interaction and, when it is, just how it affects women's and men's ways of speaking. Only then will we be in a position to address the more general comparative sorts of questions posed by Ochs: What kinds of meanings (social, pragmatic) are women and men likely to index in their speech in different kinds of societies, and how do such gender meanings relate to the positions and the images of men and women in society? (p. 140)

Tannen (1990) discusses how women tend to value intimacy and men tend to value independence. She argues that:

Muchñeven mostñmeaning in conversation does not reside in the words spoken at all, but is filled in by the person listening. Each of us decides whether we think others are speaking in the spirit of differing status or symmetrical connection. The likelihood that individuals will interpret someone else's words as one or the other depends more on the hearer's own focus, concerns, and habits than on the spirit in which the words were intended. (p. 37)

Tannen (1990) states that "playing the relationship game together is harder if you're playing by different rulesñor playing different games" (p. 187). We must make sure we are involved in a conflict of interest rather than of fighting style. Tannen summarizes by stating that "men and women learn to use language in the different worlds of boys and girls, and each group interprets the other's ways of talking in terms of its own" (p. 244). Tannen (1990) argues that "awareness can be a key to improving conversations and relationships among women and men . . . men and women often have different assumptions about the world and about ways of talking" (p. 296). Awareness of these differences can help men and women overcome the obstacles they present.

Tannen (1986) explains that:

The payoffs of indirectness in rapport and self-defense correspond to the two basic dynamics that motivate communication: the coexisting and conflicting human needs for involvement and independence. Since any show of involvement is a threat to independence, and any show of independence is a threat to involvement, indirectness is the life raft of communication, a way to float on top of a situation instead of plunging in with nose pinched and coming up blinking (p. 80).

Tannen (1986) contends that "because of this double bind, communication will never be perfect; we cannot reach stasis. We have no choice but to keep trying to balance independence and involvement (p. 34). We must understand and accept our human needs for independence and involvement, no matter which sex values which need more. Cameron explains that "the most widely held feminist idea about women's speech is that whereas men compete in conversation, women use cooperative strategies" (p. 41). It is important to note here that not all men compete in conversation, nor do all women use cooperative strategies; however, these communication styles are typical of men and women. By learning to understand and accept differences in communication styles we can lessen the likelihood of misunderstanding.

Smith (1985) argues that "there is considerable evidence that the norms of femininity and masculinity encourage women and men to construe communication situations and the goals of interaction somewhat differently" (p. 135). Smith attributes these differences to people's conceptions of individual differences in interpersonal style, social situation, and social episodes.

Kramarae (1981) lists several hypotheses that are suggested by the theory of women as a muted group. Kramarae discusses the argument that "females are more likely to have difficulty expressing themselves fluently within dominant (public) modes of expression. Males have more difficulty than females in understanding what members of the other gender mean" (p. 4). Kramarae argues that "we need to look not only at the way women's and men's world views are reflected or not in language, but also at the amount and types of speech practice of females and males" (p. 30). It is here that gender differences can affect intrapersonal communication.

Intrapersonal Communication

This section will begin with a general discussion of the field of intrapersonal communication as it relates to gender, followed by a discussion of the physiological processes involved in intrapersonal communication and how these may differ between the genders. Research deals with the right and left hemispheres of the brain as they relate to gender, and research details differences in the connection between the left and right hemispheres of the brain and how this differs in females and males will be discussed.

Pelose (1989) defines intrapersonal communication as "communication with/within oneself and . . . [it] involves introspection about one's thoughts, perceptions, and beliefs" (p. 135). Fletcher (1989) explains that it is "the process interior to the individual by which reality evolves and is maintained. The process involves muscles, hormones, neurotransmitters," and "the nervous system" (p. 190). Fletcher argues that "to a large extent intrapersonal communicationñfrom a psychophysiological perspectiveñis the interior neural manifestation of the social process of communication" (p. 200).

Because women and men are taught to communicate differently and they are taught to conform to different social norms, they often have different perceptions of themselves and how it is that they relate to society. Women are taught as young girls to be submissive and quiet and to value intimacy rather than independence. This value is reflected not only in women's intrapersonal communicationñwhat they say to themselvesñbut also in their communication with others. Similarly, men are taught as boys that they should be aggressive and speak out to assert their independence. This style of communicating is evidenced by many men's interactions with others, but it plays a part in their intrapersonal communication as well.

Elias (1992) reports that differences in male and female brains result in women's higher degrees of verbal fluency. She explains scientists' findings that reveal women tend to use both hemispheres of the brain when completing verbal tasks because they possess a larger bridge between the two hemispheres. This keeps both hemispheres of the female brain in close contact with each other producing synergistic results. These findings reinforce Tannen's conclusions that women value rapport talk while men value report talk. Women tend to communicate both to convey information and to develop and maintain relationships with others, while men communicate primarily to convey information to others. Women tend to be more fluent communicators because conveying information is not their only 'mission,' and they tend to be more involved in their interactions with others than men do.

Intrapersonal Gender Communication

Given the preceding information about gender communication and intrapersonal communication, it is important to consider how females and males communicate differently intrapersonally. This section of the paper will present some conclusions about the reasons for these differences.

Stacks and Sellers (1989) argue that when individuals interact with one another they learn societal rules for communicating with each other and this leads individuals to construct meaning according to the boundaries established by these rules. They continue, "self-esteem comes about through this process of identification with society and the concept of self as viewed within the framework of society. Role identification and modeling provide for individualistic behavior in a variety of situations as interpreted by the self and the perception of individuality" (p. 255). The processes of interpersonal communication and intrapersonal communication are inextricably linked, with each affecting and impacting on the other. How people interact with others will affect how they see themselves, and likewise, how they see themselves will impact how they interact with others. By fostering an educational system that teaches boys and girls to communicate differently, we are teaching them to see themselves as different from each other, imparting an artificial differentiation that can only provide for misunderstandings between the sexes.

So many of the differences between the way in which women and men communicate differently intrapersonally can be attributed to the ways in which they were taught to communicate as children. Awareness of the differing treatment of girls and boys may help to decrease it and result in more equal and improved communication between the sexes. As boys and girls are taught to communicate differently and to value different communication behaviors, they come to communicate differently intrapersonally. Fletcher contends that "the interpersonal communication acts of an individual are reflexive to the extent their appearance and consequences re-enter the individual to become additional 'realities'" (p. 190). It is a logical extension to argue that if men and women tend to communicate differently interpersonally, then they will also tend to communicate differently intrapersonally. This raises two issues of import; first creating awareness of the differing treatment of boys and girls concerning acceptable communication behaviors, and secondly, fostering awareness of the different ways that men and women communicate intrapersonally.

Conclusions

This article establishes a link between gender communication and intrapersonal communication, as well as presents possible causes for gender differences in intrapersonal communication. Reasons for differences between the genders in intrapersonal communication range from differences in the physiological makeup of the brain of females and males to differences in how females and males are taught in early childhood. Finally, suggestions are offered to counter any negative effects of these differences as well as a call is made for awareness of the differences in gender communication.

The manner in which girls and boys are taught to communicate differently combined with the physiological differences in the brains of women and men suggest that women and men communicate differently intrapersonally and these differences impact their interpersonal relations. These differences must be understood to lessen the likelihood of misunderstandings between the sexes.

Awareness of the ways in which girls and boys and women and men are taught to communicate differently is the cornerstone of improving the communication between the two. Teachers must be aware of the effects of reinforcing different communication styles among girls and boys, and women and men must be made aware of the differences that often exist as a result of these early childhood teachings. Awareness will allow women and men to build bridges over what used to be large communication gaps between the genders. Warshaw cites Jacobson who advises "listening with what she calls an 'inner ear' to hear your concerns and speaking calmly while revealing your own feelings (p. 70). This 'inner ear' can be explained as a function of intrapersonal communication as one attempts to put herself or himself in the other's position to reach understanding.

Enholm (1980) takes the position "that symbolic interaction is the most appropriate and productive theory to use in eliminating sexism because the way we communicate and the way we use language, determine the way we relate as human beings" (p. 126). Awareness of differences in the symbol systems of others is key to the reduction of conflicts between women and men in communication. Tannen (1986) states that standing back, reframing, and looking at situations with wider lenses will help alleviate misunderstandings that can arise when people communicate with each other. Awareness of the differences between the way women and men tend to communicate interpersonally and intrapersonally is key in lessening misunderstandings concerning the communication between the two.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

Baumgartner links gender communication and intrapersonal communication, for instance, in describing how experience "is filtered through often unconscious beliefs about 'correct' roles for men and women." Such beliefs are said to be learned as we learn our sex roles as children. Moreover, Baumgartner speculates that intrapersonal communication differences between boys and girls is a result of interpersonal communication differences. At the same time, she refers to research on brain differences between males and females, suggesting that some aspects of gendered communication differences are biologically linked. Baumgartner suggests that some findings from brain research "reinforce Tannen's conclusion that women value rapport talk while men value report talk." Yet Baumgartner contends that the way we are taught to communicate interpersonally is what is responsible for how we communicate intrapersonally.

There is a layering here of valuing some outcomes over others (i.e., no differences), highlighting learning and awareness, while finding biology supportive of some gendered differences. There is room to debate just how the lines of causation run and which components make up the system. What is to be valued?

Intrapersonal Perception and Epistemic Rhetoric: Playing Ball With the Neglected Umpire

Scott D. Johnson and Russell F. Proctor II

About the Authors: Scott D. Johnson is an assistant professor of Speech Communication at Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY 14850-7292. Russell F. Proctor II is an assistant professor of Communication at Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, KY 41076. The authors express their appreciation to Richard L. Weaver II for framing some of the terminology.

Abstract: Positions in the ongoing debate regarding rhetorical epistemology can be typified by a continuum with objectivists at one end and intersubjectivists at the other. This essay suggests that a middle position may better serve the communication discipline. The authors provide an overview of the debate, then present three common uses of the term "reality" (objective reality, social reality, and intrapersonal reality) as guides for understanding the positions of the debaters. New labels for these uses of "reality," combined with a discussion of the vital role of intrapersonal processes in epistemology, provide a position that emphasizes the significance of both symbols and their referents. Such a position satisfies the demands of the rhetorical and social science approaches to the study of human communication.

Perspective:

1. Do you agree with the authors' assertions that the neglected umpire is the one that best fits the communication discipline? Why or why not?

2. From your knowledge of articles published in communication journals, which umpire best describes the kind of research typically conducted by communication scholars? Which umpire should be describing communication scholarship? Defend your answer.

3. What role(s) do you think communication plays in the way human beings learn and discover?

 

During recent conventions of the Speech Communication Association, it has been interesting to hear scholars of diverse stature and sub-division discussing issues related to epistemology. A variety of presentations have directly or indirectly proclaimed the demise of either postmodernism or objective reality. The debate has not been restricted to official panels; a somewhat-heated discussion was overheard in a coffee shop at one convention between two professors clearly new to the debate. One presented cogent arguments for the pursuit of objective reality, the other held fast to the notion that the self-reflexive nature of personal knowledge precludes direct contact with whatever may be "out there." Despite the funeral pronouncements, it appears that both positions are alive and active within the discipline.

One of the most frustrating aspects of this debate is the lack of definitional clarity for the term "reality." Rather than developing different words to help us distinguish between varying meanings, scholars have assigned radically different meanings to the same word. "Reality" is used as suits the rhetor's purpose with the assumption that others both share and agree with that person's definition. Such assumptions blur rather than facilitate our dialogue on this important topic. This essay will propose some definitional guidelines to assist our communication. We will offer new descriptors for three prominent ways "reality" is used in our scholarship, discussing each term's position in the debate. Ultimately, we will make the case that one of these positionsñthe one that accounts for our intrapersonal perceptionsñis most useful for understanding and articulating the link between rhetoric and epistemology.

The Present Debate

There is a rather well-defined debate within communication regarding the role of rhetoric in epistemology. Scott's (1967) seminal piece, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," established rhetoric as the creator of what is "real" and placed it at the core of all that is known. Scott asserted that reality is socially constructed through rhetoric. The assignment of meaning gives existence substance and significance. Some recent theorists, most notably Cherwitz (1977), Cherwitz & Hikins (1982), Hikins (1989, 1990), Hikins and Zagacki (1988), and Orr (1978), have disputed that position and moved rhetoric to a place of prominence, but one that falls short of reality-creation.

A well-known analogy is used here to help define and illustrate the positions in the debate:

The story goes that three umpires disagreed about the task of calling balls and strikes. One said "I calls them as they is." The second one said, "I calls them as I sees them." The third and cleverest umpire said, "They ain't nothin' till I calls them" (Simons, 1976, p. 29).

The poles of the debate continuum are typified by the first and third umpires: "I calls them as they is" and "They ain't nothin' till I calls them." Which umpire do we, as a discipline, want to put behind the plate? We must first understand each umpire's approach to calling balls and strikes.

The Objectivist Umpire

At one pole in the debate is the umpire who states, "I calls them as they is." This end of the continuum, here simply titled the "objectivist" position (sometimes equated with "logical positivism" or "logical empiricism"), holds that reality is knowable and quantifiable. Scholars in this position are said to be pursuing laws which govern human behavior, with the goal of grasping the cause-and-effect nature of observed events (see Fisher, 1978). The intended meaning of the term "reality" for those espousing such a position might best be labeled "OBJECTIVE REALITY." Objective reality is that which exists separate and distinct from human conceptualizations of it. The discovery of this reality's "brute facts" is the focus of scientific study.

Exaggerated versions of this position (i.e., all human behavior is governed by laws; all that is "out there" is readily accessible) are used in arguments against objectivism, though, few in our discipline would ascribe to such extremes. Many, however, employ scientific methods that are consistent with this approach.

The Intersubjectivist Umpire

The opposite pole in the debate is represented by the umpire who says, "They ain't nothin' till I calls them." This position, labeled "intersubjectivism" by Orr (1978) (most closely related to the current "postmodern" perspective), locates reality within and among human interactants. Meanings determine existence, and ontological characteristics are both irrelevant and unknowable. Objective reality is either inaccessible to us, or it does not exist at all (Watzlawick, 1981). What is known is "known" only through the interaction of symbol systems. There is no objective Truth or standard by which to judge existence except consensus and utility. There may be a physical world, but knowledge of it can only be derived through intersubjective agreement.

Intersubjectivists use the term "reality" quite differently from objectivists. The intersubjectivist meaning for the term might best be labeled "SOCIAL REALITY." Social reality assigns reality-creating power to societies. Berger and Luckmann (1967) captured this idea in the title of their well-known work, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. While their book is often cited to support the intersubjectivist position, it seems apparent from their title and introduction that Berger and Luckmann were not asserting that people create reality; rather, in their social interactions, they act as though what they believe is real. Thus, their book might better be titled "The Construction of Social Realities." In any case, the notion that all is constructed through social interaction remains a common application of the term "reality"ñone that works well for intersubjectivists.

Social realities, according to the intersubjectivists, are created through communication (thus the appeal of this position for rhetorical scholars; see Orr, 1978). Through symbolic interaction, individuals co-create the things of the world. Rather than objective reality operating as the standard by which we measure, consensus and utility serve that function. Extreme applications of social reality can be found in the works of intersubjectivists such as Brummett (1979), who contends, "rhetoric creates all of what there is to know. . . .Furthermore, no reality that humans experience exists apart from human values, perceptions, and meanings" (p. 5. Cited in Croasmun & Cherwitz, 1982). From this position, social reality precludes access to objective reality. Our given symbol system serves to erect an impassable barrier between us and anything else that might be; therefore, it inhibits, even blocks entirely, our access to objective reality.

The existence of an objective reality is not denied by most communication theorists, whatever their position in this debate. Watzlawick (1976), though unquestionably an intersubjectivist, discusses what he calls "first-order reality": "Let us, therefore, use the term first-order reality whenever we mean those aspects which are accessible to perceptual consensus and especially to experimental, repeatable, and verifiable proof (or refutation)" (p. 14). Bateson (1979), another intersubjectivist, has what he calls "a box" for things like sticks, stones, and billiard balls, though he chooses, admittedly, not to deal with them. The key distinction here is access. Intersubjectivists believe humans have no access to objective reality; objectivists believe humans have direct, unlimited access to it.

The Neglected Umpire

The positions just presented represent polar extremes in the current debate. These positions might be placed on a continuum:

ObjectivistñññññññIntersubjectivist

First UmpireññññññThird Umpire

Objective RealityññññSocial Reality

On such a continuum, however, one of the umpires in our illustration is not being considered. The umpire who said, "I calls them as I sees them" has been neglected. It is the contention of this essay that this umpire holds the key to resolving the debate. Despite the accolades of both Simons (1976) and Weick (1979) calling the third umpire the "cleverest" because he "correctly asserts" that "They ain't nothin' till I calls them," it is the second umpire ("I calls them as I sees them") who provides the only epistemological position that offers something to all scholars across the discipline of communication.

The approach in the literature that best typifies the neglected umpire's perspective is Orr's (1978) "critical rationalism." This position has objectivist underpinnings in that it maintains reality is "out there" separate from human thought or design. Reality is objective, able to be discovered by human beings, and not dependent on the human mind for its existence. Critical rationalism also affirms intersubjectivity as it acknowledges the vital importance of interaction in ascribing meaning to the world. Meaning is significant in that it plays a sense-making roleñbut not a reality-creating role. Human beings have access (albeit limited) to objective reality via the senses and experimentation. Meaning is attributed and sense is made of experience through the use of learned symbols assigned to actual referents. While all of reality cannot be known by a single individual, an individual's beliefs about the world have a standard by which they can be measuredñobjective reality.

This third position, located between the poles on the debate continuum, recognizes a neglected dynamic that can be labeled "INTRAPERSONAL REALITY." Intrapersonal reality is, in essence, the view of the world within each of us. It is the perception of reality that people construct for themselves. It involves "the physiological and psychological processing of messages that happens within individuals at conscious and non-conscious levels as they attempt to understand themselves and their environment" (Roberts, Edwards, & Barker, 1987). Although it is substantively influenced by interaction with others, it is as unique as a fingerprint and continually growing and being reshaped. When we hear people say "That is her reality" (regardless of their intended meaning), we are hearing people refer to intrapersonal processes. Those intrapersonal processes are the locus of meaning (Cronen, Pearce, & Harris, 1982) and provide the impetus for action. Toward that end, our unique, individual world-views form the basis for our behavior. Your intrapersonal reality is giving meaning to these words and is the cause of the response you have as you read them.

Before we discuss intrapersonal reality further, it is essential that we adjust our use of terminology. As we contended earlier, one of the problems in the present debate is the way people use (and abuse) the word "reality;" therefore, relabeling is crucial for moving forward. Henceforth, we will retitle "social reality" "NEGOTIATED PERCEPTION" and "intrapersonal reality" "INTRAPERSONAL PERCEPTION." The word "reality" will then be reserved for "objective reality"ñthe world that is "out there."

"Negotiated perception" involves the interaction of individuals who assign meaning and understanding to the world around them. Reality is not created by negotiated perception; rather it is given meaning through consensus. That meaning is verified and revised by a continual process of testing and retesting. If the meaning attributed does not match what is known or found in reality, it is adjusted or replaced. "Intrapersonal perception" takes a similar course. Our individual perceptions do not create reality, but rather give meaning to the world around us (including to the "negotiated perceptions" of groups with which we interact). We act on the basis of how we view the world, but neither reality nor the negotiated perceptions within which we live tolerate all views equally well. Standing in the path of an on-coming train, regardless of the meaning attributed to the locomotive, carries certain verifiable consequences. Similarly, holding a meaning that differs dramatically from that of the surrounding negotiated perception carries societal consequences.

Relabeling these terms returns "reality" to its general and familiar definition and reinstates meaning as a matter of perception (individual and/or negotiated) about the real world. With these terms and definitions in hand, we return to exploring the domain of the neglected umpire, whose intrapersonal perception allows him to "call them as he sees them."

Intrapersonal Perception

Our intrapersonal perception begins with our sensory contact with the real world. Our visual, aural, olfactory, oral, and tactile encounters with reality stimulate intrapersonal sense-making. Reality is "out there," igniting our intrapersonal processes. Our sensory contact with reality and with those who live in it creates meaning for us, but our meaning does not create reality. Those things to which we have not yet assigned meaning still exist in the world; it is not our sense-making that brings them into being. To believe that things which we have not perceived do not exist is to limit our capacity for change or learning. If there is nothing beyond those things to which we have attached meaning, then what is there that is not already known? By what manner could we learn symbol systems or adopt new views of reality? Additionally, the world we encounter with our senses has distinct, consistent patterns and characteristics. If it did not, we would have no reason to redefine our intrapersonal perceptions except for whimsy. The earth would still be flat and the universe would continue to revolve around it! Moreover, this objective world must be at least minimally accessible and stable for there to be consistency within our intrapersonal perceptions and overlap across perceptions. Those who profess consensus as the creator of that overlap must struggle with the question of the existence of those who share the consensus. Do the others with whom we agree exist within us, or do they exist "out there" in a world that is separate from us? There is an inherent circularity in professing direct contact with other symbol holders while denying contact with the world in which they live.

Reality also serves to validate or invalidate our perceptions. For instance, the negotiated perception that the earth was flat did not hold up to the measure of objective reality. While some might contend that consensus about the earth being flat made it so for those who believed it, it is doubtful those same theorists would say the earth changed its shape from flat to spherical just about the same time consensus shifted. Reality also impinges on such events as people arguing about a disputed "fact." Two individuals may argue and debate from their own intrapersonal perceptions to no apparent end, but when one pulls out a handgun and fatally shoots the other, reality becomes undeniable. The death of one arguer and the resulting incarceration of the other (as a result of a jury's negotiated perception of the law and the behavior) become elements of reality difficult to debate.

Thus far, we have claimed that intrapersonal perceptions result from sensory interactions with the real world. It might seem as though we are discounting the role of communication in shaping those intrapersonal perceptions. We have done so purposefully to emphasize the impact and import of reality as external and objective phenomena. We suspect that few in our discipline need to be convinced of the importance of communication in shaping our intrapersonal perceptions. Without question, negotiated perception plays a vital role in the creation and molding of our intrapersonal perception. Through communication, we share with one another our negotiated and intrapersonal perceptions. We use our symbol systems and our ability to attribute meaning in the negotiation of shared understanding. The shared understanding that exists in society is imparted to us from our very first moments of life. We learn the symbol systems, negotiating their meaning with those around us as we develop values, attitudes, and beliefs that are shared with others. Also, we establish our self-concepts, in large measure, through the input of others (see, for example, Mead, 1934). That self-concept becomes a foundation for the way we make sense of our actions, our society, and reality.

Our intrapersonal perception may vary in minimal or significant ways from the negotiated perceptions of society because of our own unique neuronal, sensory, and perceptual processes, as well as our life-experiences. Heroes, rebels, and martyrs often find their intrapersonal perceptions at odds with the negotiated perceptions of the societies in which they live. The difference may be so significant that the individual is eliminated or the negotiated perception is radically altered. While some individuals or groups may develop very similar perceptions, those perceptions are never completely sharedñsome differences are always present. Negotiated perceptions may shape and mold our intrapersonal perceptions, but those intrapersonal perceptions are ultimately unique. While the contribution of our society is vast and fundamental, the individual still distinctly shapes that contribution.

Pulling It Together

So which umpire is the cleverest? The first umpire claims he "calls them as they is," failing to recognize that what "they is" is a matter of negotiated perception (as baseball fans know, the strike zone has changed many times in the sport's history). The third umpire claims "they ain't nothin' till I calls them," failing to acknowledge that regardless of his call, there is a baseball traveling through space (that will remind him of its reality if he steps in front of it). The second umpire, however, recognizes that he has sensory contact with a real baseball in a real world. His perception doesn't create the baseball or its trajectory, but it does create meaning. That meaning is determined by his sensory acuity and negotiated perceptions of the strike zone. Others may disagree with his judgment, but it's based on the best information he has. After all, he calls them as he sees them. All the participantsñthe umpire, the players, the fansñwill now communicate about their intrapersonal and negotiated perceptions of a very real pitch.

It seems logical and functional to consider the interaction of all three elementsñreality, intrapersonal perception, and negotiated perceptionñas we study communication. There are real communicators interacting within a real world using their intrapersonal perceptions in combination with their negotiated perceptions to create meaning. In acknowledging all of these elements, communication researchers can do their work in a world of real communication events created by actual communicating beings. We may find that those whom we study hold perceptions of reality (either individual or negotiated) that are different from our own. We must either accept or challenge those differences, measuring them against our best understanding of reality.

In 1991, Berger made a call to the communication discipline for "big questions." One such question might be "What does the discipline of communication believe about its role in epistemologyñin the knowing about knowing?" By taking a stand in the middle of the epistemic continuum, embracing the wisdom of the second umpire, we can provide an answer that works for all of us. Yes, objectivists, reality is out there and we have at least minimal access to it. Yes, intersubjectivists, we assign meaning toñliterally make sense ofñthat reality through symbolic interaction. Both can be true at the same time when we acknowledge that we calls them as we sees them.

Two key implications of such a stand present themselves:

First, the acceptance of a diversity of methodologies and methods becomes both possible and necessary. The need for approaching scholarly questions from quantitative, qualitative, and rhetorical critical perspectives is emphasized when adopting an "I calls them as I sees them" view. There are important questions that each methodology can answer about every communication event. The interaction of reality and perceptionsñnegotiated perceptions of a baseball game's importance, intrapersonal perceptions of winners and losers, and the baseballs and strike zones themselvesñpresent all types of scholars with opportunities to contribute substantively to our understanding of the function and effect of communication.

Second, the role of the discipline of communication in the academy can be more clearly and carefully defined. Cronkhite's (1986) assertion that communication scholars study human symbolic activity effectively provided the discipline a "niche" of our own. Applying an "I calls them as I sees them" perspective helps further define the discipline's role. It is our assertion that communication functions in the gaps between reality, intrapersonal perceptions, and negotiated perceptions. In the meeting of an individual and reality, in the meeting of individual perceivers, and in the meeting of collectives there is the symbolic activity we call communication. Human symbolic activity is the only means toward cooperative activity (beyond chance) and the key to developing and framing knowledge in useful manners. Communication scholars study the interaction of reality and perception with the countless pursuant variables and contexts. Acknowledging that "we calls them as we sees them," communication scholars find a place in the academy that is neither disconfirming of other academic pursuits nor weak and indefensible. Our discipline serves to study the glue that binds human beings together with one another and the world in which they live.

References

Response from Leonard J. Shedletsky

Johnson and Proctor make a neat division between three points of view concerning reality. First, the Objectivist position: Objective reality is knowableñit is separate and distinct from human conceptualization of it. Second, the Intrapersonal Perception position: Reality is what we construct for ourselves from our perceptionsñour perception. Third, the Intersubjectivist position: Reality is only knowable by means of intersubjective agreement. People act as though what they believe is real.

The position that is especially problematical is the Objectivist position. Johnson and Proctor assume that we have access to objective reality, that there are times when we call upon it to neatly resolve a debate. They write: "Reality also serves to validate or invalidate our perceptions. For instance, the negotiated perception that the earth was flat did not hold up to the measure of objective reality." If that were the case, then I think that umpire #1 should get a lot work and #'s 2 and 3 could do some clowning during the seventh inning stretch.

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