

**Protest Engagement in America:  
The Influence of Perceptions, Networks, Availability, and Politics \***

by

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**Abstract**

*Objective.* The determinants of individual participation in collective action are investigated. Social movement theory and recent national survey data are employed to empirically estimate the influence of attitudinal factors, social network ties, biographical availability, and conventional politics upon protest engagement. *Methods.* The 2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey is analyzed. A typology of recent protest activity is constructed from three indicators. Protestor type is predicted through logistic regressions. *Results.* Americans are very “consistent” in their protest actions – those engaging in more intense forms of protest also engage in less intense forms. Social network ties and conventional political participation are the strongest determinants of protest engagement, yet have diminishing returns. *Conclusions.* These models should be explored and replicated with other data sources. Broad generalizations gained in survey research complement the rich details that social movement case studies provide.

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## **Introduction**

Two areas of inquiry within the study of social movements are often confused. The emergence of social movements and individual participation in collective action are related, yet distinct processes (see Marx and McAdam 1994). This paper investigates the latter by seeking to identify the determinants of individual's activism. Social movement theory and recent national survey data are employed to empirically estimate the influence of various factors upon protest engagement. A typology of recent, multi-form protest activity is presented. Protestor type is predicted through logistic regressions. Five different sets of independent variables are tested for their influence upon protest engagement. These predictors include (1) attitudinal factors, (2) social network ties, (3) biographical availability, (4) conventional politics, and (5) demographic factors.

While many case studies exist which provide rich details on specific movement participation, very little is known about protest engagement among Americans as a whole. Data limitations—specifically datedness and the inability to operationalize many social movement hypotheses—plague the few existing studies of this nature (see Barnes and Kaase 1979; Wallace and Jenkins 1995; Jenkins and Wallace 1996; McVeigh and Smith 1999; McVeigh and Sikkink 2001). This study contributes to the literature in three ways: it constructs a protest group typology which effectively describes how contemporary Americans engage in multiple forms of protest activity, it tests several theories of movement participation simultaneously in an effort to identify the most salient factors, and it employs a new national sample survey which is the most appropriate and best-available to date.

## **The Current State of Social Movement Studies**

A fairly strong consensus currently exists among social movement scholars studying movement emergence (McAdam 1999). It is argued that macro-level factors such as political opportunities (see Tarrow 1998), meso-level factors such as mobilizing structures (see McCarthy and Zald 1977), and micro-meso linkage factors such as framing processes (see Snow et al. 1986) are all important in determining the how, when, and where of social movement emergence. The related, yet distinct, process of individual participation in collective action has received much less attention in the literature. Yet, as Marx and McAdam (1994) note, the two go hand in hand.

Explaining why an individual comes to participate in collective action does not suffice as an account of why a particular movement emerged when it did. By the same token, knowing what mix of factors produced a movement tells us little about the processes that led particular individuals to get involved (1994: 86).

Within the current dominant consensus, micro-level factors are slighted (Klandermans 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Early studies of collective behavior were micro-centered (see Turner and Killian 1957; Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970), but have been rightfully criticized for arguing that individual discontent and other psychological factors represent the immediate cause of movement emergence (see McAdam 1982). Fortunately, a new social psychology of protest has emerged (McVeigh and Sikkink 2001) with a social constructionist view (see Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997). While many illuminating case studies exist, the more generic consideration of how protestors differ from the general population requires further systematic attention.

The existing survey research seeking to identify determinants of individual participation in collective action has restricted utility given serious data limitations. Three studies (Barnes and

Kaase 1979; Wallace and Jenkins 1995; Jenkins and Wallace 1996) employ data from the early 1970s to predict American's *willingness* to protest. To their credit, the studies of Wallace and Jenkins (1995) and Jenkins and Wallace (1996) make important theoretical contributions in delineating how demographic factors—class, education, age, gender, and race—may determine protest potential. McVeigh and Smith (1999) and McVeigh and Sikkink (2001) employ more recent data to examine American's actual protest behavior. While these studies contribute to our understanding of the relationship between religion and protest, they fail to (or perhaps were unable to) operationalize important social movement hypotheses and rely on a single indicator for their measure of protest activity.

### **A Typology of Protest Engagement**

Social researchers are well aware of scales—composite measures based on a combination of items intended to tap the same phenomenon. Typologies are theoretically-driven groupings based on scores from multiple criteria (and are multi- rather than uni-dimensional). Typologies can be used to reveal patterns across variables (as in a statistical factor analysis) or to reveal patterns across cases (as in a statistical cluster analysis). The latter is most appropriate here as individuals will be sorted into groups according to whether or not they have engaged in particular forms of protest.<sup>1</sup>

A rather simple typology of protest engagement can be constructed by first ranking different forms of protest participation. Protest forms have been ranked on several dimensions. Dalton's (2002) ranking includes degree of direct action, legal vs. illegal actions, and nonviolent vs. violent actions (see also Marsh 1977). Others have focused on intensity (Barnes and Kaase 1979), risk (McAdam 1986), and cost (Klandermans 1997). There is a large degree of overlap

across these various dimensions. For the present purpose, three broad types of activism will be considered: low intensity, moderate intensity, and high intensity.<sup>2</sup>

The literature also suggests that there exists a hierarchy of protest participation.<sup>3</sup> That is, individuals participating in more intense forms of protest are likely to have previously engaged (and be willing to engage) in less intense forms of protest. For example, Barnes and Kaase (1979) consider petition signing as the first threshold of unconventional political activity (see also Dalton 2002). This argument suggests that some individuals who have participated in low intensity actions (such as signing a petition) will go on to participate in more intense actions, but those who do not participate in low intensity actions are not likely to engage in more intense actions. This logic of an “activism hierarchy” acts a theoretical basis for the typology of protest engagement presented in Table 1.

(Table 1 About Here)

Table 1 illustrates that there are eight possible combinations of the three different forms of activism. The first four are “consistent combinations” in that they conform with the activism hierarchy argument. The first group participates in none of the three forms, the second group participates in only the low intensity form, the third group engages in both low and moderate intensity protest, and the fourth group does it all. The “inconsistent combinations” contradict the activism hierarchy argument by representing the possibility of engaging in more intense forms of protest without engaging in less intense forms. These eight hypothetical protestor types cannot be ranked on any one dimension. Previous research has yet to consider such unique protest groups. This study provides an operationalization of this typology and seeks to identify the determinants of protest engagement. Given the exploratory nature of this venture, the hypotheses presented below will be generic (protesting groups vs. nonprotesting group).

## **Determinants of Protest Engagement**

Reviewing the literatures surrounding determinants of individual activism, Marx and McAdam (1994) argue that there are two categories of important factors. The first contains psychological aspects or attitudes that may predispose one to participation. The second concerns the social organization of one's life and how these conditions may encourage or discourage participation. Below, two hypotheses from each category are formulated and a third category is introduced with its own two hypotheses.

Attitudes have been an important topic of study for scholars of the social psychology of social movements. Both efficacy and legitimacy have been argued to be important subjective feelings which must necessarily precede one's engagement in acts of contention. Indeed, feelings of efficacy and/or legitimacy act as empirical indicators of the recruitment pool or mobilization potential of a prospective or already existing movement (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Oegema and Klandermans 1994).

It is widely argued that people are more likely to protest if they believe that their actions will be efficacious (Piven and Cloward 1977; Finkel and Opp 1991; Gamson 1992; McAdam 1999; Passy and Giugni 2001). "Even if the value of an outcome is very high it will not motivate individuals as long as they do not believe that the outcome can be produced by their efforts" (Klandermans 1984: 585). In short, people generally need to feel optimistic about their actions before they are willing to act.

Hypothesis 1. Efficacy is expected to be positively associated with protest engagement.

Another important attitudinal factor concerns legitimacy.<sup>4</sup> People are more likely to engage in political action when the behavior of authorities is perceived as illegitimate (O'Connor

1973; Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1999). “[T]he delegitimation of powerholders is likely to increase the legitimacy of protest activities” (Passy and Giugni 2001: 126).

Hypothesis 2. Legitimacy is expected to be negatively associated with protest engagement.

Social network ties are also argued to be important preconditions for protest participation. “Without structural factors that expose the individual to participation opportunities or pull them into activity, the individual will remain inactive” (McAdam and Paulsen 1993: 644).

Interpersonal social networks are argued to be the most important microstructural factor since they are the richest source of movement recruitment (Snow et al. 1980; Opp and Gern 1993). In addition to structurally connecting individuals with movement opportunities, social networks also play an important socialization role (Passy and Giugni 2001). “Strong or dense interpersonal networks encourage the extension of an invitation to participate and they ease the uncertainty of mobilization” (McAdam and Paulsen 1993: 644). Without networks, social movements will certainly face nonconversion—the failure to transform sympathizers (Oegema and Klandermans 1994).

Hypothesis 3. Network size is expected to be positively associated with protest engagement.

Biographical availability is another factor that is argued to be an important determinant of protest. McAdam (1986: 70) defines it simply as “the absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation.” In the words of Flacks (1988), those who are too busy “making life” are less likely to be willing or able to “make history.”

[S]ome individuals will be more available for movement exploration and participation because of the possession of unscheduled or discretionary time and because of minimal countervailing risks or sanctions (Snow et al. 1980: 793).

Hypothesis 4. Biographical availability is expected to be positively associated with protest engagement.

A third category of important determinants of individual activism surrounds conventional political participation. Several studies have found conventional political participation to be a significant positive predictor of protest participation (see Muller 1977; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Wallace and Jenkins 1995).<sup>5</sup> Also, Putnam (2000) notes:

Political knowledge and interest in public affairs are critical preconditions for more active forms of involvement. If you don't know the rules of the game and the players and don't care about the outcome, you're unlikely to try playing yourself (Putnam 2000: 35).

Hypothesis 5. Conventional politics are expected to be positively associated with protest engagement.

Self-reported political ideology is also important to explicitly test in the models. Opp (1989; see also Opp et al. 1995) argues that political extremists (those who identify as "very conservative" or "very liberal") are more likely to protest.

Hypothesis 6. Political extremism is expected to be positively associated with protest engagement.

## **Data and Methods**

The database analyzed here is the 2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey. This random-digit-dialing telephone survey was administered nationally in July-November 2000 to 3,003 American adults (18 years or older). The survey includes an oversample of 501 African Americans and 502 Hispanics. The questionnaire was conceptualized by Harvard's Saguaro Seminar as an extension of Putnam's (2000) well-known work and was fielded by TNS Intersearch. These data and the codebook are distributed by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research and are weighted by gender, age, education, and race in order to accurately reproduce the population distribution. This survey project is the largest-ever on the civic engagement of Americans. These data provide a unique opportunity to explore the determinants of engagement in recent protest activity in America.

### *Dependent Variable*

The survey contains three dichotomous items measuring a range of forms of protest participation. Respondents were asked: "Which of the following things have you done in the past 12 months: a) Have you signed a petition? b) Attended a political meeting or rally? c) Participated in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or marches?" These three forms of political action constitute a continuum and correspond well with the three forms of protest within the typology previously presented. While the second and third items contain multiple forms of participation, the forms within each item are rather homogeneous in respect to intensity. Petition signing is a low intensity form, rally attendance a moderate intensity form, and demonstration participation a high intensity form (note the use of short-hand labels for the latter two categories). As expected, more Americans have engaged in the less risky forms of protest participation (see McAdam 1986; Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Over a third of the

respondents (35%) had signed a petition in the past year, 16% had attended a rally, and 7% had participated in a demonstration.

Following the typology presented earlier, respondents were sorted into eight protestor types according to their engagement (or lack thereof) in these three forms of protest. Rather than assigning names to the groups, they will be referred to simply by their score combinations on the items. So, P0R0D0 represents the non-protestors, P1R0D0 represents those who have only signed a petition, etc. Appendix A provides descriptive statistics for all of the variables employed. The sample sizes for the categories indicate that 57% of Americans are non-protestors (P0R0D0), 22% are P1R0D0, 8% are P1R1D0, and only 3% do it all (P1R1D1). Together, these consistent combinations account for the protest engagement of 90% of Americans. This provides support for the activism hierarchy argument as only 10% of Americans have inconsistent combinations of protest engagement. Those who participate in demonstrations but do not sign petitions (P0R0D1 and P0R1D1) are “protest specialists” according to Jenkins and Wallace (1996). This data indicates that these protest types are very rare in contemporary America. Logistic regression analyses will be employed to identify the factors which distinguish protestor types from one another.

### *Independent Variables*

The operationalization of the predictor variables is described in Table 2. Multiple indicators were sought for each theoretical concept, only efficacy of protest relies on one indicator. Trust in government indicators are employed to measure legitimacy of protest (see Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982). Formal group involvement is one indicator used to tap network ties. Those involved with more organizations are more likely to be recruited for

collective action (Oberschall 1973). The other indicators of network ties are informal in nature, also hypothesized to be important (Tilly 1978).

(Table 2 About Here)

Student status is one of the indicators of biographical availability employed. Students often have greater discretionary time which permits them to be more politically engaged (Flacks 1971). Also, having children is a major constraint upon one's availability for political participation (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1986), so it is included in the models. Political interest, political knowledge, voter registration, and self-identified political ideology are the conventional politics indicators (the latter is coded to test the political extremism hypothesis). Standard demographic variables are included in the models and have been found to be important in previous studies (see Wallace and Jenkins 1995; McVeigh and Smith 1999).

Logistic regression models are employed to test the six hypotheses. Each protest group is analyzed against all of the remaining groups (baseline).<sup>6</sup> All 27 of the independent variables are entered simultaneously in the models. Collinearity diagnostics were studied in order to determine whether multicollinearity poses a problem. The variance inflation factor for each of the predictors is small (highest is 2.5) and well within acceptable levels (less than 10; see Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980). While the condition index did produce one dimension with a high value (25.31), this component does not contribute significantly to the variance of more than one variable (contact the author for a copy of the correlation matrix and/or the collinearity diagnostics).

## Findings

Table 3 provides the results from the logistic regression models that will be used to evaluate the hypotheses. The consistent combinations of protest engagement which correspond with the activism hierarchy argument are differentiated from the inconsistent combinations. Efficacy is not significant in any of the models, providing no support for Hypothesis 1. The legitimacy scale is significant across three of the measures, providing some support for Hypothesis 2. Those who are more likely to see the government as legitimate are more likely to be non-protestors (P0R0D0) and less likely to be protestor types P1R1D1 and P1R0D1 (note that an odds ratio of less than 1.0 is a negative effect). So, perceiving the government as illegitimate produces activists who both sign petitions and participate in demonstrations.

(Table 3 About Here)

Social network ties are considered next. Group involvement has positive effects on four of the protestor types and a negative effect upon the non-protestors. Those who are involved with more formal groups are more likely to be protestor types P1R1D0, P1R1D1, P0R1D0, and P0R1D1. The unique commonality among these groups is rally attendance. Group involvement does not produce differential effects in respect to consistent and inconsistent combinations of protest engagement. Friendships are significant for two protestor types. Those with more friends are 1.35 times more likely to be rally attendees only (P0R1D0) and are less likely to be non-protestors (P0R0D0). Visiting one's neighbors is significantly related to three protestor types. Those who visit their neighbors more often are more likely to be petition signers and rally attendees (P1R1D0) and less likely to be "demonstration specialists" (P0R0D1) and non-protestors (P0R0D0). Thus, these network ties produce only low and moderate intensity forms

of protest. Overall, social network ties seem to mostly determine rally attendance. These findings provide rather strong support for Hypothesis 3.

Only one of the three measures of biographical availability is significant in one of the models. Those who work fewer hours are more likely to be non-protestors (P0R0D0). Thus, Hypothesis 4 receives no support as the single significant relationship is in the opposite direction as predicted. The lack of findings does not necessarily suggest that availability is irrelevant, rather it may not be uniquely salient vis-à-vis the other predictors.

The effect of conventional politics is considered next. Political interest has significant effects across six of the eight models. Those with more interest in politics are less likely to be non-protestors. The only protestor types that political interest does not produce are the “protest specialists” (P0R0D1 and P0R1D1) to use Jenkins and Wallace’s (1996) label of those who engage in more intense forms of protest but not less intense forms. Political knowledge (the ability to name one’s Senators) significantly predicts those who engage in both signing petitions and rally attendance (P1R1D0). Also, those who are registered to vote are more than twice as likely to be protestor type P1R0D0, P1R1D0, and P0R1D0. Notice that political knowledge and voter registration do not predict any protestor types that demonstrate. These results provide support for Hypothesis 5.

Political extremism has some interesting effects. Those who identify as very conservative are 2.27 times more likely to engage in both petition signing and demonstration participation (P1R0D1). Those who are very liberal are less likely to only sign petitions (P1R0D0) and are less likely to only sign petitions and attend rallies (P1R1D0). However, the very liberal are more than four times more likely to engage in all forms of protest (P1R1D1). The negative effects contradict Hypothesis 6. While the fact that the very liberal do it all and the

very conservative avoid rally attendance is potentially interesting, there is no strong pattern supporting the hypothesized effects.

In respect to the demographic variables, it is interesting to note the non-effects of income. Only one variable is significant: the upper middle class (\$50,000 - \$74,999) are more likely to only sign petitions (P1R0D0). Educational attainment has several contradictory effects. Those who graduated from high school, those who have attended some college, and those who have Bachelor's degrees are all more likely to only sign petitions (P1R0D0) and less likely to be the protestor type who both sign petitions and attend rallies (P1R1D0). Bachelor degree holders are also more than five times more likely to be demonstration specialists (P0R0D1) and those with graduate degrees are more likely to be only petition signers (P1R0D0). The most interesting finding here is that non-high school graduates are more likely to be moderate protestors (P1R1D0).

Older Americans are more likely to not protest (P0R0D0) and less likely to be protestor types P1R1D1 and P1R0D1. Race has some interesting effects too. African Americans are less likely to be the protestor types P1R0D0, P1R1D0, and P1R0D1. However, they are more likely to engage in all forms (P1R1D1) and to be the protestor type who only attends rallies (P0R1D0). While it is noteworthy that African Americans are more likely to have done all forms, no discernible pattern emerges here. Latinos are less likely than whites to have only signed a petition (P1R0D0), but are more than twice as likely to only attend rallies (P0R1D0) and are more than 11 times more likely to be protest specialists (P0R1D1). It is interesting that Latinos avoid petition signing, preferring more direct action techniques. Asian Americans and those who identify as having some "other" race do not differ significantly from whites in their protest engagement. Women are more likely than men to only sign petitions (P1R0D0) and to sign

petitions and attend rallies (P1R1D0). However, men are more than six times (inverse of .16) more likely to be protest specialists (P0R1D1) than women.

Overall, the predictor variables most strongly determine the non-protestor type (P0R0D0). Thus, the independent variables most clearly distinguish the non-protestors from those who engage in any of the three actions. In this strongest model, 24% of the variance is explained. The other models are much less powerful. Clearly, American's protest behavior is not easily predicted. Now these findings can be discussed more substantively as a whole.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

This paper has sought to provide answers to the general question, who protests? Protest engagement is best understood by examining several forms simultaneously in order to get a holistic picture of how people differ qualitatively in their political actions. Protestor types were identified through a typology based on the concept of an activism hierarchy. Overall, American's protest engagement is very consistent as the hierarchy argument suggests – those participating in more intense forms of protest also participate in less intense forms. As expected, most Americans are non-protestors.

The findings indicate that attitudinal factors are rather weak in determining protest engagement. Efficacy, people having a general sense that they can make an impact, has no unique contribution to predicting protest. This suggests that efficacy operates in a more particular and grounded fashion. The mobilization processes of specific movements result in some potential participants believing that proposed actions will work. Also, mobilization often produces emotional energy and the feeling that “anything is possible.” In other words, it appears that only mobilizing efforts generate productive efficacy and turn existing optimism into action.

In regard to legitimacy, illegitimate perceptions of government consistently produces activists who both sign petitions and participate in demonstrations (P1R1D1 and P1R0D1). Inversely, those who trust government are more likely to not protest. It is interesting that illegitimacy uniquely contributes to (only) such substantive protest participation. Apparently, these effects are “all or nothing.” For Americans, lack of trust in government either produces serious protest engagement or has no impact at all.

Social network ties are strong predictors of protest engagement. The first model in Table 3 provides the best overview: those with more network ties are less likely to be non-protestors. Rally attendance was the commonality among all of the positive effects of social network ties. This seems sensible. People often literally stumble into opportunities to sign petitions (at the grocery store, etc.), so network ties are less relevant here. Rallies are events for which information must be disseminated and conversation engaged to elicit participation. But, why are network ties not as important for more intense types of activism? Demonstration participation is more intense and undoubtedly there will be some who are targeted for mobilization (through their networks) and choose not to participate. If potential participants do cognitively weigh the costs and benefits of activism (see Opp 1989; Klandermans 1997), then more are likely to opt out of higher intensity forms than less intense types of protest. These data suggest that network ties generally have diminishing effects on protest engagement.

None of the results supported the hypothesized effects of biographical availability. Models containing only the availability items as predictors also failed to indicate that availability has much of a general effect on protest (only student status had positive effects in two of these eight unreported models). Thus, in and of itself, availability does not matter when it comes to protest. However, biographical availability is likely to matter in many movement contexts. For

example, those who support the goals of a movement and have been targeted for mobilization may not be available for participation in specific events given constraints such as work and children.

Conventional political participation strongly determines protest engagement. Political interest determines all types except the protest specialists (P0R0D1 and P0R1D1). Barnes and Kaase (1979) found that those who only protest have very little interest in politics. They argue that these activists protest more for expressive purposes rather than instrumental means. While political interest did not have a negative effect on protest specialists here, Barnes and Kaase's (1979) argument may provide some clues about these groups engaging in inconsistent combinations of protest activities. While important for predicting petition signing and rally attendance, political knowledge and voter registration did not predict any of the protestor types who demonstrate. Conventional political participation, like social network ties, also appears to have diminishing returns. Conventional politics act as a threshold for producing low and moderately intense forms of protest, but matter little for more intense actions.

Extreme political identification has no consistent effects upon protest engagement. The fact that those at the political margins are not systematically more likely to protest casts doubt over Opp's (1989) theory and reflects the gulf that exists between attitudes and behavior.

Overall, the lack of linear effects of the independent variables upon the consistent protestor types supports the methodology employed here. A simple additive scale of protest participation would lead to misunderstandings given the complexity of these relations. The typological approach highlights the differential and specific effects that social movement factors have upon protest engagement. While 90% of Americans engage in consistent combinations of protest (supporting the notion of an activism hierarchy), different factors are often responsible

for producing these different protestor types. The models also indicate that those protestor types engaging in inconsistent combinations of activities are less predictable than the consistent groups.

This study presents a sound portrait of Americans' recent engagement in protest activities and provides evidence concerning the determinants of such action. While the Social Capital Benchmark Survey is currently the best dataset from which to explore these questions, these models should be explored and replicated with other sources of data. More detailed data is also needed to determine what people are and are not willing to do as far as protest is concerned. By its very nature, this type of study is quite static. It tells us nothing about the actual mobilization processes through which people come to protest. Moreover, causality is not always clear with cross-sectional data. For example, do Americans who engage in all three forms of protest (P1R1D1) do so because they feel that government is illegitimate or are their observed feelings of legitimacy actually determined by their previous protest activities and exposure to social movements (see Pierce and Converse 1990)? Such relations are certainly dialectical. Case studies can and do provide such rich details and are better able to tap into important interpretive phenomenon such as emotions.

Broad generalizations gained in survey research complement the rich details that social movement case studies provide. This paper has sought to contribute to the research literature seeking to explain the generic, individual determinants of protest engagement in America. Despite the limitations of this study, it does provide large-scale support for the salience of social network ties and conventional political engagement. The diminishing returns that these factors have upon protest engagement reflect the complexity of individual behavior as found in study after study of social phenomena.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Barnes and Kaase's (1979) typology of political action remains the best known of its kind.

Unfortunately, this typology combines different forms of protest with different forms of conventional political participation and is never estimated in a multivariate model as a dependent variable in their study.

<sup>2</sup> Intensity is a good generic descriptor, implying that low intensity actions involve a low degree of direct action, little risk, and few costs to the participant.

<sup>3</sup> See Maslow (1954) and Inglehart (1977) for examples of behavioral and attitudinal hierarchies.

<sup>4</sup> "Attitudinal affinity," the extent to which potential protestors support the values or goals of the movement, is also frequently discussed in the literature (see McAdam 1986; Klandermans 1997).

The dependent variable constructed in this study is generic. Specific information about the issues surrounding the actions that respondents participated in is not available. Therefore, it is not possible to test the effects of attitudinal affinity here.

<sup>5</sup> The argument that conventional political participation is a necessary precondition for protest participation also corresponds with the idea of an "activism hierarchy."

<sup>6</sup> This was suggested by a reviewer and is the most robust approach to determining whether the independent variables effect these protestor types uniquely. Other options would be to compare each of the engaged protestor types against the non-protestors or to employ multinomial logistic regression and compare every group to one another.

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**Table 1. Possible Empirical Patterns of Participation in Three Forms of Activism**

	Low Intensity	Moderate Intensity	High Intensity
<i>Consistent Combinations</i>	0	0	0
	1	0	0
	1	1	0
	1	1	1
<i>Inconsistent Combinations</i>	0	1	0
	1	0	1
	0	0	1
	0	1	1

0 = Non-participant; 1 = Participant

**Table 2. Independent Variables: Measurement and Coding**

Concept	Indicator	Coding
Efficacy of protest	“Overall, how much impact do you think people like you can have in making your community a better place to live?”	“No impact” and “A small impact” = 1; “Moderate impact” = 2; “Big impact” = 3
Legitimacy of protest	“How much of the time do you think you can trust the national government to do what is right?” and “How much of the time do you think you can trust the local government to do what is right?”	“Hardly ever” = 0; “Only some of the time” = 1; “Most of the time” = 2; “Just about always” = 3. Two items added to form legitimacy scale (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .67$ )
Social network ties	“Answer yes if you have been involved in the past 12 months with this kind of group” <sup>a</sup>	No groups = 0; 1 to 2 = 1; 3 to 4 = 2; 5 to 7 = 3; 8 to 18 = 4
	“About how many close friends do you have these days? These are people you feel at ease with, can talk to about private matters, or call on for help.”	“No close friends” = 1; “One or two” = 2; “Three to five” = 3; “Six to ten” = 4; “More than that” = 5
	“Next I have a few questions about your immediate neighbors... the 10 or 20 households that live closest to you. About how often do you talk to or visit with your immediate neighbors?”	“Never” and “Once a year” = 1; “Several times a year,” “Once a month,” and “Several times a month” = 2; “Several times a week” = 3; “Everyday” = 4
Biographical availability	“About how many hours do you work in the average week?”	51 or more hours = 1; 41 to 50 hours = 2; 40 hours = 3; 1 to 39 hours = 4; No paid job = 5
	Current employment status	“Student” = 1; Non-students = 0
	“How many children, aged 17 or younger, live in your household?”	“0” = 1; One or more children = 0
Conventional politics	“How interested are you in politics and national affairs?”	“Not at all interested” = 1; “Only slightly interested” = 2; “Somewhat interested” = 3; “Very interested” = 4
	“We’d like to know how well known different governmental leaders are... Could you tell me the names of the two U.S. Senators from your state?”	Failed to name either Senator = 0; At least close to naming one or better = 1
	“Are you currently registered to vote?”	“Yes” = 1; “No” = 0
	“Thinking politically and socially, how would you describe your own general outlook?”	“Very conservative” and “Very liberal” = 1; “Moderately conservative,” “Middle-of-the-road,” and “Moderately liberal” = 0
Demographics	1999 household income	Less than \$30,000 = 0; \$30,000 - \$49,999 (dummy 1); \$50,000 - \$74,999 (dummy 2); More than \$75,000 (dummy 3); Refuse to state (dummy 4)
	Formal educational attainment	Not a high school graduate = 0; High school graduate (dummy 1); Some college (dummy 2); Bachelor’s degree (dummy 3); Graduate degree (dummy 4)
	Age	Range 18 - 92
	Race	Whites = 0; African Americans (dummy 1); Latinos (dummy 2); Asian Americans (dummy 3); “Other” race (dummy 4)
	Gender	Men = 0; Women = 1

<sup>a</sup> The organizations include: charity or social welfare organization; professional, trade, farm, or business association; hobby, investment, or garden club; youth organization; neighborhood organization; literary, art, or musical group; service or fraternal organization; self-help program; parent association or other school support group; political group; organization affiliated with religion; seniors groups; sports club, league, or outdoor activity club; ethnic, nationality, or civil rights organization; other kinds of clubs or organizations; veterans group; labor union; group that meets over the Internet.

**Table 3. Odds Ratios from the Logistic Regression of Protest Group Membership on Attitudes, Networks, Availability, Politics, and Demographics<sup>a</sup>**

Independent Variables	<i>Consistent Protest Combinations</i>				<i>Inconsistent Protest Combinations</i>			
	P0R0D0	P1R0D0	P1R1D0	P1R1D1	P0R1D0	P1R0D1	P0R0D1	P0R1D1
	<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>
<u>Attitudinal Factors</u>								
Efficacy	.95	1.03	.87	.92	1.03	.95	1.59	1.75
Legitimacy	1.17*	.97	.95	.82*	.98	.71***	.91	.94
<u>Social Network Ties</u>								
Group Involvement	.60*	1.04	1.83***	2.59***	1.58***	1.26	1.11	1.97*
Friendships	.98*	.98	.93	.90	1.35***	.95	1.26	.62
Visit Neighbors	.93*	1.04	1.28**	.93	.95	1.04	.69*	.72
<u>Biographical Availability</u>								
Work Hours (high to low)	1.02*	.97	.97	1.02	1.05	1.00	1.26	1.36
Student (non-student = 0)	.88	1.09	1.71	1.75	.48	1.48	.15	.58
No Children (kids = 0)	1.07	.97	.92	1.16	.97	.71	.85	.54
<u>Conventional Politics</u>								
Political Interest	.57*	1.12*	2.12***	2.21***	1.34**	2.56***	1.02	2.14
Name Senators (unable = 0)	.89	.93	1.51*	1.01	1.19	.82	.51	1.29
Voter Registration (no = 0)	.41	2.26***	2.86***	.71	2.28*	1.31	1.74	3.60
Very Conservative (middle = 0)	.93	.85	.98	1.33	1.28	2.27**	.14	.63
Very Liberal (middle = 0)	.84	.63*	.51*	4.49***	1.08	1.79	1.76	.59
<u>Demographic Controls</u>								
\$30-49.9k (< \$30k = 0)	.91	1.13	1.57	.87	.90	.58	1.32	.91
\$50-74.9k (< \$30k = 0)	.83	1.48**	1.54	1.08	.72	.66	.67	.00
More than \$75k (< \$30k = 0)	.81	1.27	1.25	1.69	1.08	.73	.50	1.69
Refuse to State (< \$30k = 0)	1.05	.76	1.64	.49	1.43	.76	.76	3.18
HS Degree (Not HS grad = 0)	.79	1.83***	.33***	3.34	1.66	.71	2.89	2.28
Some Coll. (Not HS grad = 0)	.63	2.46***	.42***	4.16	1.79	.63	2.22	1.80
Bachelor's (Not HS grad = 0)	.58	2.75***	.36***	3.92	1.56	.65	5.74*	1.64
Graduate (Not HS grad = 0)	.55	1.98**	.54	3.94	1.54	1.65	2.71	.82
Age	1.02***	1.00	.99	.97***	1.00	.96***	.98	.98
African American (white = 0)	1.89	.46***	.37***	2.26*	1.86*	.21*	2.20	3.81
Latino (white = 0)	1.01	.63*	1.07	.64	2.15**	.68	2.51	11.78***
Asian American (white = 0)	.67	1.16	1.98	.67	2.38	.00	3.02	.00
Other Race (white = 0)	1.16	.75	1.12	1.13	.85	.81	1.80	.00
Woman (man = 0)	.83	1.27*	1.52**	.89	.76	.92	.74	.16*
Constant (Unstandardized)	3.27***	-3.00***	-6.34***	-7.42***	-6.91***	-3.80***	-6.17***	-9.58***
-2 Log Likelihood	3063.49	2777.69	1249.97	512.58	1054.48	551.95	345.20	113.94
Cox & Snell R <sup>2</sup>	.24	.07	.10	.07	.04	.05	.02	.02
N = 2782								

\*\*\*p<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05; two-tailed tests

<sup>a</sup> Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors available from author upon request

## Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics

	N <sup>a</sup>	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
P0R0D0	1724	0	1	.57	.49
P1R0D0	660	0	1	.22	.41
P1R1D0	230	0	1	.08	.27
P1R1D1	81	0	1	.03	.16
P0R1D0	159	0	1	.05	.22
P1R0D1	77	0	1	.03	.16
P0R0D1	39	0	1	.01	.11
P0R1D1	15	0	1	.01	.07
Efficacy	3003	1	3	2.11	.75
Legitimacy	2911	0	6	2.51	1.31
Group Involvement	3003	0	4	1.62	1.20
Friendships	2989	1	5	3.36	1.09
Visit Neighbors	2980	1	4	2.62	.97
Work Hours	2981	1	5	3.30	1.50
Student	106	0	1	.04	.18
No Children	1712	0	1	.57	.50
Political Interest	2992	1	4	2.83	1.00
Name Senators	1255	0	1	.42	.49
Voter Registration	2393	0	1	.80	.40
Very Conservative	435	0	1	.15	.35
Middle-Ground	2252	0	1	.75	.43
Very Liberal	223	0	1	.07	.26
Less than \$30k	852	0	1	.28	.45
\$30-49.9k	783	0	1	.26	.44
\$50-74.9k	526	0	1	.18	.38
More than \$75k	562	0	1	.19	.39
Refuse to State	280	0	1	.09	.29
Not High School Graduate	514	0	1	.17	.38
High School Degree	760	0	1	.25	.44
Some College	811	0	1	.27	.45
Bachelor's Degree	588	0	1	.20	.40
Graduate Degree	311	0	1	.10	.31
Age	2954	18	92	44.63	17.24
White	2158	0	1	.72	.45
African American	351	0	1	.12	.32
Latino	303	0	1	.10	.30
Asian American	59	0	1	.02	.14
Other Race	131	0	1	.04	.20
Man	1433	0	1	.48	.50
Woman	1570	0	1	.52	.50
Valid N (listwise)	2782				

<sup>a</sup> Category Ns are presented for dummy variables rather than the total N for the variable