1. Democracy and Human Rights
It seems to me beyond question that the most comprehensive systems of political rights and liberties exist in democratic countries. That this is so is scarely surprising. For one thing, extensive political rights and liberties are integral to democracy: they are necessary to the functioning of the institutions that distinguish modern democracy from other kinds of political orders. The rights and liberties are therefore an element in what we often mean today by democracy or the democratic process, or a democratic country.
The institutions that, taken as whole, distinguish modern democracy (or polyarchy) from other regimes, contemporary and historical, are a written or unwritten constitutional system that vests control over government decisions about policy in elected officials; the selection of elected officials in frequent and fairly conducted elections; an inclusive right of adults to vote in these elections as well as run for elective office; a broadly defined and effectively protected right to freedom of expression; the existence of alternative and independent sources of information, to which citizens are entitled to gain access; and the right of citizens to form relatively independent organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.
Each of these institutions is either an effective right to which citizens are entitled, or it implies the existence of effective rights. Therefore in order to classify a country as democratic we are obliged to make a judgement that certain political rights exist in that country in a realistic (not nominal or formal) sense and at a comparatively high level. If the rights do not exist, or do not exist above a certain threshold, then by definition the country is not 'democratic'. To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that in distinguishing between democratic and non-democratic countries we of course employ judgements that are mainly qualitative - about the appropriate threshold for 'democracy' and about the condition of the various rights and institutions in specific countries.
The range of rights and liberties available to citizens in democratic countries, however, goes well beyond what is strictly required for the existence of democracy itself, for people in democratic countries tend to value rights and liberties generally. Stable democracies are supported by a broader culture, political and general, that places more than trivial value on such qualities as personal freedom, fairness, legality, due process and the like. While I can conceive of a purely theoretical democratic system in which persons accused of strictly criminal offences had no right to a fair trial, and yet all the political rights and liberties necessary to democracy were perfectly protected, I very much doubt that such a strictly compartmentalized system would ever exist in the real world. Citizens who valued the rights and liberties required for the democratic process would hardly be so morally schizoid as to reject the right to a fair trial for criminal offences.
To say that political rights are more fully protected in democratic than in non-democratic countries should not be misinterpreted as an invitation to complacency about the condition of rights in democratic countries. For one thing, economic and social rights, of which I say nothing in this chapter, are of course also important and vary greatly among both democratic and non-democratic countries. Of more immediate relevance to the argument of this chapter is the fact that rights may be effectively protected above the threshold of 'democracy' or polyarchy, and yet fall well short of the standards to which people in democratic countries tend to aspire. For example, if it were not for recurring invasions of political and civil rights in the United States, the American Civil Liberties Union would soon cease to exist. Whether fundamental rights are protected better or worse in the United States than in other democratic countries I cannot say, but I doubt whether any democratic country fully lives up to its own standards of human rights.
Moreover, even among countries above the democratic threshold, the effectiveness and stability of the rights, liberties, opportunities and institutions integral to democracy vary considerably, and they may also vary over time within a country. In order to discuss these variations, and more importantly those among non-democratic countries, I am going to draw heavily on a recent study by Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke.
Coppedge and Reinicke ranked 170 independent countries as of mid-1985 on four criteria: free and fair elections, freedom of political organization, freedom of expression, and availability of alternative sources of information. Within each criterion Coppedge and Reinicke created three or four categories into which countries could be assigned. For example, on the criterion of free and fair elections, countries were assigned to one of three categories:
The four criteria and their internal categories resulted in a satisfactory ranking of 163 countries. However, I deliberately made three changes in the original classification. First, because of the rapid changes taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, I decided to treat them as special cases. Second, I split the least polyarchal (or most authoritarian) countries into two categories: non-Marxist, and Marxist-dominated countries outside Europe.
Finally, because the forty-one most democratic countries - those above the threshold of democracy (polyarchy) by all four criteria - are far from a homogeneous group, it seemed to me useful to divide them into two categories. The 'old' or 'mature' democracies consist of twenty-one countries - predominantly English-speaking or European - where democratic institutions have existed continuously since 1950 or earlier. The 'new' democracies, then, consist of the remaining twenty countries that had made the transition to democracy since 1950 and where at the time of writing the four democratic institutions were above the threshold of polyarchy (see figure 9.1).
Four (Colombia, Venezuela, Spain and Portugal) were large countries that had been redemocratized after repressive periods of military dictatorship. Even were mini-states in the Caribbean and Pacific that had only recently gained independence. The total also included the doubtful case of Honduras, where the institutions of polyarchy are recent, fragile, and weak in relation to the independent influence of the military.
Thus even though a country has reached the threshold of democracy, its system of rights and liberties may be precarious; and even a democratic country where rights and liberties are quite sturdy may fall considerably short of its feasible possibilities. While it is true that countries where the institutions of democracy (polyarchy) have been achieved set a relatively high world standard for rights and liberties (both from a historical perspective and in comparison with all non-democratic countries in the world today), the evidence does not permit the complacent conclusion that advocates of human rights living in democratic countries can safely turn their attention exclusively to the plight of people in non-democratic countries.
2. Variations in Political Rights in Non-democratic Countries
Nonetheless, given that a preponderant majority of countries are not fully democratic it might seem reasonable to conclude that the best means for advancing basic political rights and liberties in the world would be to bring about democracy in countries now governed by non-democratic regimes. Yet however desirable it would be if all countries were to attain a democratic level of political rights and liberties, for the foreseeable future many countries will continue to be governed by non-democratic regimes.
To help us understand why this is so, I want to make use again of the analysis of Coppedge and Reinicke, as I have revised it in figure 9.1. Ignoring the special cases of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the remaining countries range from the forty-one full polyarchies at one end of the scale to the least polyarchal at the other. In the twenty-two least polyarchal (most authoritarian) countries, both Marxist and non-Marxist, no meaningful elections are held, all organizations are banned or controlled by the government or the official party, all public dissent is suppressed, and no publicly available alternative to official information exists. Between these extremely repressive authoritarian regimes and the democracies at the other end of the scale, however, there is a world of very considerable complexity.
Take the countries classified in figures 9.1-9.4 as nearly polyarchal, for example. Judged by one criterion these ten countries were somewhat below the threshold for full polyarchy; but according to the other three criteria they were above the threshold. Probably many observers, using less stringent standards, would call these countries democracies. But perhaps it is more accurate to call them near-polyarchies. Or consider the next scale type (III). This consists of countries that on two of the four criteria fall somewhat short of the levels attained in the fully democratic countries. Suppose we call them proto-polyarchies. Is it not reasonable to assume that in the foreseeable future near-polyarchies and proto-polyarchies are far more likely to attain democratic levels of political rights than countries near the bottom of the scale?
2.1 Obstacles to Democratization
Consequently, I do not see how we can think intelligently about democracy and human rights unless we recognize that in many countries the obstacles to full democratization, and thus to the achievement of a full system of democratic rights and liberties, are enormous. Let me summarize some of the main obstacles.
(1) In order for democracy to exist, it is essential that leaders do not employ the major instruments for violent coercion - notably the police and the military - to gain and maintain their power. Yet in a great many countries the government of the state is directly under the control of military leaders; or indirectly under the control of military leaders who govern through civilian agents; or under the control of civilian leaders who make use of violent coercion by police and military forces to maintain their rule; or under the control of civilian leaders who govern within a limited set of options circumscribed by the probable reaction of military leaders to decisions that would violate acceptable limits. Although transitions to democracy are by no means impossible - as in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, for example - they are difficult, rare, and not necessarily irreversible.
(2) As study after study has shown, polyarchy is highly correlated with socio-economic levels and the nature of the socio-economic order. Democratic institutions are highly favoured by the existence of a modern, dynamic, organizationally pluralist society with historically high levels of material well-being and rates of economic growth, extensive literacy, widespread access to education, relatively high levels of education, extensive organizational and administrative capacities, a plurality of relatively autonomous organizations - economic, social, political - and so on. All the 'mature' democracies exist in countries with such a society.
But of course many countries do not possess a society of this kind. Because of the relatively high intercorrelations among the characteristics of these 'advanced' countries, GNP per capita is a convenient if somewhat crude indicator. Figure 9.2 compares GNP per capita among countries that have been democratic (polyarchies) since 1950. As we see from figure 9.2, with a mean GNP per capita of $11,000 the twenty-one older and more stable democratic countries are among the richest in the world. Not surprisingly, they also spent more per capita on health and education than other countries - far more indeed than the poorest countries (see figures 9.3 and 9.4). Because the presence of a few very rich oil sheikdoms among the authoritarian countries enormously raises the average, we might be misled about the relation between poverty and authoritarianism. In figure 9.2, categories VI, VII, and IX show the average GNP per capita of these countries with the sheikdoms included; when they are excluded (below the horizontal bar) we see that the remaining countries are among the poorest in the world. Their expenditures on education, health, and presumably other social services as well were correspondingly low. To take another example, in the 1980s the GNP per capita of the Soviet Union and most of the other Eastern European countries had reached levels well above those of the European democracies in the 1920s, and probably higher even than that of what was then the wealthiest democratic country, the United States, in 1929.
(3) Acute and persistent conflicts that polarize or fragment the people of a country are likely to prevent democratic institutions from fully developing, and to destroy democratic rights and liberties should they be introduced (as in Lebanon, to take an acute case). Among the most important sources of such conflicts is the existence of sharply divided subcultures, formed around the axis of religion, language, race, ethnic group, region, and in some cases ideology. Unlike purely economic questions, subcultural differences tend to generate conflicts that are not only too intense but also too deeply 'non-rational' and primordial to allow for settlement by democratic means. To be sure, there are some well-known exceptions, and in a few democratic countries consociational systems have helped to damp down the dangers of subcultural conflict. But in many non-democratic countries subcultural conflicts pose a barrier to the development and maintenance of a system of democratic rights and liberties that is unlikely to be much reduced in the foreseeable future.
(4) Nor can we omit the impact of foreign influence and control. Historically, foreign control has often been adverse to the development of self-governing institutions. At least until Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, the impact of Soviet hegemony on democratic developments in the countries of Eastern Europe was unrelievedly negative. I am also compelled to say that the direct influence of the United States government has, on the whole, impaired rather than assisted the development of democratic systems in Latin America throughout most of this century.
Surely, however, we would not be gathered here unless we had reason to think that outside influences might sometimes have a positive effect on human rights, and even perhaps on the development of full democracy. No doubt the most dramatic instance of the positive effects of outside intervention was the pivotal role of the Allied forces of occupation in the post-war democratization of Germany, Austria and Japan. However, those circumstances were historically unusual, and we can hardly wish for their repetition. But there is also evidence that outside influences in the form of 'world opinion' and other pressures - requirements concerning rights attached to loans, grants, and other assistance - can sometimes have a positive effect. For example, though the human rights policies of the Carter administration were sharply criticized by political opponents in the United States and by authoritarian leaders abroad, it is my strong impression that Latin American advocates of democracy and human rights saw them - and see them in retrospect - as helpful. And it is hardly an accident that democratic rather than authoritarian regimes have been introduced - and show signs of taking root in a number of the Caribbean and Pacific microstates that were until recently dependencies of Britain, France, Holland or the United States, and on whom, it may be added, they often continue to depend for financial support.
(5) Finally, it would be a profound mistake to neglect the independent effects of ideas, belief systems, basic attitudes, political culture, and similar influences on the ways people in a country - particularly perhaps the political elites - think about and orient themselves toward political life and their fellow beings. While political beliefs, habits, and norms of behaviour obviously do not develop independently of historical experiences and current influences, they can become deeply rooted and resistant to change. The effects can of course go either way. A deeply rooted belief system favourable to democracy and rights is a powerful support to democratic stability, particularly in times of crisis; but deeply rooted beliefs can also be hostile to democratic institutions and human rights. In a great many countries a system of democratic rights finds little support in the beliefs, habits and norms of the people, and more important, I think, among the political activists and elites.
3. Reflections on Limits, Possibilities and Strategies
Because of persistent obstacles to full democratization, a majority of countries in the world are very likely to be governed by undemocratic regimes in the foreseeable future - meaning, let us say, for the next fifteen to twenty years. If this is so, then we ought to consider the limits and possibilities of enhancing rights in countries governed by nondemocratic regimes - without necessarily expecting these countries to become democratic.
At this point, if not earlier, one might ask: In saying that 'we ought to consider', just who are 'we' and why 'ought' we to consider these matters? My assumption is that 'we' may be any persons or any association or organization concerned about democracy and rights and wishing to act so as to enhance the prospects for democracy and rights whenever opportunities to do so are available and our actions might make a difference. The relevant actors, therefore, might be citizens or subjects of a non-democratic regime who wish to alter that regime. They might be citizens or officials in a democratic country who for whatever reason are, or believe themselves to be, in a position to make a difference.
Consequently, I want to cast my thought now in terms somewhat closer to action, to policy - though what I shall say will still be too general and abstract for immediate translation into a feasible policy. By way of advance warning, I want to add that what I am going to propose may seem not only too schematic to do justice to the infinite and subtle variations among countries but unhappily reminiscent at times of the once fashionable and ultimately unrewarding attempt to identify 'stages of development'. I cannot emphasize too strongly how important it is in thinking about prospects for strengthening human rights to avoid mechanistic interpretations, and to pay scrupulous attention to the unique limits and possibilities of a particular country. Yet I also think that a focus on particulars can be enlightened by an awareness of general tendencies.
In considering the limits and possibilities of change in a particular country it seems obvious that we need to ask at least four questions. (1) What is the present state of rights in the country? (2) What is the nature of the underlying conditions (of the kind I just described) that favour or impede the development of democratic rights and liberties? (3) What is the present and, given certain reasonable assumptions, probable future direction of change? (4) What is the present and, given certain reasonable assumptions, probable future rate of change? It goes without saying that the answers will usually be fraught with uncertainty.
As I have already pointed out, it is absurd to look upon the prospects for democratization and rights in all non-democratic countries as essentially the same. For example, imagine a country that is now only just below the threshold of democracy (let us say a near-polyarchy, or a proto-polyarchy). Suppose further that the underlying conditions I described earlier look on the whole to be favourable to democratization, and the country has been moving more or less steadily, over the long pull at any rate, toward greater democratization. Then obviously the prospects for achieving a full system of democratic rights and liberties are very high. And in so far as actors inside or outside the country are in a position to do anything about it, it would be reasonable for them to try to push the country toward a full system of democratic rights and liberties. But imagine instead that what we have is a country like those in scale type VIII. Suppose further that all five of the conditions mentioned earlier are unfavourable to democracy. Would it not be utterly foolish to clamour for full-scale democracy and immediate elections, on the assumption that all the necessary democratic rights and liberties would somehow come into being? Yet if it is unreasonable in these circumstance for persons deeply committed to democracy to focus on the immediate goal of full democracy, what are they to do?
I want to propose therefore that in attempting to answer the four questions I posed a moment ago, it would be useful to follow a strategy something like the following:
First, because the conditions I mentioned influence but by no means fully determine the characteristics of a regime, we should always (to repeat my earlier warning) pay attention to the unique limits and possibilities of a particular country.
Second, we should look for discrepancies between the conditions of a country and the characteristics of its political system. Perhaps the most important cases are non-democratic countries where the conditions rather strongly favour democratization, i.e., potential democracies; and democratic countries where the conditions provide weak support for democracy, i.e., countries where democratic breakdown is likely. With respect to the potential democracies, we need to search for whatever effective means we have to influence the country to achieve full democratization. Our means may in fact be quite limited. For democratic countries facing potential breakdown we need to identify the major causes. The common tendency to assume economic causes and thus to prescribe economic assistance as a remedy has, I think, often misled us into ignoring other factors, particularly the critical role of the military. Probably American policy has done more harm to democratization in Latin America by assisting military establishments than any gain it has ever achieved through economic aid programmes.
Third, and here I return to the central theme of this paper, for nondemocratic countries where the conditions are not particularly favourable for democratization, I think it might be useful to adopt a strategy based on the following tentative assumption (or hypothesis if you prefer): the achievement of certain rights and liberties is likely to precede the achievement of others. To emphasize the point, let me repeat it in several different ways. Some democratic rights and liberties are unlikely to exist or endure unless they have already been preceded by the attainment of certain other rights and liberties. Or again: full democratization is likely to be achieved only at the end of a process - perhaps often a lengthy process of many vicissitudes - of expanding rights and liberties.
This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of Coppedge and Reinicke, though strictly speaking we cannot infer it from their scale types. Their scale is derived from a cross-section in time, the 1980s. It is a world panoramic snapshot, so to speak. It is not a set of historical or developmental 'stages' that show how democratic rights have developed over time. Nonetheless, it is perfectly consistent with the hypothesis that certain democratic rights and liberties are likely to be institutionalized before others. A plausible sequence seems to me as follows:
1. The earliest political right to develop is likely to be the right of access to alternative sources of information, independent of government control: samizdat, journals of dissent and opposition, an opposition press, and so on.
2. Building on these achievements, a general freedom of expression may come to be protected by courts and other institutions. People are able to speak out more or less publicly without fear of reprisal. Governments and oppositions may even become habituated to the notion that so long as people do not actually organize into parties or other explicitly political organizations, they may express themselves almost without limit.
3. A dangerous and critical threshold is finally reached with freedom to organize, not only when people may gather together in informal associations but - passing a threshold of extraordinary consequence - like-minded political activists may actually organize themselves freely and openly in political parties that have as their ultimate objective participating in, and possibly winning, elections.
4. Finally, free and fair elections may now be achieved. Together with elections the full range of institutions that mark the transition to a democratic polyarchy may now be more or less in place.
In this perspective free and fair elections are the culmination of a process, not its beginning. Indeed, unless and until the other rights and liberties are firmly protected, free and fair elections cannot take place. Except in countries already close to the threshold of democracy, therefore, it is a grave mistake to assume that if only the leaders of a non-democratic country can be persuaded to hold elections, then full democracy will follow. Other than in the near-polyarchies or the protopolyarchies, elections should be seen as a critical stage following a process of liberalization, probably a lengthy process, in which the prior institutions and appropriate underlying conditions for stable democracy have developed.
What about other, less explicitly political, rights and liberties? It might seem reasonable to conjecture that political rights and liberties cannot be assured unless they have been preceded by certain pre-political rights. Of these, probably the most important is an effective right to a fair trial. For it might be supposed that without fair treatment in the courts, the enforcement of political rights would be virtually impossible.
It is true that historically an effective right to a fair trial did precede democratization in some countries. Yet it seems doubtful to me that this has been or is likely to be the general case. If the sequence of political rights suggested above is roughly correct, the explanation is to be found, I believe, in the relative costs to a non-democratic government of repression and toleration in the different areas. The costs of suppressing all alternative sources of information are so staggering in comparison with the costs of tolerating some sources difficult to control that leaders in a non-democratic regime will often find some degree of toleration preferable to total repression, 'which' may be impossible in any case. Repressing free expression more generally is relatively easier and less costly, though as a society begins to approach a relatively high level of social and economic modernity the costs will rise to a level at which a non-democratic government may well decide that the gains from repression no longer exceed the costs (and the costs of toleration no longer exceed the gains of permitting free expression). Crossing the next two thresholds is not only far more dangerous to non-democratic leaders but easier to prevent. Short of overthrow or collapse, a non-democratic regime can hold out against free and fair elections almost indefinitely. By contrast, the costs of preventing fair trials do not seem to be unusually high, while the costs of accepting or tolerating fair trials, particularly in political cases, may be quite extraordinary. If these assumptions are correct then an effective right to a fair trial need not necessarily come into existence prior to the more strictly political rights necessary to democracy. Evidently then we cannot uncover the relation between democratization and a right to a fair trial without looking at experiences in a large number of countries, and analysis of patterns in a large number of countries.
4. Conclusion
My argument, in summary, is then as follows:
1. The most comprehensive systems of political rights and liberties in the contemporary world exist in democratic countries. Even democratic countries, however, vary in their protection of political (not to mention other) rights.
2. Many countries are not democratic and are unlikely to become so in the foreseeable future because the conditions that tend to favour democracy are weak, or the conditions that tend to favour authoritarian regimes are strong, or both.
3. However, non-democratic countries vary greatly in the extent of political (and pre-political) rights and liberties. They can be arrayed, more or less accurately, on a scale - an ascending series of thresholds - extending from countries in which political rights are virtually non-existent to countries in which political rights are close to the threshold of democracy.
4. Given the wide variety of political systems in the world and the great variation in the conditions that tend to favour democratization or authoritarianism, a feasible strategy for contributing to the development of rights in a non-democratic country would be:
(a) Carefully consider the concrete conditions and characteristics of the country, including the direction and rate of recent changes.
(b) If the underlying conditions are generally favourable for the prospects of democratization, press for full democratization.
(c) If not, adopt an incremental strategy. Identify the next feasible threshold of rights and liberties, and first seek to consolidate rights at this threshold. The immediate aim need not be democracy, but attaining one of the prior rights and liberties necessary for democracy.
Postscript, October 1990
When I wrote the paper above for the Oslo meetings in June 1988, I certainly did not foresee the speed with which movements toward democratization would occur in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. To what extent does the argument I presented at that time require modification in the light of the extraordinary speed and magnitude of these changes?
The events surely challenge one assumption I then thought reasonable - that 'in the foreseeable future near-polyarchies and proto-polyarchies are far more likely to attain democratic levels of political rights than countries near the bottom of the scale'. The fact is, in the original scale the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries were classified by Coppedge and Reinicke, quite properly, at or near the most extreme authoritarian end of the scale. It was only a year later, after the Oslo meetings, that I pulled these countries out and made them special cases, as they are shown in the figures now presented here.
Yet the events do appear to confirm the explanation in 2.1 of five major obstacles to democratization.
1. When Gorbachev reversed sixty years of policy and practice under which opposition was systematically silenced in the Soviet Union by violent coercion and intimidation, public opposition immediately sprang up and hitherto suppressed demands for political rights and liberties became irresistible. Likewise, when it became evident to people in the countries under Soviet domination that public political activity would no longer be coercively suppressed, the democratic oppositions took off like wildfire and helped to bring about the liberalization and democratization of their regimes.
2. As figures 9.2-9.4 illustrate, many of the social and economic characteristics of the USSR and, even more, of countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and East Germany were at variance with the extreme authoritarianism of their regimes. In many respects, in their socio-economic levels these countries were closer to the mature democratic countries (even though the gaps were great and a major source of discontent) than to the less developed countries with highly authoritarian regimes.
3. When the expansion of political rights and liberties made it possible for hitherto suppressed cleavages to appear, conflicts among sharply divided subcultures rapidly emerged. How, and how successfully, these conflicts will be managed without impairing or reversing the movement toward democratization and liberalization remains highly uncertain, particularly in the Soviet Union. Clearly one part of any solution will be greater autonomy for subgroups conscious of their distinctiveness. Though the problem is too complex to explore here, it is worth stressing that decentralization, increased autonomy, and even separation and independence need not by themselves impair - and may in some circumstances actually enhance - basic rights, liberties, and democratic processes. The danger to human rights and democratic institutions arises not from decentralization or autonomy per se but from the intense conflicts and repressive actions that they may stimulate.
4. The events certainly underscore 'the impact of foreign influence and control' on democracy and political liberties. The observation that 'the impact of Soviet hegemony on democratic developments in the countries of Eastern Europe was unrelievedly negative' was abundantly confirmed by the amazing speed of democratization following the withdrawal of the threat of Soviet coercion.
5. Finally, the events seem to me to yield strong support for the independent effects on the prospects for democracy and rights of ideas and beliefs, particularly among political elites. Democratic ideas that were previously suppressed spread with amazing speed among elites and, so far as can be ascertained, among broader publics. Yet influential as they have been, among many people beliefs in democracy and fundamental political rights have roots so shallow and so weakly embedded in a traditional political culture that they may not survive the economic and political challenges these countries face.
What these five factors neglected, however, was the potentially decisive impact of leadership. No explanation of the transformations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would be complete if it omitted the extraordinary impact of Mikhail Gorbachev in initiating changes that may well have gone beyond anything he originally intended.
Turning now to my 'reflections on limits, possibilities, and strategies', several of my suggestions seem to be confirmed by the events, while a few others require qualifications. The events certainly support the view that we should 'pay attention to the unique limits and possibilities of a particular country'. In each of the one-time communist countries the conditions and prospects are different from those of its neighbours; indeed, the republics within the Soviet Union obviously differ too much to allow for generalization.
Certainly, too, 'we should look for discrepancies between the conditions of a country and the characteristics of its political system.' I have already mentioned the tension between the socio-economic levels of the communist countries and their authoritarian regimes.
I believe also that many of the changes in these countries conform to the 'plausible sequence' I proposed. In fact, the sequence from alternative sources of information, to a wider public expression, then to a plurality of illegal and semi-legal associations and groups seems to me to fit their experiences moderately well.
However, the general tone of my discussion emphasized its slowness:
Other than in the near-polyarchies or the proto-polyarchies, elections should be seen as a critical stage following a process of liberalization, probably a lengthy process, in which the prior institutions and appropriate underlying conditions for stable democracy have developed.
I believe this is correct. Yet I probably underestimated the extent to which the setting of elections can under some conditions turn into a driving force that enormously speeds up the whole sequence. What then are the requisite conditions? The answer, a speculative one no doubt, would take a separate essay, and I shall not undertake to provide one here. But surely an answer would include these three factors: First, if any of the five obstacles mentioned above stands massively in the way, elections cannot produce democracy and fundamental rights. The lamentable example of El Salvador, and the less well known examples of Honduras and Guatemala, demonstrate that elections are not sufficient to transform a regime dominated by a military establishment into a democratic government that respects fundamental rights. Second, the prior elements in the sequence - alternative sources of information, freedom of expression, and freedom to organize - must already be in place firmly enough to survive the vicissitudes of the post-election period.
Third, international opinion, information, and policy can nowadays exert extraordinary influence on the development of these crucial elements, on the conduct of the elections themselves, and on the postelection transition. It is possible, indeed, that international influences may now help to shorten a process of change that historically was ordinarily quite protracted.
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