1. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2 (Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason), trans. Thomas McCarthy, Cambridge: Polity Press 1987, pp. 361-73.

2. Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1992, pp. 502-3.

3. Faktizität und Geltung, p. 502.

4. The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 362, 369.

5. Ibid., pp. 372-3 (trans. altered).

6. Faktizität und Geltung, p. 536.

7. Ibid., p. 44.

8. Claus Offe, "Bindings, Shackles, Brakes: On Self-Limitation Strategies", in A. Honneth et al., eds, Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press 1992, p. 86. Cf. Gunther Teubner's argument that juridification finds itself confronted with a 'regulatory trilemma': if legal norms do not transgress the boundaries of social domains which have their own internal steering mechanisms, they will remain ineffectual; however, in overstepping these limits they risk triggering consequences which will have 'disintegrative effects' either on the intergrity of law itself, or on the integrity of the relevant social domain. (Gunther Tuebner, "Verrechtlichung - Begriffe, Merkmale, Grenzen, Auswege", in Friedrich Kübler, ed., Verrechtlichung von Wirtschaft, Arbeit und sozialer Solidarität, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984, esp. pp. 313-25.)

9. The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p. 371 (trans. altered).

10. Jürgen Habermas, "Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität: Zur Diskussion über 'Stufe 6"', in Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik, Frankfurt am Main 1991, p. 69.

11. Ibid., p. 72.

12. Andreas Wildt, Autonomie und Anerkennung: Hegels Moralitätskritik im Lichte seiner Fichte-Rezeption, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1982, p. 153.

13. Ibid., p. 176.

14. Axel Honneth has recently pointed out, in a critique of Ulrich Beck, that 'de-traditionalisation' should not be automatically equated with processes of the loss of community. Cf. Axel Honneth, Disintegration: Bruchstücke einer soziologischen Zeitdiagnose, Frankfurt am Main 1994, p. 25.

15. Faktizität und Geltung, p. 566.

16. Ibid., p. 568.

17. Ibid., p. 12.

18. Ibid., p. 570.

19. Cf. Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1992, pp. 9-10.

20. Habermas claims that: 'One can at least affirm that, to the extent that a rationalized lifeworld encourages the formation of a public sphere with a strong basis in civil society, then the authority of public attitudes in the context of escalating public controversies is strengthened'. (Faktizität und Geltung, p. 462)'.

21. On this see Claus Offe, "Bindings, Shackles, Brakes", pp. 63-5.

22. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Edmund Husserl über Lebenswelt, Philosophie und Wissenschaft", in Texte und Kontexte, Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 48. Cf. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, London: Sage 1992.

23. "Edmund Husserl über Lebenswelt, Philosophie und Wissenschaft", p. 48.

24. Ibid.

25. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson, Cambridge: Polity Press 1995, p. 174.

26. Ibid., pp. 106-7.

27. Cf. Ibid., pp. 107-11.

28. Ibid., p. 125.

29. Ibid., p. 122 (trans. altered).

30. Cf. Faktizität und Geltung, p. 506-15.

31. Cf. The Struggle for Recognition, ch. 9.

32. Cf. Ibid., p. 179.

33. Ibid., p. 227.

34. Cf. Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh PA: Duquesne University Press (no date), and Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self, Cambridge 1989. The Lévinas phrase cited is from p. 215.

35. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter", in Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy, eds., After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1987.

36. Martin Seel, "Die Zwei Bedeutungen 'kommunikativer' Rationalität. Bemerkungen zu Habermas' Kritik der pluralen Vernunft", in Honneth and Joas, eds., Kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986, p. 55.

37. '... denn jeder Diskurs ist sozusagen unmittelbar zu Gott'. (Habermas, "Entgegnung", in Kommunikatives Handeln, p. 343.)

38. "Edmund Husserl über Lebenswelt, Philosophie und Wissenschaft", p. 34.

39. Jürgen Habermas, "Exkurs: Transzendenz von innen, Transzendenz ins Diesseits", in Texte und Kontexte, Frankfurt am Main 1991, p. 38.

40. Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophiche Diskurs der Moderne, Frankfurt 1985, p. 224.

41. Jürgen Habermas, "Metaphysik nach Kant", in Nachmetaphysiches Denken, Frankfurt 1988, p. 26.

42. Ibid.

43. "Edmund Husserl über Lebenswelt, Philosophie und Wissenschaft", p. 41.

44. An important criterion of assessment for such discourses would be the extent to which they merely 'express' a particular constellation of attitudes, or social mood, as opposed to also taking a reflective distance on the lifeworld context from which they derive.

45. Cf. "Philosophy as Placeholder and Interpreter", p. 314.

46. Axel Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today", in Constellations, vol. 1, no. 2, October 1994, p. 255.

47. Jürgen Habermas, Vergangenheit als Zukunft, Zurich: Pendo Verlag 1990, p. 136.

48. Vergangenheit als Zukunft, p. 149-50.

49. Cf. The Ethics of Authenticity, passim.

50. Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1981, p. 66.

51. Ibid., p. 71.

52. Continuing this tradition, which includes such figures as Dilthey, Weber and Scheler, Dieter Henrich has suggested, for example, that 'there is a continuity between the fundamental constitution of conscious life and the cultural process of humanity which is in no sense identical with socialization, and collective self-preservation and need-satisfaction. Of course it is intertwined with these, but in such a way that it co-determines the forms in which this self-preservation is organized'. (Dieter Henrich, Fluchtlinien, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1982, p. 92.)

53. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Working Notes", in The Visible and the Invisible, Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press 1968, p. 186.

54. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge: CUP 1989, p. 21.

55. Cf. "Philosophy as Placeholder and Interpreter", pp. 296-309.

56. Habermas writes that: 'Instead of grounding the lifeworld in the primal founding of an acting subjectivity or in the event of a world-interpretation which prejudices everything, philosophy can concentrate on the task of reconstructing the background knowledge which is connected with our grammatical intuitions. The goal of such an analysis is less the tracking of hidden foundations than the explication of what we always already know and can do'. ("Edmund Husserl über Lebenswelt, Philosophie und Wissenschaft", p. 41.) However, this account overlooks that fact that the recourse to an absolute subject or to the Heideggerian 'sending of Being' (Seinsgeschick) must be seen as attempts, albeit unsatisfactory, to account for the relation between the lifeworld and its source in a way which does not leave 'grammatical intuitions' hanging question-beggingly in the air.

57. Herbert Schnädelbach, "Metaphysik und Religion heute", in Zur Rehabilitierung des animal rationale. Vorträge und Abhandlungen 2, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1992, p. 138.