1. A more detailed exposition of this connection can be found in my doctoral thesis, "Solipsisticki argumenti". It remains unpublished, while a copy of the manuscript is available in the library of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade.

2. Schopenhauer, A. The World as Will and Idea.

3. Russell, B.: Human Knowledge - Its Scopes and Limits (5th ed.), London, 1966, p. 196.

4. Philosophical encyclopedias rarely offer a complete classification of solipsist positions. In Eisler's Worterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe (4th ed., Berlin, 1930, p. 104) we find only the division into ontological and gnoseological solipsism; Edwards's; The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 7 (New York/London, 1967, pp. 487-488) covers egoism in addition to the above, while Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (vol. II, Glouchester, MA, 1960, p. 533) also cites an imprecisely defined version which should be applied to Berkeley.

5. Kant, I.: Antropologie - in Pragmatischer Hinsicht (4th ed.), Leipzig, 1922, p. 12.

6. Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations.

7. Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason.

8. I have written about the possibility of this transformation of solipsism in the transcendental attitude in the article "Solus ipse kao hipoteticki ekstrem", Filozofija i drustvo III, Belgrade, 1991, pp. 133-148.

9. I am thinking primarily of Appel's Transformation of Philosophy, but also of a whole series of other attempts to link hermeneutics and pragmatism, on which I have written at greater length in the final chapter of Hegel i hermeneutika (Novi Sad, 1989).

10. That is why Kant in the "Transcendental Dialectics" of the Critique of Pure Reason does not introduce transcendental deduction in the same way as he did transcendental deduction of categories (explained in the "Transcendental Analytic"). However, in the Appendix, he justifies the regulative use of ideas with an argument which can undoubtedly be called transcendental deduction, but which is no longer an analytical but an eminently pragmatical argument.

11. A useful analysis of the change in Kant's thematization of the subject in the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason is given by Swing, T.K.: Kant's Transcendental Logic, New Haven/London, 1969, esp. pp. 258-269.

12. See Dilman, I.: Matter and Mind, London, 1975, pp. 132-141. Critically on "solipsism without Selfhood" Strawson, P.: "Persons", in Feigl & Maxwell (eds.): Minneapolis Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis, 1990.

13. Hegel, G.W.F.: Science of Logic.

14. I have written in more detail on the connection of anthropocentrism and logocentrism in the article "Solipsizam i centrizam Moderne", Delo 1-2 (1992): 115-133, Beograd.

15. An excellent analysis of this type of rhetoric is provided by Wilhelm Reich in The Mass Psychology of Fascism, Harmondsworth, 1983.

16. This model has been reincarnated in the 19th and 20th centuries in the most varied - and often conflicting - ideologies. The example of fascism and communist Bolshevism at the end of the first half of the 20th century is certainly the most radical and most interesting for analysis, especially in the light of the latest turn away from communism towards nationalism in the former countries of the "socialist block".

17. Freud, S., Unbehangen in der Kultur.

18. Jung, K.G., Psychological Types.

19. See the analysis of the private language argument in Kripke, S.: "Wittgenstein on Roles and Private Language", in Block (ed.): Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Oxford, 1981.

20. On how far this can be taken as a belief in the contingency of selfhood (and therefore as an "anti-solipsist" attitude) see in Hintikka, J.: "On Wittgenstein's Solipsism", Mind 67 (1958): 88-89.

21. This shift represents the destruction of "directness" as the starting point of phenomenology. As Gadamer explained in Truth and Method, falling back on directness always denied itself, and this could be termed a kind of "Hegellianism" within phenomenology. I have written on the relationship of Hegel and hermeneutics in my book Hegel i hermeneutika.

22. See earliest formulation of this stance in Royce, J.: Studies in Good and Evil. New York: 1902, p. 203.

23. Rorty, R.: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: 1978. In later works, Rorty avoided the use of the term hermeneutics, although he continued stressing the closeness of his neo-pragmatism to the "Hegellian" trends in modern philosophy, among which the hermeneutic trend is one of the most significant.

24. Lacan, J.: Ecrits, London, 1977, p. 165.

25. The most suggestive explanation of contingency was put forward by Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge, 1989), especially in the first three essays "Contingency of Language", "Contingency of Selfhood" and "Contingency of a Liberal Community".

26. See Williams, B.: "Wittgenstein and Idealism", in Vesey (ed.): Understanding Wittgenstein, Ithaca, 1992.

27. See Putnam, H.: "Why Reason Can't be Naturalized?", in Realism and Reason, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 234-235. Putnam also presents similar criticism of Rorty in the books Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge/New York, 1981) and Representation and Reality (MIT Press, 1988).

28. See Rorty, R.: "Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and Pragmatism" in Bieri, Horstmann, Kruger (eds.): Transcendental Arguments and Science, Dordrecht, 1979.

29. See "Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism", in Nagl, Redell (eds.): Wo steht die sprachanalytische Philosophie Heute?, Wien, 1986.

30. See Koerner, S.: "The Impossibility of Transcendental Deduction", in Beck, L.W. (ed.): Kant Studies Today, La Salle, 1965, pp. 230-245.

31. I have written more extensively on the similarity of the "negative utopias" of Rorty and Adorno in the article "Kraj utopije kao kraj istine" (The End of Utopia as the End of Truth), Revija za sociologiju 4 (1990), Zagreb.